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ABSTRACT

Identity and Counterparthood in a Many Worlds Universe
by
Sophia A.M. Bishop

Advisor: Graham Priest

The Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics - arguably our most powerfully
predictive scientific theory to date - describes a branching Universe composed of an infinite
number of quasi-classical macroscopic physical worlds. Though elegant in its straightforward
rendering of the mechanics, the Many Worlds Interpretation presents a challenge for understanding identity over time. If we wish to preserve the notion of strict numerical identity, we
are faced with the choice between: denying the transitivity of identity; very short-lived lives
with near constant death; or accepting that the world is filled with many more individuals
than we previously dreamed. In adopting a perdurantist account of identity over time, I argue
for this last option. But questions remain about the relationship that branching individuals
have to those from whom they’ve split. In this dissertation, I develop a novel account that I
call Many Worlds Counterparts. This theory takes its inspiration from Lewis’s Counterpart
Theory in offering a modal analysis of de re possibility, but avoids the major challenges that
Lewis’s theory faces.
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Chapter 1
The Measurement Problem
Reality is larger than we can observe. How much so, and what exactly that means is still
largely unclear. But that is the story of quantum mechanics.
At the heart of quantum mechanics lies the Measurement Problem. Quite simply, it seems
that we cannot make complete, non-disruptive observations of a physical system. There
are certain pairs of properties – like position and momentum; angular position and angular
momentum; energy and time – for which the more precisely one half of the pair is determined,
the less precisely the other half can be known (or, according to some interpretations, is even
determined!); if we know one exactly, the error in knowing the other is without bound. Why
this is – and what exactly happens when we try to observe something – is a mystery.
Ironically, our evidence for such limits on our observational powers is rooted in observation; science itself illuminates the boundaries of scientific inquiry. The Double Slit experiment, and more generally, Which Path experiments show electrons behaving badly. That is,
behaving in a way inconsistent with classical mechanics, or with any other preceding scientific theory. It shows them behaving in such a way as is only consistent with an altogether
new understanding of how the universe works.
My aim here is to consider what comes of supposing that The Many Worlds Interpreta1
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tion, which describes a branching Universe composed of an infinite number of quasi-classical
macroscopic physical worlds, is the correct solution to the measurement problem. In Chapter
1, I discuss the experimental foundation of quantum mechanics. Both Double Slit experiments and Which Path experiments give rise to the Measurement Problem. In an effort
to explain the puzzling empirical data that comes out of these experiments, several interpretations of quantum mechanics have emerged, all of which attempt to tell a story that
sets up a correspondence between the quantum state of the Universe and our experiences. I
briefly discuss the most prominent theories, including collapse theories such as the Copenhagen Interpretation and the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory, hidden variables theories such
as Bohmian mechanics, and the literal interpretation, Many Worlds. In Chapter 2, I build on
the Chapter 1 discussion of the Many Worlds Interpretation, and consider the most notable
objections to it.
If the Many Worlds Interpretation is true, then it presents a challenge for understanding
identity over time. I take up this topic in Chapter 3. If we wish to preserve the notion
of strict numerical identity, we are faced with the choice between: denying the transitivity
of identity; very short-lived lives with near constant death; or accepting that the world is
filled with many more individuals than we previously dreamed. In adopting a perdurantist
account of identity over time, I argue in favor of this last option. But questions remain about
the relationship that branching individuals have to those from whom they’ve split, and how
we ought to think of possibility in a Many Worlds Universe. I address the topic of modality
and transworld identity in Chapter 4, before developing in Chapter 5 a novel account of de
re possibility that I call Many Worlds Counterparts. This theory takes its inspiration from
Lewis’s Counterpart Theory, but avoids the major challenges that Lewis’s theory faces.
My aim here is not to defend the Many Worlds Interpretation, so much as to give it the
benefit of the doubt, and ask what comes of it if we do.

2

CHAPTER 1. THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM

1.1

Double Slit Experiment

Consider a setup as follows. On the left, we have a source of electrons. The electron
source points towards an electron-opaque screen (a screen which electrons are unable to pass
through). The only way for an electron to pass through the screen is via one of two slits.
When uncovered, the slits allow for the passage of electrons, but when covered, do not.
Beyond the electron-opaque screen is a fluorescent screen. The fluorescent screen acts as a
detector, lighting up at the point of impact by an electron (figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Double slit setup
Suppose that both slits in the screen are covered. When we turn on our electron source,
not much happens. The fluorescent detector screen registers no impacts, telling us that no
electrons have passed through the electron-opaque screen to impact it. In other words, our
electron-opaque screen is acting as it should.
Now suppose that we uncover one of the slits – let’s call this one the ‘right slit’. When
we turn on our electron source, most of the electrons collide with the electron-opaque screen.
But some of the electrons go through the right slit and collide with the fluorescent detector
3
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screen. After some time of shooting electrons at our apparatus, a noticeable pattern appears
on the fluorescent detector screen – a single band, roughly the size and shape and in direct line
with the right slit. This is totally unremarkable, and just the result that classic mechanics
tells us to expect (figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2: One slit open
We can repeat this process by closing the right slit and opening the other slit – we’ll
call it the ‘left slit’. And, as expected, we obtain similar results (with the band appearing
behind the left slit this time). Again, this is unremarkable (though good) news that the
world behaves as classical mechanics tells us that it should.
Now let’s uncover both slits. What should we expect to see? We know that all of the
electrons that arrive at the fluorescent detector screen will pass through either the right slit
or the left slit. From our previous observations, we know that electrons who arrive at the
fluorescent detector screen via the left slit impact on the detector screen in the rough size and
shape and in direct line with the left slit. We also know that the same is true for electrons
that pass through the right slit, though their impacts on the fluorescent detector screen are
4
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roughly the size and shape and in direct line with the right slit. Since all electrons that
impact the fluorescent detector screen must pass through a slit to do so, and since electrons
are discrete particles that will either pass through one slit, or the other (or else not impact
the fluorescent detector screen at all), we can predict with confidence that when both slits
are open, we expect to see banding that is nothing more or less than the sum of the banding
that appears when the left slit is open and the banding that appears when the right slit is
open. In other words, we expect to see precisely two bands, roughly the size and shape and
in direct line with each of our slits.
But this is not at all what we actually observe. Rather than two bright bands in line
with the slits, there are multiple bands – even bands where there is a 0% chance of electron
impact. This multi-banded pattern resembles a wave interference pattern – somehow, the
electron particles are behaving like waves (figure 1.3) (Albert, 1992)!

Figure 1.3: Expected versus actual
That’s strange.
Classical mechanics tells us there are particles – massive entities like electrons – and
5
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waves – things like electromagnetic fields. And it gives us theorems and laws to describe the
behavior of each. Classical mechanics does not describe anything which is both.
So perhaps we’ve been too hasty in our conclusions here. Maybe, in firing off electrons
from our electron source we’ve just been a bit sloppy. Perhaps the patterns that we’ve
so eagerly described as a wave interference pattern is not wave interference at all, but just
electrons bouncing off each other after passing through the slits because we’ve fired too many
electrons too quickly, and that’s what is producing the banding that we’re seeing.
Luckily, we can easily control for this. Rather than rapidly firing electrons towards our
apparatus, we can fire a single electron at a time. So we do. We fire a single electron at
a time, and we see a single impact at a time on the fluorescent detector screen, as per our
classical expectations of the behavior of particles.
What is not classical is the pattern that emerges over time as we fire single electrons
towards our apparatus. If we fire electrons, one at a time, for long enough, we once again
start to see the banded wave interference pattern (figure 1.4). Single electrons are impacting
the fluorescent detector screen in locations that, according to classical mechanics, they simply
cannot. How can this be? The only thing (that we know of) that creates such a pattern is
wave interference – specifically, a wave that interferes with itself after passing through both
slits. But surely, a single particle cannot pass through both slits. Which means that either
our particles are behaving very badly; our particles are actually waves; or something else
entirely is going on that we have no idea how to describe.
And if the behavior of our electrons is not concerning enough, this experiment has been
done with much larger and more massive entities. We’ve reproduced these results with
atoms. In fact, we’ve done it with fullerene molecules, which are each composed of 810
carbon atoms!

6
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Figure 1.4: Interference pattern with one electron at a time

1.2

Which Path Experiments

But let’s set aside worries of fullerene molecules for the moment; there are more bizarre
stories to tell about our electrons.
Two physical properties of the electron which it happens to be possible to measure with
very great accuracy are: the angular momentum with which the electron is spinning about
an axis which passes through its center and which runs along the x-direction, and the angular
momentum with which the electron is spinning about an axis which passes through its center
and which runs along the y-direction. It also happens to be an empirical fact that the angular
momentum with which the electron is spinning about an axis which passes through its center
and which runs along the x-direction can take one of only two possible values (spin “up”
and spin “down”), and the same is true of the angular momentum with which the electron is
spinning about an axis which passes through its center and which runs along the y-direction.
For the sake of brevity, let’s refer to the angular momentum with which the electron
is spinning about an axis which passes through its center and which runs along the xdirection as the “x-spin” property of the electron, and the angular momentum with which
7
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the electron is spinning about an axis which passes through its center and which runs along
the y-direction, as the “y-spin” property of the electron. Likewise, let’s refer to the two
possible states that the x-spin of the electron can assume as “x-spin up“ and “x-spin down”,
and the two possible states that the y-spin of the electron can assume as “y-spin up” and
“y-spin down”.
It’s possible to build something called an x-spin box which is a device for measuring the
x-spin of an electron. The box has three apertures. Electrons are fed in through the left
aperture, and x-spin up electrons emerge from the aperture x-up, while x-spin down electrons
emerge from the aperture x-down (figure 1.5). Thus, we can determine the x-spin of any
electron fed into our device by its final position. In the same manner, we can build a y-spin
box, with apertures y-up and y-down (Albert, 1992).

Figure 1.5: x-spin box
Measurements using the x-spin and y-spin boxes are repeatable. If an electron fed into
the left aperture of the x-spin box emerges along x-up and is then fed into the left aperture
of another x-spin box (without being tampered with), it will once more emerge along x-up.
This measurement can be repeated indefinitely, and every time the electron will emerge along
x-up, provided no tampering has occurred. The same goes for x-spin down, y-spin up, and
y-spin down electrons.
8
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Furthermore, it turns out that there is no correlation between the x-spin and the y-spin
of an electron. Of any large collection of x-spin up electrons fed into the left aperture of a
y-spin box, half of them will emerge y-up and half of them will emerge y-down. The same
is true of x-spin down electrons. Likewise, of any large collection of y-spin up electrons fed
into the left aperture of a x-spin box, half of them will emerge x-up and half of them will
emerge x-down. It seems that the x-spin of an electron entails nothing about its y-spin, and
that the y-spin of an electron entails nothing about its x-spin.

1.2.1

Experiment 1: Mixed Boxes

Now let’s consider a sequence of three boxes: an x-spin box, then a y-spin box, and then
another x-spin box. Suppose that we feed an electron into the left aperture of the first xspin box, and it emerges along x-down. This electron is then fed into the left aperture of a
y-spin box, and emerges along y-down. Presumably, this electron is known to be both x-spin
down and y-spin down as it is fed into the left aperture of the second x-spin box. Since
we know our x-spin box to be a good measuring device that produces consistent, repeatable
measurements, we expect for the electron to emerge from the second x-spin box along x-down,
since we already measured it to be x-spin down using the first x-spin box. And 50% of the
time, it behaves just as expected. But the other 50% of the time it emerges along x-up!
We can repeat this experiment, starting with x-spin up electrons, and we still get 50% xspin down, 50% x-spin up upon the second x-spin measurement. Nor does it seem to matter
if we have a y-spin-x-spin-y-spin box sequence instead; half the time, the final y-spin box
will spit out y-spin up electrons and half the time, it will spit out y-spin down electrons,
regardless of which path the electrons took out of the first y-spin box.
This is unexpected. It seems that in the case of the x-spin-y-spin-x-spin box sequence,
the y-spin box itself constitutes some sort of tampering (Albert, 1992).
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1.2.2

Experiment 2: Merge Box

Let’s add two new pieces of apparatus to our system: mirrors and a “merge box ”. Both of
these pieces of apparatus change the direction that an electron is traveling.
Mirrors bounce the electron off of themselves at the same angle at which the electron
impacts. An electron which impacts a mirror set perpendicular to its path will bounce off
the mirror and be redirected along the same path, but traveling in the opposite direction.
An electron traveling due east which impacts a mirror set at a 45 degree angle to the path of
the electron will bounce off the mirror with an angle of 45 degrees to the mirror, and travel
due north as a result.
Mirrors change the direction of travel of electrons, but have no impact on their x-spin or
y-spin properties. This is easy enough to confirm with two x-spin (or y-spin) boxes and a
mirror. We can take an x-spin (or y-spin) measurement, bounce the electron off a mirror,
and then take another x-spin (or y-spin) measurement. There is never any change in the
property measured; 100% of electrons that emerge along x-down from our first x-spin box,
emerge along x-down from the second x-spin box after being redirected by the mirror, and
100% of the electrons that emerge along x-up from the first x-spin box emerge along x-up
from the second x-spin box after being redirected by the mirror (and the same is true about
y-spin up and y-spin down electrons if we use two y-spin boxes instead).
A merge box, similar to an x-spin or y-spin box, has three apertures. But rather than
the one input, two outputs of x-spin and y-spin boxes, a merge box has two inputs and one
output. A merge box changes the direction of travel of an electron by merging the paths of
both inputs. Regardless of the input path that an electron travels to the merge box, it will
emerge along the singular output path of the merge box.
Like a mirror, the merge box does not change the x-spin or y-spin properties of an
electron. We can confirm this using the same method that we used to test the mirror, by
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replacing the mirror with a merge box : take an x-spin (or y-spin) measurement, feed the
electron into the merge box, and then take another x-spin (or y-spin) measurement. Once
more, there is never any change in the property measured; merge boxes do not change the
x-spin or y-spin properties of an electron any more than mirrors do.
Now consider the following setup, consisting of a y-spin box, two mirrors, and a merge
box (figure 1.6).

Figure 1.6: Merge box
Feed an electron into the y-spin box. A y-spin up electron will travel along y-up to the
merge box, and emerge along y-up and y-down as a y-spin up electron (since the merge box
does not change the y-spin properties of electrons). Likewise, a y-spin down electron will
travel along y-down to the merge box, and emerge along y-up and y-down as a y-spin down
electron. We can confirm this by setting up yet another y-spin box after the merge box. And
indeed, every electron that travels along y-up and emerges y-up and y-down, is measured to
be y-spin up upon performing another y-spin measurement, and every electron that travels
along y-down and emerges y-up and y-down, is measured to be y-spin down upon performing
another y-spin measurement.
Now let’s feed x-spin down electrons into the y-spin box of our setup (we can determine
an electron is x-spin down by first performing an x-spin measurement on it with a x-spin
11
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box ), and then measure their y-spin at y-up and y-down (by adding another y-spin box after
our merge box at y-up and y-down). What should we expect to see?
From our initial correlation tests, we know that there is no correlation between the y-spin
of an electron and the x-spin of an electron; half of x-spin down electrons are y-spin up upon
measurement, and half are y-spin down upon measurement. So we expect that upon feeding
x-spin down electrons into our apparatus, 50% of those electrons travel along y-up and 50%
of them will travel along y-down – in other words, 50% of x-spin down electrons emerge y-up
and y-down as y-spin up, and 50% emerge y-up and y-down as y-spin down. And we’re not
disappointed – this is exactly the result we obtain (Albert, 1992).
Let’s instead feed a y-spin up electron into our y-spin box, and measure its x-spin at
y-up and y-down (once again, we can accomplish this by adding an extra y-spin box to the
beginning of our setup, and an x-spin box to the end of our setup). Every y-spin up electron
will travel along y-up and emerge y-up and y-down as a y-spin up electron (since there is
nothing along the path which is known to randomize y-spin properties). Again, we know
from our initial correlation tests that half of all y-spin up electrons are found to be x-spin
down upon performing an x-spin measurement, and half of all y-spin up electrons are found
to be x-spin up. Thus, we expect that if we feed only y-spin up electrons into our apparatus,
and then perform an x-spin measurement on them at y-up and y-down, that 50% will be
x-spin down, and 50% will be x-spin up. And again, that is exactly what we see (Albert,
1992).
Now let’s feed x-spin down electrons into the y-spin box of our setup, and take an xspin measurement at the end. We know from our prior experiment that 50% of x-spin
down electrons travel along y-up and emerge y-up and y-down as y-spin up electrons, and
50% of x-spin down electrons travel along y-down and emerge y-up and y-down as y-spin
down electrons. We also know from our Mixed Boxes experiment that inserting a y-spin
box between two x-spin boxes randomizes x-spin. So while we start out with all x-spin down
12
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electrons, if we feed them into a y-spin box, and then perform another x-spin measurement
upon them (via an x-spin box ), we expect to end up with half x-spin down electrons and
half x-spin up electrons. Since our current setup is really no more than an x-spin box, y-spin
box, x-spin box sequence (with some redirection equipment thrown in), we expect that upon
taking an x-spin measurement at y-up and y-down, 50% of our initially x-spin down electrons
will be x-spin down, and 50% of them will be x-spin up. But this time, our results are not
as expected – 100% of the initially x-spin down electrons fed into the apparatus are x-spin
down at y-up and y-down. And this is a bit puzzling (Albert, 1992).
Let’s try to think this through.
We have every reason to believe that the electrons are moving through the apparatus that is, there don’t seem to be any electrons that go missing, nor any that seem to materialize
out of the blue. For every electron we feed into our initial y-spin down box, exactly one
electron emerges at y-up and y-down, no more, and no fewer. Given this, there seem to be
four possibilities to account for the path an initially x-spin down electron could take through
the apparatus: the electron travels along y-up to y-up and y-down; the electron travels along
y-down to y-up and y-down; the electron travels along both y-up and y-down to y-up and
y-down; or the electron travels along neither y-up nor y-down to y-up and y-down (in which
case we have no idea what is going on). The first two possibilities are quite ordinary, and
what we’ve come to expect from electrons. Thus, it is a good place to begin our investigation.

1.2.3

Experiment 3: Merge Box with Wall

We can learn quite a bit about the path of our electrons by adding one more piece of
equipment to our apparatus: a sliding wall on a track that intersects path y-down (figure
1.7). This wall is impenetrable to electrons. By placing it on a track, we have the option of
sliding the wall “in” to intersect with y-down, or sliding the wall “out” so as not to intersect
with y-down. When the wall is “out” our apparatus is precisely the same as it was earlier –
13
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electrons are able to travel along y-up or y-down to y-up and y-down. When the wall is “in,”
all electrons traveling along y-down get stopped, and only those electrons traveling along
y-up get to y-up and y-down. As such, we can determine whether our electrons travel along
y-up or along y-down to reach y-up and y-down. Perhaps this path information can help
explain our previous Merge Box experiment results.

Figure 1.7: Merge box with wall
Considering our previous results, there are a couple of expectations we have for the
outcome of an x-spin measurement taken at y-up and y-down when the wall is “in” and we
feed only x-spin down electrons into our y-spin box. Firstly, we should expect that 50% fewer
electrons will emerge from y-up and y-down than we start with. After all, we know from
1.2.1 that when a y-spin measurement is performed on an x-spin down electron, half of those
electrons are measured to be y-spin up, and half of them are measured to be y-spin down.
In other words, half of our initially x-spin down electrons take y-up and half take y-down.
But as y-down is blocked by our wall, only those electrons which take y-up actually arrive
at y-up and y-down. And the electrons which take y-up are only half of the total electrons
fed into our y-spin box.
Additionally, we can reason about the x-spin of the electrons that arrive at y-up and
y-down with the wall in. When the wall is out, 100% of the initially x-spin down electrons
we feed into the y-spin box turn out to be x-spin down upon an x-spin measurement at y-up
14
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and y-down, as we saw in 1.2.2. This means that all of the electrons that take y-down turn
out to be x-spin down, and all of the electrons that take y-up turn out to be x-spin down.
Whether or not the wall is in or out along y-down should have no effect on the x-spins of
electrons traveling along y-up. Thus, we can reason that all of the electrons that arrive at
y-up and y-down - that is, the 50% that take y-up – should all be x-spin down, since with
the wall out 100% of them are x-spin down, and 50% of them take y-up.
Yet again, our results are not as expected. We do see a 50% reduction in the number
of electrons at y-up and y-down. However, upon taking an x-spin measurement of these
electrons, we do not find that all of them are x-spin down as we expect. Rather, only 50%
of them are x-spin down, and the other 50% of them are x-spin up – the original expectation
that we had when we first performed the Merge Box experiment with x-spin down electrons
in 1.2.2. And nothing changes if we place our track and wall so it intersects with y-up rather
than y-down - we still get the 50-50 split on x-spin measurements. Rather than helping to
explain our Merge Box experiment results, we’ve only muddied the waters further (Albert,
1992).
Let’s consider again the possible routes that an electron passing through the apparatus
with the wall out could have taken: an electron could travel along y-up, along y-down, along
both y-up and y-down, or along neither y-up nor y-down. We know from the Merge Box
with Wall experiment that the electron could not have taken y-up, as electrons which take
y-up are known to have the property that their x-spin statistics are 50% x-spin down and
50% x-spin up at y-up and y-down, whereas an electron passing through the apparatus with
the wall out is known definitively to be x-spin down at y-up and y-down. Likewise, we know
that the electron could not have taken y-down, since y-down also has 50-50 x-spin statistics.
So it seems that our electron either takes both y-up and y-down, or takes neither y-up nor
y-down.
We have a straighforward method to test out the “neither” hypothesis. Using our existing
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pieces of equipment, we can wall up both y-up and y-down simultaneously, and see what
happens. If our electrons take neither y-up nor y-down, then we should expect that despite
the walls, electrons still arrive at y-up and y-down, as they are taking some other unknown
route to get there. Perhaps fortunately, that is not what happens. When we wall up both
y-up and y-down, not a single electrons arrives at y-up and y-down. So it seems that our
electrons are dependent on the paths y-up and y-down to arrive at y-up and y-down, and
thus it would be inaccurate to say that the electrons take neither y-up nor y-down.
And so remains one final option: the possibility that the electron takes both y-up and
y-down. What does this look like? Perhaps the electron splits in half, and one half of the
single, split electron takes each route. Or perhaps the electron multiplies, and there are two
electrons, one taking each route. Either way, we can stop the experiment while an electron
is in the midst of passing through the apparatus and check to see where it is. When we do,
we always find a single electron, definitely located on either y-up or on y-down. We never
find two halves of a single, split electron; nor do we find two electrons, one on each route;
nor anything else out of the ordinary. We do not see anything to suggest any sense in which
the electron seems to be taking both routes.

And so we have exhausted our current understanding of the space of logical possibilities.

1.3

Physics Reimagined

Experiments like the Double Slit experiment and Which Paths experiments mean that the
scientific community has to face a troubling realization: the Universe is not classical. Our
picture of well-behaved bodies that follow singular, definite, deterministic trajectories in
accordance with classical mechanics, is wrong. Despite our best efforts, classical mechanics
cannot account for the behavior of our electrons. So what to do?
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Enter quantum mechanics.
Quantum mechanics is our attempt to account for the classically-unexplainable data and
reconcile that data with our experiences.
Quantum mechanics describes nature in terms of the behaviors of microscopic particles.
At its core is a complex wave function which mathematically specifies all of the possible
outcomes of a measurement on a system. These different possibilities are together referred
to as the state space of the system. For every possible state, the wave function assigns an
amplitude. The absolute value of the square of this amplitude is the weight of that state.
Empirically, this weight seems to correspond to the probability distribution of states that
we observe.1
For instance, we might have the following wave function for the x-spin of an electron:
1
1
Ψ = √ |upi + √ |downi2
2
2

(1.1)

We would expect that if we measured a large number of electrons, we would find that
upon measurement 50% of them are x-spin up (as the wave function specifies a weight of
√1
2

for the state |upi), and 50% are x-spin down (as the wave function specifies a weight of

√1
2

for the state |downi). This mixed state is known as a superposition of the two distinct

possibilities we would have in classical mechanics.
Superpositions give us a fifth possibility to explain what is going on with the electron
passing through our apparatus with the wall out in 1.2.3. Recall that we ruled out the
possibilities that the electrons travel along up, down, both up and down, and neither up
1

Traditionally, the weight of each term has been described as the probability of obtaining a measurement
of that state. But this description, as we shall see later, is itself interpretation-laden. I have tried to be
interpretation-neutral here in my description. But it’s worthwhile to know that the stochastic Copenhagen
Interpretation (which has been long taught as the “standard” interpretation of quantum mechanics) treats
these weights as the probabilities of obtaining those states upon measurement.
2
The language of quantum mechanics is vector calculus, and the state space is typically expressed as a
vector sum.
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nor down. In a classical world, we’ve exhausted the space of logical possibilities. But in a
quantum world, we have a new possibility: the electrons are in a superposition of traveling
along up and down.
What this means is not exactly clear. Our electron’s quantum state is described by
a superposition of the two distinct possibilities we would have in classical mechanics. A
superposition is a state of intrinsic quantum indeterminacy, and it’s the best way we have
of describing the location of our electrons. It’s not that our electrons are traveling on both
up and down at once (recall that we ruled that out); it’s that there is no single place where
the electrons are. In quantum mechanics, there is no fact of the matter about where the
electrons (or anything else) are located. The state space given by the wave function is the
best description we have of the reality of the electrons.
It’s worthwhile to pause for a moment here to reflect on just how weird superpositions
are. We can imagine that a cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following
diabolical device (which must be secured against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger
counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the course
of one hour one of the atoms decays, but also, with equal probability, perhaps none. If it
happens, the counter tube discharges, and through a relay releases a hammer which shatters
a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this entire system to itself for an hour, one
would say that the cat still lives if meanwhile no atom has decayed. The wave function of
the entire system would express this by having in it a superposition of the living cat and the
dead cat in equal parts (Schrödinger, 1935).
This thought experiment shows that quantum theory is in conflict with some very powerful common sense beliefs we have about macro-sized objects such as cats - they cannot be
both dead and alive in any sense whatsoever. The bizarreness of superpositions in the atomic
world is worrisome enough, says Schrödinger, but when it implies that same bizarreness at
an everyday level, it is intolerable.
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Of course, we don’t see objects in superpositions – we see them definitely located. According to quantum mechanics, what we can observe about the world is only a tiny part of
what actually exists. In the classical world, it might be difficult to obtain a precise measurement; but there is nothing in classical physics that ultimately prevents us from being careful
and thus, successful. In quantum mechanics, on the other hand, there is an unavoidable
obstacle to making complete and nondisruptive observations of a physical system - it simply
can’t be done. This is the measurement problem. What exactly happens when we try to
observe something, and what actually counts as a “meaurement” are the big questions. How
to reconcile what quantum mechanics is telling us with our real-world experience is one of
the foremost challenges of any interpretation.

1.3.1

Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

Quantum mechanics exists in two parts: the mechanics itself - that is, the mathematical
core that forms the basis of our physical laws - and an interpretation of those mechanics - a
theory that marries the bare mechanics to our experiences of the world.
Physicists are completely confident in the mechanics itself – they can build theories,
make predictions, and test against experiments, and there is never any ambiguity along
the way. Nevertheless, we’re not completely sure we know what quantum mechanics really
means. This mysteriousness has spawned several interpretations of quantum mechanics –
and there’s no consensus about which interpretation is correct.
Contrast this a moment with classical mechanics. You don’t hear of “interpretations
of classical mechanics” because we understand both its physical and metaphysical commitments. Quantum mechanics is different. The single, basic difference: what we can observe
about the world is only a tiny part of what actually exists.
And that leads to a plethora of problems.
At its core, our entire scientific method relies on observation. When our primary method
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of scientific inquiry is no longer sufficient for describing the nature of reality, science comes
to a bit of an impasse. No longer can we rely on experimental data to adjudicate between
competing theories. Instead, the discussion becomes a bit murkier and mired in the realm
of metaphysics – an uncomfortable place, to be sure, for most scientists.
And so we arrive at interpretations of quantum mechanics. We have some experimental
data that any theory must account for – the seemingly paradoxical behavior of things like
electrons, and the meaning of the Schrödinger equation – but otherwise, theory choice here
relies on vague qualitative concepts like elegance, simplicity, cohesiveness. Out of the mire
rise four leading interpretations of the mechanics: two collapse-based theories, the Copenhagen Interpretation and the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber Interpretation; Bohmian mechanics, a
theory which purports that the matter is largely epistemic; and the Many Worlds Interpretation, which claims to interpret the mechanics literally. Of these, I argue, it is the Many
Worlds Interpretation that is the most interestingly promising.

1.3.2

The Copenhagen Interpretation

The Copenhagen Interpretation, long-treated as the ‘standard’ interpretation of quantum
mechanics, claims that when a quantum system is subjected to an observation or measurement, its wave function collapses. The wave function goes instantaneously from describing a
superposition of the various possible observational outcomes, each with non-zero probability
assignment, to a completely different wave function, one that assigns 100% probability to
the outcome that was actually measured (the eigenstate), and 0% to anything else. Once we
measure the system in an eigenstate, it will remain there and we can repeat the measurement with the same results (unless we tamper with it in some way as to put it back into a
superposition). The reason why we never see things in superpositions is because as soon as
we look, the wave function collapses, and they are no longer in one (Faye, 2019).
Let’s go back to our previous experiments. Recall from our Mixed Boxes experiment
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in 1.2.1 that measuring the x-spin of an electron randomizes the y-spin. Within quantum
mechanics, there are certain pairs of properties (e.g. position and momentum; angular
position and angular momentum; energy and time) for which it’s not possible for us to know
both values precisely, simultaneously. The greater the confidence we have in the measurement
of one property, then less we have in the other. The x-spin and y-spin properties that we’ve
been using here are such a pair. When we measure the y-spin of an electron, its x-spin
properties are in a superposition of x-spin up and x-spin down. If we then measure the
x-spin of that same electron, according to the Copenhagen Interpretation, the wave function
describing the x-spin properties collapses to describe a single state (either x-spin up or x-spin
down), and it’s y-spin properties evolve into a superposition of y-spin up and y-spin down.
This is why in 1.2.1 we see that only 50% our initially x-spin down electrons are measured
to be x-spin down upon the second x-spin measurement after being measured by a y-spin
box.
During the Merge Box experiment in 1.2.2, the x-spin down electrons are in a superposition of y-spin up and y-spin down. Though we feed these electrons into an y-spin box,
no measurement on their y-spin is actually taken, since the merge box effectively destroys
the measurement. According to the Copenhagen Interpretation, as long as we never look
to see which path the x-spin down electrons take, their wave function doesn’t collapse and
the y-spin properties remain in a superposition of y-spin up and y-spin down, and thus their
x-spin remains x-spin down – hence, we observe 100% x-spin down electrons from the merge
box. But if we attempt to observe, measure, record, or otherwise “look” for the path the
electrons take (by either removing the merge box or adding the wall), we collapse the wave
function of the electrons, and they are no longer in the superposition of y-spin up and y-spin
down. And since we now know the y-spin properties of our electrons with certainty, we no
longer know anything of the x-spin properties – despite knowing them with certainty just
moments before.
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A similar story is told about the Double Slit experiment from 1.1. If we leave both slits
open, the electrons behave like literal waves, and are in a superposition of traveling through
the right slit and the left slit. Thus, we wind up with the wave interference pattern that
we see. However, if we attempt to observe which slit the electron travels through (either by
blocking off a slit, or some other means of detection), we collapse the wave function of the
electron (which describes a superposition of traveling through both slits), and instead find
a single, definitley located particle.
According to the Copenhagen Interpretation, simply observing a particle changes it.
The Copenhagen Interpretation fits the data. If we imagine that wave functions collapse
every time we make an observation – no matter how unobtrusive our observational strategy
may be – and that they end up in eigenstates that assign 100% probability to the outcome
we observed, we successfully account for all of the various quantum phenomena known to
physicists.
The problem is, this story barely makes sense.
The Copenhagen Interpretation depends on observation and measurement to trigger collpase of the wave function. But what counts as “observation” or “measurement”? Neither
of these concepts is well-defined by the scientific community. Moreover, how does this even
work? The Copenhagen Interpretation gives us no explanation for how observation and
measurement collpase the wavefunction. Surely, electrons don’t know that they’re being
watched. And we don’t want to suggest that the phenomenon of consciousness is somehow playing a crucial role in the fundamental laws of physics. But short of just declaring
observation to be magical, it seems that we are at a loss for explanation.
And about that collapse - the evolution of the wave function (and thus the state space it
describes), is governed by the Schrödinger equation. The Schrödinger equation is deterministic, unitary, and linear. The mechanics, given by the Schrödinger equation, do not describe
any collapses of the wave function. In order to get collapse into the theory, the Copenhagen
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Interpretation has to add an additional rule to the mechanics – the collapse postulate – to
explain the observational outcomes.
The collapse postulate concludes that there are two fundamental laws about how the
state of quantum mechanical systems evolve (rather that the one that we are familiar with
- the Schrödinger equation):
1. When no measurements are going on, the states of all physical systems
invariably evolve in accordance with the dynamical equations of motion.
2. When there are measurments going on, the states of the measured systems
evolve in accordance with the postulate of collapse, not in accordance with
the dynamical equations of motion. (Albert, 1992, 80)
The collapse postulate treats observation as a distinct kind of natural phenomenon, one
that requires a separate law of nature. It’s been invented as a mechanism to account for
unexpected data, but explains nothing further than that, and has no basis or other connection
to the rest of the mechanics. The collapse postulate stinks of being ad hoc.
Furthermore, according to the Copenhagen Interpretation, the world is no longer deterministic. The Schrödinger equation describes a smooth, determinsitic evolution of the wave
function. There is no collapse, and information is conserved. But the collapse postulate
introduces a stochastic element into the evolution of the world. In adopting the collapse
postulate, information is lost: two very different wave systems can collapse to exactly the
same state when an observation is made. Collapse is irreversible.
The Copenhagen Interpretation certainly “works” - that is to say, we can go about treating unobserved systems as though they evolve in accordance with the Schrödinger equation,
and treating observed systems as collapsing to particular states with a probability distribution of the amplitude squared of those states. In speaking the language of the Copenhagen
Interpretation we can get along perfectly well in making predictions about the behavior of
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electrons. But the cost seems to be additional laws and forces of nature, the likes of which
we’ve birthed from deseperation, without any further explanatory depth.

1.3.3

Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber

The Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory also employs wave function collapse, but manages to
avoid the problems of ascribing collapse to measurement or observation. Instead, GRW
claims that the wave function collapse happens spontaneously, albeit rarely – for an individual particle, this is something on the order of once every one hundred million years. While
spontaneous collapse of any given particle from a superposition to a stable state is rare,
due to the extraordinary number of particles involved in any macroscopic system – like a
measuring apparatus – it is highly likely that at least one particle in the system will experience a spontaneous collapse. And because of the quantum phenomenon of entanglement,
the collapse of a single particle collapses the wave function of the entire system (Ghirardi,
2018).
Entanglementis another unusual, but now well-accepted, feature of quantum theory.
When particles interact with each other, they influence and limit the degrees of freedom
of the other particles around them. Two (or more) particles are said to be entangled when
their quantum states cannot be described independently from one another; it’s the quantum
version of a co-dependent relationship.
GRW relies on entanglement to explain the different results from the Merge Box experiment of 1.2.2 versus the Merge Box with the wall “in” of 1.2.3. It claims that when we add
just the merge box to the system, the electrons do not become entangled with the measuring
apparatus. So when we feed x-spin down electrons into our setup, we get x-spin down electrons at y-spin up and y-spin down, because none of these electrons experience spontaneous
collapse (which, afterall, for any given electron is incredibly rare). However, when we add in
the wall, GWR claims that the initially x-spin down electrons become maximally entangled
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with our measuring apparatus, and somewhere during the experiment, one of the trillions of
particles in the entangled system experiences spontaneous collapse, thereby collapsing the
wave function of all the particles with which it is entagled, including our electrons. We never
observe superpositions because the moment we go to look for one, the superposed particles
become entangled with the particles of a macroscopic system. And since the macroscopic
system has trillions of particles, it’s extrememly likely that at least one of those particles will
spontaneously collapse, thereby collapsing the entire system, including our electron. Thus,
if we leave the electron alone (i.e. we don’t attempt measure or observe it), then it remains
unentangled and in a superposition of y-spin up and y-spin down; when we try to measure
the y-spin (by inserting the wall to determine its path), however, our electron becomes entangled with the measuring apparatus, which experiences the spontaneous collapse of one of
its particles, and so collapses the wave function of our electron to an eigenstate.
While GRW improves upon the Copenhagen Interpretation by moving away from the
imprecise talk of ‘observations’ and ‘measurement,’ it still suffers from many of the other
ills that befall Copenhagen. The GRW theory still feels very ad hoc; no attempt is made
to explain the occurrence of these collapses. They just happen, randomly, rarely. And how
rarely is simply a product of coming up with a number that’s rare enough so as to explain
why the collapse doesn’t occur in single particle systems, but does occur in macroscopic
systems – there’s no other external justification to support such a statistic. Nothing in
our deterministic quantum laws describes this stochastic collapse, let alone supports this
particular probability of its occurence. Once more, we are inventing new laws of nature, in
a muddled attempt to explain the experimental data, and making a radical departure from
the previous laws and the deterministic evolution of the Schrödinger equation.
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1.3.4

Bohmian Mechanics

Bohmian mechanics, also know as the de Broglie-Bohm theory or pilot-wave theory takes a
radically different approach to the measurement problem by denying any physical reality to
superpositions, and instead claiming that superposition is simply epistemic uncertainty. In
fact, its metaphysics is exactly that of classical mechanics (Goldstein, 2017).
Bohmian mechanics stipulates that particles are always definitely located. The wave
function is not a description of the particle’s evolution, but rather a separate physical object,
somewhat like a force field. Wave equations act on particles to guide them through physical
space.
According to Bohmian mechanics, spin properties are taken to be mathematical properties of the wave functions. In the region just outside of the y-spin box, the y-spin up and
y-spin down branches of the y-spin wave function overlap. But because of how the y-spin box
has been constructed, within the box, the up and down branches are pulled apart. Which
route an initially x-spin down electron will take is fully determined by its initial wave function
and position. In the region of overlap, if the electron’s position is just slightly biased towards
the direction that the up branch of the wave function travels, then the electron will travel
along up; if its position is just slightly biased towards the direction that the down branch of
the wave function travels, then the electron will travel along down. And the electron must
be biased towards one side of the region or the other, as the probability that it isn’t is 0.
Moreover, an electron that emerges from the y-spin box along up will emerge from another
y-spin box along up, so long as we’ve done nothing to reunite the branches of the wave
function. When we add a merge box, our electrons still deterministically travel along either
up or along down, but the merge box reunites the up and down branches of the wave function
so that it is identical to the region just outside of the y-spin box aperture. Thus, we start
with 100% x-spin down electrons, and we end up with 100% x-spin down electrons. But
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when we put the wall in, the down branch of the wave function is blocked from reuniting
with the up branch at the merge box. Instead, only the up branch of the wave function
reaches up and down – and the up branch of the wave function is different from the x-spin
down branch, so we no longer have 100% x-spin down electrons, but rather a mixture of
x-spin down and x-spin up once again.
Bohmian mechanics is certainly a more promising theory than either the Copenhagen
Interpretation or the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory. Bohmian mechanics is able to account
for the seemingly paradoxical behaviors of our electrons without having to posit new types
of fundamental laws; but it does so at the cost of creating a new type of force (for lack
of a better description). While this might be uncomfortable, it’s certainly not a knockout
criticism.
More concerning, Bohmian mechanics, as it stands today, presents conflicts with relativity
and quantum field theory (Goldstein, 2017). Bohmian mechanics is distincitly classical, while
our most up-to-date physics, is not. Perhaps a Bohmian field theory will be proposed, but
until then, Bohmian mechanics strikes us as a promising theory that falls short.

1.3.5

The Many Worlds Interpretation

Unlike the other interpretations we’ve discussed, the Many Worlds Interpretation attempts
to take seriously the bare quantum mechanics, rather than tacking additional theortical
framework onto the Schrödinger equation.
The Many Worlds Interpretation denies wave function collapse, and insists that the ordinary, smooth evolution of the wave function suffices to explain everything we know about the
world. Quantum phenomena cause a splitting of the wave function into its various possible
outcomes – this splitting produces “many worlds.” A world is the totality of macroscopic
objects: stars, cities, people, grains of sand, etc. in a definite classically described state
(Vaidman, 2018).
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Like GRW, MWI relies on quantum entanglement to play a crucial role in explaining why
we don’t directly observe superpositions. MWI claims that observers are entangled with the
system that they are observing. When you make an observation of a quantum phenomenon,
“the world” splits into multiple “worlds,” one for each of the various possible observational
outcomes. And what you think of as “you” splits into different worlds, too.
When we feed the x-spin down electrons into our setup with the merge box, the electrons
are in a superposition of traveling along up and traveling along down, in a single macroscopic
world. But when we attempt to observe which path an electron takes (by removing the
merge box or putting in the wall), we become entangled with the electron’s state. This
entanglement, via decoherence (which I will say more about in Chapter 2), leads to a splitting
of the single macroscopic world into two macroscopic worlds – one in which we observe the
electron traveling along up and the other in which we observe the electron traveling along
down. Both worlds exist, but are distinct.
For MWI, there is no collapse, the wave function evolves smoothly, and there is nothing
special about the process of observation. Moreover, the entire procedure is reversible – given
the final state, we could use the Schrödinger equation to uniquely recover the initial state; no
information is lost. MWI does not postualte new fundamental laws, nor new forces. In fact,
MWI is the only interpretation to take the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics
- the bit of quantum theory that is completely uncontroversial and well-understood - at face
value. It takes the mechanics literally. And if there is a plausible, literal explanation of the
mechanics, then it seems that we ought to prefer that to an ontologically heavier one.

1.3.6

Against Instrumentalism

Perhaps science is deeply flawed. In running these experiments, we have been operating
under the assumption that our results reveal to us something about the nature of reality.
After all, the conventional picture of science is one of metaphysical commitment. Scientific
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theories claim to give us information about the universe – about what sorts of things there
are in it, about how they are structured, about how they come into existence and interact
and change and disappear. This is what science is about; that is what every scientific theory
does.
But perhaps this assumption is where our error lies. Perhaps the lesson to be learned from
our electron’s bad behavior is that this view of the scientific project is optimistic and naı̈ve.
Perhaps, as the instrumentalist will argue, the function of science is nothing more than the
predicting of experimental results. If so, then quantum mechanics succeeds brilliantly, end
of story.
As we’ve seen already, quantum mechanics brings to the table two bits: the mechanics,
and the theory. The mechanics – that is, the math that predicts the behavior of things like
electrons – we have pretty well worked out. In fact, it’s fair to say that the mathematics of
quantum mechanics is the most powerfully predictive theory to date in the history of science.
It really is quite remarkable. And the instrumentalist will have you believe that good math
that makes accurate predictions is the end. The mechanics works, and there is quite simply
nothing more to the say about it.
Historically, instrumentalism has certainly tempted many serious students of quantum
mechanics, who have taken the difficulites in giving a realist reading of quantum mechanics
as evidence that the theory is simply not in the business of giving us a description of the
world. Fuchs and Peres (2000) make the point eloquently:
We have learned something new when we can distill from the accumulated data
a compact description of all that was seen and an indication of which further
experiments will corroborate that description. This is what science is about. If,
from such a description, we can further distill a model of a free-standing “reality”
independent of our interventions, then so much the better. Classical physics is
the ultimate example of such a model. However, there is no logical necessity
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for a realistic worldview to always be obtainable. If the world is such that we
can never identify a reality independent of our experimental activity, then we
must be prepared for that, too . . . [Q]uantum theory does not describe physical
reality. What it does is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for the
macroscopic events (“detector clicks”) that are the consequences of our experimental interventions. This strict definition of the scope of quantum theory is the
only interpretation ever needed, whether by experimenters or theorists.(Fuchs
and Peres, 2000)
And if that is your leaning, then I likely won’t convince you otherwise here. However, I
will offer this: whether or not this “strict definition” is the only interpretation every needed
by physicists, it fails to do justice to the actual practice of physics. Physicists talk constantly
about the microscopic world. They discuss the mass of the Higgs boson, describe tracks made
in cloud chambers by pions, discuss the creation and destruction of various species of quasiparticles in various kinds of matter. But the Fuchs-Peres proposal has no need for such talk,
except as a mere façon de parler - and that doesn’t seem to accord with how physicists do
physics.
Furthermore, it’s hard to see how the split between the quantum and classical required
by instrumentalism is really coherent. Isn’t classical physics supposed to be in some sense a
limiting case of quantum physics? Don’t we know rahter a lot about exactly how classical
physics emerges from quantum physics (I will take this explanation up in Chapter 2)? And
aren’t macroscopic objects like measuring devieces supposed to be composed of microscopic
objects like atoms, in a way which physicists and materials scientists understand fairly well?
Additionally, there is another problem for instrumentalism when it comes specifically
to quantum mechanics: quantum cosmology. It has been clear for several decades that
any forumulation of quantum mechanics which gives a special role to measurement will have
grave difficulties with quantum cosmology. Measurement presupposes an external measuring
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process, but the subject matter of cosmology is the Universe as a whole. An instrumentalist
account which treats quantum mechanics as being just a method for predicting the results of
measurements on a system will be pretty hopeless when that system incorporates everything
there is (Hawking, 1976) and (Hartle, 2010).
Of course, this doesn’t then require us to be realists about quantum mechanics. One
might choose to adopt a construtive empiricist approach to quantum physics instead. This
position, developed by van Frassen (1980) claims that while our scientific theories should
be understood in realist terms, this undertanding does not commit us to the belief in the
claim of these theories when we use them. Crucially, constructive empiricism interprets
theories in precisely the same manner as realism. The antirealism of the position is due
entirely to its epistemology - it recommends belief in our best theories only insofar as they
describe observable phenomena, and is satisfied with an agnostic attitude regarding anything
unobservable. The constructive empiricist thus recognizes claims about unobservables as true
or false, but feels no need to believe or disbelieve them. Thus, while I do not think this is a
successful approach to quantum mechanics, nonetheless, the constructive empircist has just
as much reason as the realist to study the Many Worlds Interpretation, because it solves the
measurement problem for constructive empiricists if and only if it does so for realists.
So we have a choice: we can write off the idea that the scientific project offers us a
description of the universe, or we can attempt to craft a consistent story to explain what
is going on. While instrumentalists will take the first horn, and write off the quantum
mechanics as nothing more than an algorithm for computing probabilities for the macroscopic
consequences of our experiments, I think this is a poor route to go down. The motivation for
scientists seems to be the explanation of phenomena; not merely predictive success. And this
shows in just how successful we’ve been – the scientific project has arguably been the most
empirically powerful endeavor of our species. It seems unlikely that we could have become
so good at experimental predictions without any understanding of how the world is.
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And if that is unconvincing, then there is a quite simple reason to adopt a realist attitude
towards science: it’s just so much more interesting to do so. The instrumentalist story stops
here; but the realist story has so much more to tell.
Nonetheless, it is not my intention here to turn the instrumentalist (or the constructive
empiricist) into a realist, but rather to assume a realist understanding of scientific inquiry
and see what we can make of it. And to that end, quantum mechanics presents us with quite
the puzzle indeed.
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The Many Worlds Interpretation
The Many Worlds Interpretation is perhaps ill-named. Unlike other interpretations of quantum mechanics, its aim is not to “interpret” the quantum mechanical data at all. Instead,
the aim of the Many Worlds Interpretation is to take the mechanics at face value. After all,
this is what happens in every other area of scientific inquiry.
It’s worth considering for a moment just how different the treatment of quantum mechanics has been in comparison with other areas of science. Consider the field of paleontology.
Very little has been written (and very little needs to be written) on the interpretation of
paleontology. There is no mystery at all about what the claims of our best theory of dinosaurs are supposed to be: they are supposed to be about dinosaurs. That is, they are
quite literally to be telling us about the giant animals that we believed once roamed the
Earth tens of millions of years ago. Nobody seriously believes that ‘dinosaurs’ are just a
calculational device intended to tell us about fossils. The purpose of paleontology is to make
certain factual claims about certain aspects of the world. And furthermore, since we have
good reason to think that our best theory of dinosaurs is a pretty good theory, we have good
reason to think that the factual claims that paleontology makes about the world are true.
And almost all of science is like this. High-energy astrophysics tells us about quasar
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emission jets. Nobody studies quasars in order to better predict the X-ray spectrum. Molecular biology tells us about DNA strands. Nobody studies molecular biology to better predict
the behavior of the mass spectrometer. The point of high-energy astrophysics, of molecular
biology, of science writ large, is to understand and make claims about the way the world is.
What scientific theories do is give us information about the universe – about what sort of
things are in it, about how they are structured, about how they come into existence and
interact and change and disappear. This is what science is about.
That is, with one notable exception. Quantum mechanics is treated differently. At first
sight, it is impossible to understand quantum mechanics as telling us objective facts about
the world. At best, it seems to be telling us about the results of experiments we can perform,
and to be telling us about them in an unsatisfactorily ad hoc way. At worst, it seems to be
telling us plain nonsense, claiming that somehow things can be in two places at once, and
that cats can be alive and dead simultaneously.
And so we resort to interpreting quantum mechanics. Scientists take the mechanics –
arguably the most powerful, most accurate, and most fruitful theory that physics has ever
devised – and they replace it with one where notions of measurement and observation play
a central role. That is, science treats quantum mechanics in a different – and unprecedented
– way from all other scientific study. It revises the conventional picture of science itself by
claiming that our best scientific theory to date isn’t actually describing the world.
The Many Worlds Interpretation aims to fix this.
The Many Worlds Interpretation purports to establish a theory of quantum mechanics
which takes the quantum formalism at face value without postulating additional theory. In
the following pages, I will provide a brief overview of the Many Worlds Interpretation, in
particular how decoherence leads to a multiplicity of quasi-classical worlds, and how we get
probability within a deterministic theory. My aim in this chapter to provide the reader
with the relevant background to engage in the philosophical considerations that the Many
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Worlds Interpretation, if correct, brings forth in Chapters 3 through 5. I do not intend the
following discussion to be an ironclad defense of the Many Worlds Interpretation – there has
been much ink spilled to such ends already, by many better suited to do so than myself.
Nothing in this chapter will be new to those already well-acquainted with the Many Worlds
Interpretation; I do not pretend to have the expertise to add meaningfully to the physics
of quantum theory. My goal is to look deeper at such existent theories and consider their
philosophical implications.
While I do not intend here to defend the claim that the Many Worlds Interpretation is
true, nor even that it is the best theory of quantum mechanics on offer (though I do hold
both such beliefs myself), I do hope to persuade the open-minded reader to seriously consider
that it might be both the best theory of the quantum data and even, perhaps, true.
Nonetheless, the work of this dissertation is couched as a hypothetical: If the Many
Worlds Interpretation is true (that is, the Many Worlds Interpretation accurately describes
reality), then what implications does that have for identity across time?

2.1

Interpreting Quantum Mechanics

Any interpretation of quantum mechanics consists of two parts:
i. A mathematical theory which yields the time evolution of the quanum state of the
Universe.
ii. A prescription which sets up a correspondence between the quantum state of the Universe and our experiences.
Part (i) - the quantum algorithm - is essentially given to us by the Schrödinger equation,
which produces a wave function that picks out a deterministic, dynamical evolution of the
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Universe. It is a rigorous mathematical theory whose deployment and usage to make predictions is well understood, remarkably powerful and accurate, and not at all problematic
philosophically.
But in certain instances - quantum events - the wave function describes an evolution
of the Universe into superpositions of mixed classically-definite states - states that seem to
describe a cat as being simultaneously both alive and dead, or an electron traveling along
both y-up and y-down. The trouble starts here because we don’t actually ever see these
superpositions. We can detect them - by the interference patterns in a two-slit experiment
for instance - and the quantum algorithm describes them as happening, but if we attempt
to actually observe them, we only ever find objects in definite, classically-defined states. We
never actually find a cat simultaneously both dead and alive, despite the quantum formalism
seeming to tell us that we should.
This mismatch of the descriptions that come of the quantum formalism with our experiences is known as the measurement problem (see Chapter 1). And it is because of the
measurement problem that we need part (ii). The foremost task of any interpretation of
quantum mechanics is to explain why we seem to obtain classically-definite results from
quantum measurements when the Schrödinger equation describes a superposition of states.
So what to do? Until Everett’s 1957 proposal, the common approaches to part (ii) had
included: adding additional structure to the formalism, sufficient to represent the actual
world, so that even if the quantum state is in a macroscopic superposition, the additional
structure describes a unique classical world; or else modifying the dynamics of the theory so
that macroscopic superpositions do not occur in the first place. As John Bell famously put
it, “Either the wavefunction, as given by the Schrödinger equation, is not everything, or it
is not right” (Bell, 1987, 201).
The first type of theory – those that attempt to supplement the quantum state with
additional ontology – are generally known as hidden-variable theories. The second type of
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theory – those that modify the Schrödinger equation to eliminate macroscopic superpositions
– are dynamical-collapse theories. As we saw in Chapter 1, both possibilities have been
extensively explored. But there is one point worth noting here: both of these theories only
exist in the nonrelativistic domain. And we know that non-relativistic quantum mechanics
is not the end of the story. We require relativistic quantum theory to explain the results of
particle physics and quantum-mechanical aspects of radiation. And so far, there is neither
a hidden-variables theory nor a dynamical-collapse theory which is able to reproduce the
predictions of relativistic quantum dynamics. So if the goal here is to provide a satisfactory
realist solution to the problem plaguing our best current physical theory, then neither hiddenvariables approaches nor dynamical-collapse approaches even come close to doing so (Ismael,
2015).
And so faced with the measurement problem, it seems like we have few options left. We
could rethink the nature of the scientific enterprise (the instrumentalist response); we could
replace quantum theory with a new theory we have not constructed yet; or we could simply
hope that the problem goes away when general relativity and quantum mechanics are unified.
Neither of the first two are very attractive options for the realist, and there just isn’t really
much to say about the third one. Perhaps the measurement problem will magically go away
with the quantization of gravity; perhaps it won’t. But sitting around and hoping that’s the
answer – and to be clear, ‘hope’ is the only evidence we have here to suggest that it will –
seems itself counter to the goal of science. After all, few questions about the nature of our
reality have been answered through sitting back and crossing our fingers until the answer is
just revealed to us.
Luckily, there is another option. Everett’s great insight was that this apparent dilemma
is actually false. There is a straightforwardly realist way to interpret the bare quantum
mechanics without modifying them or rethinking the aim of the scientific project. It is a fact
that the quantum algorithm describes macroscopic superpositions. But it doesn’t follow that
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the superposition describes an indefinite state. And it is only this last assumption – that
a superposition is a macroscopically indefinite state – that is problematic. But as Everett
realized, there’s another possibility: macroscopic quantum superpositions are just states of
the world in which more than one macroscopically definite thing is happening at once. As
Wallace puts it, “Macroscopic superpositions do not describe indefiniteness, they describe
multiplicity” (2012, 37).

2.2

The Many Worlds Interpretation, In Brief

At its core, the Many Worlds Interpretation is pretty straightforward. The fundamental idea
is that there is a multiplicity of worlds in the Universe in addition to the world that we are
aware of. Every time a quantum event occurs (which is very often), all possible outcomes are
obtained, each in a different world, even if we are only aware of the world with the outcome
that we have seen.
The Many Worlds Interpretation attempts to take quantum theory at face-value, interpreting it without additional structure. There is no collapse postulate, no point particles,
no genuine randomness. There is just unitary, deterministic, evolution of the Universe as
described by the Schrödinger equation. The Many Worlds Interpretation simply claims that
this evolution is real, and that each of these states is realized in a quasi-classical world
(Vaidman, 2018).

2.2.1

Quantum Entanglement

Of course, one might readily object, this must be false. If superpositions describe multiplicities, it would be quite obvious because we would observe them. However, when we go to
check on our cat to see if it is dead or alive, we find there is just one cat (in a macroscopically definite state), not multiples. And if the Many Worlds Interpretation were correct,
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there should be both an alive cat and a dead one! But there is not. So surely, the Many
Worlds Interpretation is incorrect.
But this move is made too quickly. There is a simple explanation as to why we find one
(definite) cat, and not two. Our cat – or better, cat system – very quickly becomes entangled
with its surroundings.
Quantum entanglement occurs when pairs or groups of particles are generated, interact,
or share spatial proximity in ways such that the quantum state of each particle cannot be
described independently of the state of the others. That is to say, for all pratical purposes,
the particles can no longer be considered as individuals - rather, they are best treated as an
inseperable whole (Barrett, 2018).
In short, we wind up not just with a superposition of cats, but a superposition of quasiclassical regions – worlds, if you will – some of which contain live cats and some of which
contain dead cats. Our failure to observe the multiplicity is due to our entanglement with
the cat system. We live in one of the worlds, and the others don’t interact strongly enough
with ours to detect them.
And this is the Many Worlds Interpretation. It consists of two parts: a contingent physical
postulate - that the state of the Universe is faithfully represented by a unitarily evolving
quantum state; and an a priori claim about that quantum state - that if it is interpreted
realistically it must be understood as describing a multiplicity of approximately classical,
approximately non-interacting regions which look very much like the ‘classical world’. There
are no additional physical postulates introduced; there is just unitary quantum mechanics.
The Many Worlds Interpretation is just quantum mechanics itself, ‘interpreted’ the same
way we have always interpreted scientific theories in the past: as modelling worlds (Wallace,
2012).
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2.3

Objections

Two notable objections have been leveled against the Many Worlds Interpretation: the Problem of Preferred Basis, and the Probability Problem. The first is generally not considered as
a serious objection anymore, due to the extensive work on the phenomenon of decoherence.
The second is more or less troublesome, depending upon who you ask.

2.3.1

Preferred Basis

A common criticism of the Many Worlds Interpretation stems from the fact that the formalism of quantum theory allows infintiely many ways to decompose the quantum state of the
Universe into a superposition of orthogonal states.
Recall that the formal language of quantum mechanics is vector calculus. Vectors, in
quantum mechanics, represent physical states of affairs. The sum of any two vectors in any
particular vector space is always another vector in that same space. The fact that two vectors
can be added together to form a third will turn out to accommodate the fact that certain
physical states of affiars - states like x-spin up are superpositions of certain other states of
affairs, states like y-spin up and y-spin down. If the angle between any two vectors is 90◦
(i.e. |A| =
6 0 and |B| =
6 0, and hA|Bi = 0), they are said to be orthogonal to one another.
Consider an N -dimensional space, and any collection of N mutually orthogonal vectors in
that space, and suppose that the length (i.e. the norm) of each of those vectors happens to
be 1. Such a set of vectors is said to form an orthonormal basis of that N -dimensional space.
Suppose that the set |A1 i, |A2 i, . . . |AN i forms a basis of a certain N -dimensional vector
space; it turns out that any vector whatever in that space (call it |Bi) can be expressed as
the following sum:

|Bi = b1 |A1 i + b2 |A2 i + . . . bN |AN i
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where bi are all numbers where

bi = hB|Ai

(2.2)

So any vector in a vector space can be “built up” out of the elements of any basis in that
space. For any space of more than a single dimension, there will be an infinity of equivalently
good orthonormal bases to choose from. Any vector in that space will be writable (as shown
in 2.1) in terms of any of those bases.
The question arises, “Why choose one particular decomposition over another?” What
justification is there in speaking of the states of a superposition as quasi-classical worlds?
Bare quantum theory doesn’t speak of ‘worlds’ – it only speaks of a unitarily-evolving quantum state. Since another decomposition might lead to a very different picture, how is it that
we can justify priviledging this particular decomposition into worlds - that is, the preference for this world-centered basis - from just the mechanics alone? It seems as though the
proponent of the Many Worlds Interpretation is either adding additional structure to the
formalism by modifying the axioms to include explicit mention of ‘multiple physical worlds’,
or the existence of these multiple worlds must be some kind of illusion (Vaidman, 2018).

Decoherence
In fact, this choice of a world-centered basis is not ad hoc at all. Rather, it emerges via
decoherence.
The two slit experiment of Chapter 1 is a paradigm example of an interference experiment. Decoherence is the suppression - artificial or spontaneous - of interference phenomena.
This happens, for instance, when we perform a detection at the slits. The disappearence of
the interference term, however, can also happen spontaneously if some other systems (say,
sufficiently many stray cosmic particles scattering off the electron) suitably interact with
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the wave between the slits and the screen. In this case, the reason why the interference
term is not observed is because the electron has become entangled with the stray particles.
The phase relation between the two components of the wave function, which is responsible
for interference, is well-defined only at the level of the larger system composed of electron
and stray particles, and can produce interference only in a suitable experiment including
the larger system. It is this phenomenon of suppression of interference through suitable
interaction with the environment that is known as dynamical or environmental decoherence
(Bacciagaluppi, 2016).
One feature of these environmental interactions is that they suppress interference between states from some preferred set. Roughly speaking, the system gets entangled with the
environment, but the states between which interference is supressed are the ones that would
themselves get least entangled with the environment under further interaction. The locality
of physical interactions defines the preferred basis. Only localized states of macroscopic objects are stable. Interaction potentials are functions of positions, so the preferred states will
tend to be related to position (Bacciagaluppi, 2016).
The resulting localisation can be on a very short length scale. For example, a speck
of dust of radius a = 10−5 cm floating in the air will have interference supressed between
position components with a width of 10−13 cm. Even more strikingly, the time scales for
this process are minute. This coherence length1 is reached after a microsecond of exposure
to air, and suppression of interference on a length scale of 10−12 cm is achieved already after
a nanosecond (Joos and Zeh, 1985).2
One can thus argue that generically the states priviledged by decoherence at the level
of components of the quantum state are localised in position or both position and momentum, and therefore are kinematically classical. Interference is a dynamical process that is
1

The amount of time that the particle remains in a superposition before becoming entangled with the
environment.
2
Length and time scales for more massive objects are further reduced.
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distinctively quantum, so, lack of interference might be thought of as classical-like.
The fact that interference is typically very well suppressed between localised states of
macroscopic objects suggests that it is relevant to why macroscopic objects in fact appear to
us to be in localised states. In the special case of measuring apparatuses, it would explain
why we never observe an apparatus pointing, say, to two different results, i.e. decoherence
would provide a solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. Decoherence
tells us, among other things, that plenty of interactions are taking place all the time in
which differently localised states of macroscopic systems couple to different states of their
environment. In particular, the differently localised states of the macroscopic system could
be the states of the pointer of the apparatus registering the different y-spin values of the
electron. The composite of electron, apparatus, and environment will be a sum of (i) a
state corresponding to the environment coupling to the apparatus coupling in turn to the
value +1/2 for the spin, and of (ii) a state corresponding to the environment coupling to the
apparatus coupling in turn to the value −1/2 for the spin. But the meaning of such a sum
for the composite system is not obvious - this requires giving an appropriate interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Decoherence alone does not provide a solution to the measurement
problem, but when it is combined with the Many Worlds Interpretation, we see a picture of
branching quasi-classical worlds emerge (Bacciagaluppi, 2016).
What suggests that decoherence may be relevant to the issue of the classical appearance
of the everyday world is that at the level of components of the wave function, the quantum
description of decoherence phenomena can display tantalisingly classical aspects. The question is then whether, if viewed in the context of the Many Worlds Interpretation, the results
of decoherence could thus be used to explain the emergence of the entire classicality of the
everyday world.
The main argument in support of this is that the locality of interactions yields stability
of worlds in which objects are well localized. The small value of the Plank constant allows
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macroscopic objects to be well localized for a long period of time. Worlds corresponding
to localized quantum states do not split for long enough time such that sentient beings can
perceive the locations of macroscopic objects. By contrast, a “world” obtained in another
decomposition3 splits immediately, during a period of time which is much smaller than the
perception time of any feasible sentient being, into two worlds (Vaidman, 2018).
Thus, decoherence yields a natural solution to the problem of preferred basis for the
Many Worlds theorist, in that it identifies a class of ‘preferred’ states, and allows one to
reidentify them over time, so that one can identify ‘worlds’ with the trajectories defined by
decoherence. If part of the aim of the Many Worlds Interpretation is to interpret quantum
mechanics without adding extra structure, in particular without postulating the existence of
some preferred basis, then one will try to look for potentially relevant structures that are
already present in the wave function. In this sense, decoherence is the ideal candidate for
identifying ‘worlds’.

How Many Worlds?
The quasi-classical ‘worlds’ of the Many Worlds Interpretation emerge from the underlying
quantum mechanics because certain quantum-mechanical histories of certain systems instantiate a quasi-classical history, and superpositions of those histories then instantiate multiple
quasi-classical histories (always assuming that interference between those histories can be
neglected). How these quasi-classical worlds emerge is due in large part to the phenomenon
of decoherence.
The importance of decoherence is: when it occurs, quantum-mechanical systems (ap3

For example, “world+” which is characterized by the relative phase of a superposition of states of
macroscopic objects being in macroscopically distinguishable states A and B, √12 (|ΨA i + |ΨB i)|Φi, splits
immediately into the new “world+” and “world−”: √12 (|ΨA i − |ΨB i)|Φ0 i (n.b.: The wave function of
all particles in the Universe corresponding to any particular world will be a product of the states of the
sets of particles corresponding to all objects in the world mulitplied by the quantum state |Φi of all the
particles that do not constitute “objects”. Within a world, “objects” have definite macroscopic states by
fiat: |ΨW ORLD i = |ΨiOBJECT1 |ΨiOBJECT2 . . . |ΨiOBJECTN |Φi.)
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proximately) develop a particularly natural branching structure. For decoherence is a process which constantly and (on sub-Poincaré-recurrent timescales) irreversibly4 . entangles
the environment with the system so as to suppress interference between the terms of the
decoherence-preferred basis. (We might say that environment constantly measures the system and records the result). If we idealize the dynamics as discrete, then at each branching
event, the environment permanently records the pre-branching state, so that at each time
the Universal state is a superposition of states each of which encodes a complete record of
where ‘its weight’ comes from (Wallace, 2012). Of course, talk of branching naturally leads
to a question familiar to the ears of the proponent of the Many Worlds Interpretation: Just
how many worlds?
There are really two responses to this question. The first: the question ultimately doesn’t
make sense. The second: a lot. Let’s start with ‘a lot’.
Branching is caused by any process which magnifies microscopic superpositions up to the
level where decoherence kicks in. These processes are basically of three kinds:
1. Deliberate human experiments: two-slit experiment, Schrödinger’s cat, etc.
2. Natural quantum processes and measurements such as cell mutations caused by radiation.
3. Classically chaotic processes (those which are governed by Hamiltonians whose classical
analogues are chaotic) (Wallace, 2012).
The first is relatively recent (and rare); the other two are ubiquitous. Chaos is everywhere,
and where there is chaos, there is branching. Thus, in answer to the question How many
branches are there?, the response is, a lot.
4

The irreversibility here is a feature of the emergent quasi-classical macro environment, not of the mechanics itself (as is the case with collapse theories). An analogy may be draw here between classical mechanics
and statistical mechanics. It’s generally accepted that classical mechanics is time-reverse invariant, while
the emergent thermodynmaic behavior of large systems is not.
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But, it’s also necessary to note that there is no precise answer to the question at any given
moment. While the processes noted above cause branching, there is no sense in which they
lead to a naturally discrete branching process. How many branches we count will depend on
our choice of configuration space5 . That choice will produce a discrete branching structure,
and the number of branches will depend on how fine or coarse grained the discretization
of our chosen configuration space is. A finer or coarser choice will produce a different
number of branches. And while a branching structure can be discerned in quantum chaotic
systems, these systems have no natural grain. Neither is there a ‘finest’ choice of branching
structure. As we fine-grain our decoherent history space, we will eventually reach a point
where interference between branches ceases to be negligible, but there is no precise point
where this occurs. So the particular choice of configuration space really is arbitrary, and as
such the question of How many worlds? doesn’t really make sense.
Decoherence causes the universe to develop an emergent branching structure. The
existence of this branching is a robust (albeit emergent) feature of reality; so is the
mod-squared amplitude for any macroscopically described history. But there is no
non-arbitrary decomposition of macroscopically-described histories into ‘finestgrained’ histories, and no non-arbitrary way of counting those histories. (Wallace,
2012, 101-102)
So while the localization of physical interactions leads to an emergent branching structure
(via decoherence), it does not tell us how many branches there are.
5

The configuration space is the vector space defined by the generalized coordinates of a system. For
example, the position of a single particle moving in ordinary Euclidean 3-space is defined by the vector
q = (x, y, z), and therefore its configuration space is Q = R3 .
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2.3.2

Probability

The ‘Probability Problem’ is generally considered the biggest challenge faced by proponents
of the Many Worlds Interpretation. Our empirical evidence for quantum mechanics is entirely
composed of its probabilistic predictions. The Schrödinger equation produces a wave function
that picks out the dynamical evolution of the Universe. In instances of quantum events, the
Universe evolves into a superposition of the possible outcomes, each possibility represented
as a term with an associated amplitude. The absolute value of the amplitude squared is
the “weight” of that term. Traditionally, this amplitude squared has been thought of as the
“probability” of that outcome obtaining - and for good reason! Generally, empircally, this is
what we experience. A quantum event which produces a wave function with, say, amplitude
√1
3
1
3

for outcome A and

√
√2
3

for outcome B seems to correspond to us experiencing outcome A

of the time, and outcome B

2
3

of the time.

The difficulty with the concept of probability in a deterministic theory such as the Many
Worlds Interpretation is that the only possible meaning for probability is an ignorance probability - the measure of an agent’s uncertainty of an outcome - but there is no relevant
information that an observer who is going to perform a quantum experiment is ignorant
about. The quantum state of the Universe at one time specifies the quantum state at all
times. If I am going to perform a quantum experiment with two possible outcomes such that
standard quantum mechanics predicts probability

1
3

for outcome A and

2
3

for outcome B,

then, according to the Many Worlds Interpretation, both the world with outcome A and the
world with outcome B will exist. And if every outcome is obtained, how are we to interpret
the probability measure of quantum mechanics? How can we have probability in a Universe
where everything happens?
As Wallace puts it,
In physics, probability basically enters in one of two ways. Sometimes – as in
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classical statistical mechanics – it represents our ignorance of the microstate of
the system [. . . ] Other times, probability represents the fact that the system is
not deterministic. [. . . ] Neither of these applies to the Everett interpretation
[. . . ]What is more, in both the ignorance case and the stochastic case the probabilities can be taken as labelling alternative possibilities. We can’t understand
the weights in the Everett interpretation that way: all branches are actually
there! So whatever those ‘weights’ may be, they are not probabilities. And since
our empirical evidence for quantum mechanics is entirely composed of its probabilistic predictions, that makes the Everett interpretation empirically inadequate.
(2012, 113-114)
So it seems the issue is two-fold. If we continue to interpret the weight of the branches
as ‘probability’, then how do we make sense of ‘the probability of a particular outcome
occurring’ when all outcomes occur? And if we reject the notion that the branch weights are
probability measures, then what are they and how do we account for their empirical success?

Probability Problem?
Despite the frequency of the criticism, probability is not really as problematic for the Many
Worlds Interpretation proponent as it has been made to seem – or at least, it’s not any more
problematic for the supporter of the Many Worlds Interpretation than it is for anyone else.
Really, it turns out that probability is enormously difficult, and the issues which supposedly
plague the Many Worlds Interpretation are in no way unique to it; they are issues shared by
science generally.

Technically Fine It needs to be emphasized that from a mathematical standpoint, there
is no probability problem for the Many Worlds Interpretation. Mathematically speaking,
probability enters our theories thusly: we have a space of instantaneous configurations to48
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gether with a rule specifying which paths through that space are allowed. In a deterministic
theory, paths are either allowed or not, and for each initial segment of a path there is at most
one path which has that segment as its initial segment (i.e. there is at most a single possible
history of the system given a set of initial conditions). In a stochastic theory, the rule is
more flexible. For each initial segment, there may be multiple permissible paths through the
configuration space. The theory places a probability measure over all allowable paths (i.e.
all paths which have that segment as their initial segment). Mathematically, this measure is
simply a function from sets of histories to positive real numbers, additive over disjoint sets
of histories, and such that the set of all histories with the given segment as initial segment
gets probability one. (Wallace, 2012)
Fundamentally, the Many Worlds Interpretation is deterministic. The Schrödinger equation picks out exactly one dynamically allowed trajectory through every point in the Hilbert
space. But there is also an emergent branching structure whose configuration space can be
taken to be the space of instantaneous decoherence-selected projectors, and whose dynamics
assign a relative weight to each history relative to each of its initial segments. And because of decoherence, those weights obey the axioms of a probability measure. So formally
– mathematically speaking – the branching structure of the Many Worlds Interpretation is
a stochastic dynamical theory:
. . . there is no probability ‘problem’. Decoherence provides the link between our
precisely formulated, deterministic, microdynamics and our emergent stochastic
macrodynamics. The microscopic theory is precisely formulated, extends cleanly
to relativistic dynamics, and can be understood as a literal description of the
world; the macroscopic theory shows how this literal description reproduces the
empirical data; anything else is useless metaphysics. (Wallace, 2012, 115)
And so, from a technical standpoint, no more needs to be said.
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Nonetheless, there is an historically great interest in the “useless metaphysics,” and
while it may not be necessary for the success of the Many Worlds Interpretation to provide
a conceptual explanation of probability in a branching universe, it would still be highly
satisfactory to be able to do so. And so while formally, there is no ‘Probability Problem,’
a conceptual explanation of what the probability measure is, and how probability functions
within the Many Worlds Interpretation, would certainly be considered a boon to the theory.

Getting Probability into the MWI
From a philosophical standpoint, (“ordinary”) probability is a conceptual puzzle.6 There
have been many attempts, and little consensus, when it comes to defining probability, though
a survey of the role of probability in scientific practice, and human activity more generally,
suggests that there are broadly two sorts of ways in which probability manifests. One
way we use probability is inferentially. We make inferences from non-probabilistic data to
probabilities, in particular, using relative frequency as a guide to probability. The other way
we see probabilities used in practice is decision-theoretically – we use known probabilities as
a guide to decision-making (Papineau, 1996).
From this observation, we see that roughly, two main approaches to understanding probability emerge. The first kind of strategy treats the inferential link between probability and
relative frequency as definitional, effectively identifying probability with relative frequency
(or some close cousin), and treating the decision-theoretic link as derivative. The second
kind of strategy treats probability as definitionally linked to rational decision-making, and
tries to derive its connection with observed relative frequencies (Wallace, 2012).
There have been various attempts at resolving the difficulty that probability poses for
the Many Worlds Interpretation, from postulating that the many worlds are really many
6

“Ordinary” here denotes the conception of probability as we typically think of it, i.e. in non-branching
cases. Of course, if we do live in a branching universe as the Many Worlds Interpretation claims, then
“ordinary” probability is branching probability.
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minds, to decision theoretic accounts. Below, I provide a brief survey of the most popular
proposals.

Many Minds One approach proposed by Albert and Loewer (1988) claims that the many
worlds of the Many Worlds Interpretation only exist in our minds. In addition to the quantum
wave of the Universe, Albert and Loewer postulate that every sentient being has a continuum of minds. Whenever there is a quantum event that developes into a superposition of
states that would correspond to difference experiences, the minds develop randomly and
independently into mental states that correspond to perceptions of the different outcomes,
with probabilities equal to the quantum probabilties for those states. Each possibility corresponds to one mind which ends up in a state corresponding to a world with a particular
outcome. This proposal has, quite suitably, been dubbed the Many Minds Interpretaion.
While perhaps comforting to some to think that there aren’t really a plethora of physical
worlds in the Universe much like our own, to many, this proposal represents a drastic departure from the realist picture which is the heart of the Many Worlds Interpretation. Indeed,
it resembles the Many Worlds Interpretation in little more than name only. Moreover, this
proposal comes at a cost of introducing additional structure into the quantum theory, while
the main attraction of the Many Worlds Interpretation is that it takes the mechanics literally
without the need for ad hoc additional structure.

Probability from Ignorance Another approach to solving the Probability Problem comes
from Tappenden (2011), following Vaidman (1998, 2012). They define the probability of the
outcome of an experiment to be performed as the ignorance probability of the successors of
the observer for being in a world with a particular outcome.
The general idea is this. Within the Many Worlds Interpretation, it is senseless to ask,
“What is the probability that I will get outcome A over outcome B?” because there will be
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both a world in which someone who is continuous with me now observes A and another world
with someone who is continous with me now that observes B. But this question becomes
more meaningful when addressed to the “me” in the world of outcome A before I am aware of
the results of the experiment (and thus which world I am in). At this moment, it is sensible
to ask, “What is the probability that I will get outcome A over outcome B?” because there
is a definite result that I will observe, but I’m ignorant of what that result is.7 It is this
ignorance, claims Vaidman, that gives us the illusion of probability.
The value of the probability, though, must be postulated.
Probability Postulate An observer should set his subjective probability of the
outcome of a quantum experiment in proportion to the total measure of existence8
of all worlds with that outcome. (Vaidman, 1998)
Since all outcomes of a quantum experiment are realized, there is not probability in the
usual sense. Nevertheless, Vaidman claims that this construction leads all believers in the
Many Worlds Interpretation to behave according to the ‘Behavior Principle’:
Behavior Principle We care about all our successive worlds in proportion to their
measures of existence. (Vaidman, 1998)
Thus, the Probability Postulate tells us that an observer should set their subjective probability in accordance with the “probabilities” (i.e. branch weights) of quantum mechanics,
and the Behavior Principle that our behavior should be similar to the behavior of a believer
of collapse theory who cares about possible future worlds in proportion to the probability of
their outcomes.
7

The question of obtaining A also makes sense for the “me” in the world with outcome B before she
becomes aware of the outcome. Both world-A-me and world-B-me have the same information on the basis
of which they should give their answer.
8
The measure of existence of a world, claims Vaidman, quantifies a world’s ability to interfere with other
worlds in a gedanken experiment, and is equal to the branch weight (Vaidman, 1998, 256).
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While Vaidman makes the connection between the determinism of the Many Worlds Interpretation and our empirical evidence for quantum mechanics, the justification for identifying
the probability of obtaining a particular outcome with a world’s measure of existence (i.e.
branch weight) is lacking. Why is it that an observer should set their subjective probability
of a particular outcome to a world’s measure of existence? What justification is there for
this connection? Vaidman doesn’t derive this connection from the mechanics itself; rather
he must postulate it, meaning that he’s adding additional structure to the quantum theory.
However, Vaidman argues that this additional structure ought to be given different consideration from the additional structure of, say, the Collapse Postulate.9 Since Vaidman’s
Probability Postulate is related only to part (ii) of the Many Worlds Interpretation - the
prescription which sets up a correspondence between the quantum state of the Universe and
our experiences - and not to the mathematical formalism of part (i), it may be argued that
the Probability Postulate’s additional structure is ontologically free, and as such, relatively
benign (contrast this with the Collapse Postualte, which modified the mathematical theory
as well as adding a fundamentally new type of law to the Universe). Still, a clearly preferable
approach would be to be able to derive the Probability Postulate instead.

Probability from Decision Theory Deriving the Probability Postulate (or the like)
from the mechanics itself has become a prime goal of those working within the Many Worlds
Interpretation. This is what Deutsch (1999) and Wallace (2012) attempt in taking a decisiontheoretic approach to probability.
Deutsch and Wallace reject the frequentist program in favor of a decision-theoretic approach, or in Wallace’s terminology, rationalist strategy.10 Wallace argues that while we can
9

The postulate according to which, after a measurement, the quantum state collapses from a superposition
of states to a single particular branch with probability proportional to its squared amplitude (i.e. branch
weight).
10
A more familiar name for this strategy might be the Bayesian approach. But as Bayesian is also used
in many subtly different ways, I will adopt Wallace’s terminology here to avoid confusion.
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use relative frequency to measure probability, using relative frequency to define probability
is disastrous: if probability is limiting relative frequency, what can it possibly mean to say
that the long-run relative frequency approaches the probabilities with high probability?11
Recall that we said there were two general ways that we use probabilities: we make inferences from non-probabilistic data to probabilities, and we use known probabilities as a
guide to decision making. One on the many failings of the frequentist approach to probability is that it fails to reproduce the role that probability plays in guiding action. The
decision-theoretic approach that Deutsch and Wallace put forth, on the other hand, regards
probability’s role in rational action as definitional, and tries to recover its connection with
frequencies. The centerpiece of this approach is the Born Rule Theorem:
[. . . ] a rational agent, certain that unitary quantum mechanics is true and that
the quantum state of his branch is |Ψi will act as if branches in his future had
probabilities and those probabilities were equal to the (relative) branch weights.
(Wallace, 2012, 199)
The Born Rule theorem provides us with a decision-theoretic approach to the conceptual
role of probability with the Many Worlds Interpretation by positing a connection between
the relative weights of branches and rational action. If it feels very familiar, that is because it
is a looks a lot like Vaidman’s Probability Postulate and Behavior Principle in disguise. But
where Vaidman had to postulate the connection between branch weights and rational behavior, Deutsch and Wallace claim to be able to derive the Born Theorem from the quantum
formalism and decision theory, thus without the price tag of attaching additional structure
to the quantum mechanics.
In Deutsch’s and Wallace’s arguments the notion of probability is operationalised by
being reduced to an agent’s betting preferences. Betting odds give us a context to measure
11

For a more detailed discussion of the frequentism program and its failings, see (Wallace, 2012, Chapter

4).
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an agent’s assessment of probabilities: if someone is willing to bet on a fair die landing 4 at
6-to-1 odds, but not at worse odds, we can assume her assessment of the probability of the
die landing 4 is 1/6. On the rationalist approach, the criterion for the probability of some
event x being P is that a rational agent is willing to bet on it at 1/P -to-1 odds (i.e. the
agent would be willing to pay λP dollars, but no more, in exchange for receiving λ dollars
in the event that x obtains) (Wallace, 2012).
On this approach, probability is agent-relative. There is no probability of x occurring per
se; there is only the probability of x for agent A. But that doesn’t mean that anything goes.
We can argue that if an agent’s betting-defined probabilities fail to satisfy the probability
calculus, then she becomes vulnerable to Dutch book bets, in which an agent accepts a set of
bets that will always lose money, regardless of the outcome (Wallace, 2012).
For example, suppose that an agent assigns probability P to some event occurring, and
probability Q to that event not occurring. By definition, this means that she will be willing
to pay λP dollars for a bet on the event occurring that has a payoff of λ dollars, and µQ
dollars for a bet on the event not occurring that has payoff µ dollars. If she accepts both
bets, her return will be:

λ(1 − P ) − µQ if the event occurs;
−λP + µ(1 − Q) if the event does not occur.
Suppose that Q 6= 1–P . Then we can choose λ and µ such that both of these returns are
negative,12 and the agent will surely lose money, whatever the outcome of the event. Thus,
an agent who does not assign probabilities that add up to one is committed to accepting
bets according to which she will certainly lose money. And insofar as we agree that any
rational agent seeks not to lose money, then a rational agent’s probability analysis of event
12

λ or µ may be negative; paying −λ for a bet is the same as selling the bet.

55

CHAPTER 2. THE MANY WORLDS INTERPRETATION
x occurring is constrained by the usual axioms of probability theory (Wallace, 2012).
Of course, it seems appropriate to ask how this rationalist strategy is supposed to work
in a Many Worlds universe in which all the outcomes of the bet occur. Surely, it makes little
sense to bet on any single outcome occurring when they all do. But, as it turns out, betting
in a Many Worlds universe is not all that different or mysterious, and just as meaningful.
Consider for a moment the non-branching scenario. In buying a bet, an agent is purchasing the possibility of a reward for her future self. Suppose that a quantum system is
prepared in some superposition of N states in a given basis, and that in ten minute’s time it
is to be measured in that basis. Then there are N interestingly different possible outcomes,
and we can ask of the agent what probability she puts on each. We can make sense of this
question by looking at which bets the agent is willing to accept for each outcome. What it is
for an agent to bet on an outcome is a willingness to pay a certain amount of money up front
in exchange for a promise that if the outcome obtains, the bet pays off and the agent gets
the reward; if it does not obtain, then the agent is not rewarded. And if the agent fails to
assign probabilities in accordance with the probability calculus then there will be some bet
which she is committed to accepting but which will lose her money whatever the outcome is
(Wallace, 2012).
In a branching universe, rather than purchasing the possibility of a reward for her single
future self, an agent is purchasing rewards for some but not all future versions of herself.
Instead of there being N interestingly different possible outcomes, there are N sets of interestingly different branches, one for each distinct outcome. In the branches where the
outcome is appropriate, the bet will pay out, and where a different outcome is obtained, it
will not. Some of the agent’s future selves will be rewarded, and some will not, in accordance
with the bet’s terms. Functionally, the process is the same.
The rationalist definition of probability works just as well in the Many Worlds context
as in the non-branching context. To say that an agent assigns probability P to an outcome
56

CHAPTER 2. THE MANY WORLDS INTERPRETATION
is to say that she is committed to paying λP dollars in exchange for her successors receiving
λ dollars in all branches in which P occurs. And once more, just as in the non-branching
case, if the agent’s probability assignments do not conform to the probability calculus, then
she will be committed to accepting collections of bets in which all of her future selves lose
money (Wallace, 2012).
Thus we can develop a decision-theoretic account of probability, that, while being relative
to an agent, still requires that one conform to the usual axioms of probability theory in order
to be considered rational. And we see how it’s possible to have such a theory of probability
even within the a Many Worlds Universe in which all the outcomes of a bet occur. But it’s
not enough that our agent assigns some probabilities in accordance with the axioms of a
probability measure. We specifically want to show that the agent should assign probabilities
in proportion to branch weights.
Deutsch attempts to prove that the only rationally coherent strategy for an agent is to assign these operationalised “probabilities” to equal the quantum-mechanical branch weights.
Wallace developed this approach by making explicit the tacit assumptions in Deutsch’s argument. In the most recent version of these proofs, the central assumptions are (i) the
symmetry structure of unitary quantum mechanics; (ii) that an agent’s preferences are consistent across time; (iii) that an agent is indifferent to the fine-grained branching structure
of the world per se.
A broad strokes outline of the Wallace proof follows below.
Principal Principle In addition to the personal probabilities 13 illustrated by a rational
agent’s betting behavior, there also seem to be objective probabilities 14 which do not vary
from agent to agent, and are the things that scientists are talking about when they make
statements about the probabilities of reactions and the like. Consider the half-life of radio13
14

These are sometimes called subjective probabilities or credences.
Sometimes called chances.
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carbon (Carbon-14), which is generally accepted to be approximately 5,730 years.15 That is
to say that in any given sample containing radiocarbon, there is a nearly 100% probability
that half of the isotope will have decayed after 5,730 years. Now, we may ask an agent to
assign a probability to the decay of half of the isotope in a given sample after this time,
and that agent may assign a probability of only 10% (and a probability that half the sample
of the radiocarbon isotope will not have decayed after 5,730 years of 90%). Though the
agent’s probability assignments (betting preferences, if you will) adhere to the usual axioms
of probability theory, there is still a strong sense that the agent who makes such a bet is
simply wrong (Wallace, 2012).
Wallace argues that we have two sorts of probability – personal probability, as understood
via Dutch book arguments, and objective probability, which is a bit more mysterious. Despite
this mysteriousness, we do know that we use objective probability as a guide to action,16
which suggests a link between the two, given by Lewis’s (1980) Principal Principle:
For any real number x, a rational agent’s personal probability of an event E conditional on the objective probability of E being x, and on any other background
information, is also x. (Wallace, 2012, 140)
The Principal Principle both captures the way we use objective probability in decisionmaking as well as the idea that we use frequencies to measure probabilities. For the former,
suppose that I want to know the probability of a die landing on four and I’m 90% sure that
the die is fair, while 10% sure that it’s loaded to always land four. The Principal Principle
states that my personal probability in the die landing four conditional on it being fair is 1/6,
and my personal probability in it landing four conditional on it being loaded is 1. Then, we
conclude that my personal probability in the die landing four is 0.9 × 1/6 + 0.1 × 1 = 0.25,
15

± 40 years
If we believe the objective probability of an event is approximately P , we will bet on it at odds of
approximately 1/P : 1.
16
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which accords with the normal rules of conditional probability.
As for the the idea that we use frequencies to measure probabilities Wallace shows that as
more and more experiments are carried out, any agent conforming to the Principal Principle
will become more and more confident that the objective probability is close to the observed
relative frequency.17
The Principal Principle can be used to provide a functional definition of objective probability: objective probability is whatever thing fits the ‘objective probability’ slot in the
Principal Principle. If some physical theory T enables us to define some magnitude Q for
events, then Q is objective probability just if anyone believing T is rationally required to
constrain her personal probabilities to equal Q. More formally, Q is objective probability
iff for any event E, if T together with (admissible) background information B entails that
Q(E) = p, then Pr(E|BT ) = p (Wallace, 2012).
Thus, the Principal Principle together with the rationalist strategy of probability allows
us to make sense of the inferential and decision-theoretic links between objective probability
and the rest of our concepts. But we may now wonder, what could make it true that in a
given situation, agents knowing all the relevant information are rationally compelled to set
their probability equal to p? In other words, what could objective probability be (Wallace,
2012)?
We must find some alternative characterization of objective probability, independent of
the Principal Principle, and then prove that the Principal Principle is true for that alternatively characterized notion. For the Many Worlds proponent, the path is clear: declare
those probabilities to be equal to the relative weights of the branches.
Wallace attempts to justify why quantum-mechanical branch weights play the role in
decision-making that ‘ordinary’ probability is supposed to play by proving from general principles of rationality that a rational agent, believing that (Many World Interpreted) quantum
17

For the proof, see (Wallace, 2012, 140-141).
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mechanics correctly gives the structure and dynamics of the world and that the quantum
state of her branch is |ψi, will act for all intents and purposes as if she ascribed probabilities
in accordance with the Born Rule, as applies to |ψi.18

Utilities We said previously that one way to understand probability is in terms of a rational
agent’s betting behavior. A rational agent will not accept a bet that an event will occur any
worse odds than she judges the probability of that event to occur-to-one. But of course, she
doesn’t have to take the bet at all, even at even odds. In deciding whether to accept a bet,
the agent has to weigh the benefit of winning the bet against the cost of losing it. One might
be given even odds on a million-dollar coin flip, but if one doesn’t have a million dollars to
potentially lose, then the bet probably shouldn’t be bought regardless.
Suppose a coin is to be tossed in ten minutes’ time, and an agent is offered even odds
on this coin toss. The agent bets $10 that it will land heads. There are two interestingly
different possible results: (i) the coin lands ‘heads’ and the agent wins $10, or (ii) the coin
lands ‘tails’ and the agent loses $10. We can suppose that she would be happy to win, and
disappointed to lose. Should she take the bet?
In deciding whether to accept this bet (as opposed to any number of other bets, including
none at all), the agent has to weigh the risk-versus-reward - that is, the potential benefit to
her of winning against the cost to her of losing. Decision theory gives us a precise directive
on how to carry this out: an agent should assign a utility to each payoff, and a probability to
each outcome, and that faced with any decision, the agent should choose that option which
maximizes expected utility with respect to those assignments. For our agent, this means
that she should assign some utility19 V(+$10) to receiving $10, some other utility V(−$10)
to losing $10, and some third utility V($0) to neither getting nor losing $10. She should
18

That is, if U is a unitary transformation which might be applied to the agent’s branch, and Π is one of
the decoherence-defined projectors that pick out branches, then the agent will act to all intents and purposes
as if Π has a probability and that probability is hψ|U † ΠU |ψi.
19
Some real number.
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also then assign a probability Pr(H) to landing heads (the probability to landing tails is, in
accordance with the probability calculus 1 - Pr(H)). The agent should take the bet only if

Pr(H) × V(+$10) + (1 − Pr(H)) × V(−$10) > V($0).
It’s important to note that utility and probability aren’t independent functions. Each can
be defined in terms of the other and of the agent’s preferences. As we’ve already seen, we
can measure probabilities in terms of betting odds (in effect, in terms of the utility we put
on a bet on the event in question actually occurring). But we can also measure utilities in
terms of probabilities - to say that an agent regards the utility of X (relative to the utility of
getting nothing) as K times the utility of Y is to say that this agent is indifferent between
a bet with (as she judges) a probability of 1/K of getting X and a bet which in fact just
delivers Y with certainty (Wallace, 2012).
This second way is preferable for Wallace, as a purely qualitative ordering can be defined
on the outcomes of the bets. We can say that an agent regards E as more likely than F is
she prefers a bet on E to a bet (with the same stakes) on F . The space of outcomes has
the structure of a Boolean algebra, since for any two outcomes E and F we can consider
their union E ∪ F (‘either E or F happens’), their intersection E ∩ F (‘both E and F
happen’), and their negations ¬E and ¬F (‘E/F doesn’t happen’). With a sufficiently
rich structure of outcomes, and with some additional qualitative assumptions about the
agent’s preferences, we can prove that this qualitative ordering is uniquely represented by
some uniquely determined probability measure. We can then use this probability measure
to construct utilities such that the agent’s preferences are represented by the maximizing
expected utility rule with respect to the probability measure and those utilities (Wallace,
2012).

61

CHAPTER 2. THE MANY WORLDS INTERPRETATION
General Proof Structure Wallace’s proof begins with the idea of a bet on the result of an
outcome of a measurement of a quantum state. In general, such bets lead to branching, with
different rewards being given to different sets of agent’s future selves. Since different actions
lead to different costs and benefits for her future selves, the agent needs to choose which act
she prefers to carry out, which in turn defines a preference order between bets. By considering
in particular that agent’s preferences between bets in which a reward of fixed value is provided
on different sets of branches, Wallace constructs a qualitative preference order over those sets
of branches. He then shows that the order is uniquely represented by a probability measure,
and constructs a utility function.20 The representation theorems of ordinary decision theory
show that an agent’s preferences are represented by some probability measure, but they put
no constraint at all on which one. This quantum representation theorem shows that that
probability measure is rationally required to be the probability measure defined by the Born
Rule (Wallace, 2012).
Thus, we see that a rational agent, believing that the Many Worlds interpretation is
true and that the quantum state of a given system is |ψi, knows that measurements on that
state will generally split her part of the multiverse into multiple branches, with different
measurement outcomes, and different versions of the agent, on different branches; she also
knows that the relative weights of these branches are given by the Born Rule, applied to the
post-measurement state of the system and measurement device. Rationality considerations
not different in kind to those that apply in single-universe decision making then compel the
agent to act as if a set of branches of relative weight w has probability w. In other words,
she is rationally required to act as if the Born Rule in true.21
20

It’s important to note that a given choice by the agent is represented by a given branching structure, and
not by a given branch within that structure. This, Wallace argues, should obviate the worry that an agent
will make all possible choices, one per branch, and so the idea of ’deciding’ between choices is meaningless.
21
For proofs, see (Wallace, 2012, Appendix C).
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Reception Early criticisms of the Deutsch-Wallace approach focussed on circularity concerns. As the program led to more explicit proofs, criticism turned to the decision-theoretic
assumptions being made (Albert, 2010; Kent, 2010; Lewis, 2010; Price, 2010). The status
of these arguments remains highly controversial, though they represent the most ambitious
and comprehensive work towards the Many Worlds Interpretation to date.

2.4

Are There Many, Many Worlds Interpretations?

Thus far, I’ve been referring to the Many Worlds Interpretation, as though it’s a given that
there is a singular theory going by this name that serves as a point of reference. And to a
certain extent, there is. The Many Worlds Interpretation theory that I’ve described here what I will call the ‘Oxford MWI’ for the purpose of this discussion - represents the best and
most current work to date. Contemporary discussions of the Many Worlds Interpretation
are almost undoubtedly working from the Oxford MWI picture (unless, of course, otherwise
noted). It is the current standard, if you will.
However, it is not the one-and-only theory to go by the name ‘the Many Worlds Interpretation’. Indeed, the origins and subsequent history of the Many Worlds Interpretation
has often led to some confusion over whether the MWI itself is singular or a multiplicity.

2.4.1

Everett’s Relative State Formulation

In the 1950s, Hugh Everett III suggested that we drop the collapse postulate and take the
Universe to be such that its quantum state is a complex superposition that never collapses.
Everett published one short paper in 1957 - his doctoral dissertation (Everett, 1957a,b) after which he left academia.22 In his dissertation, Everett develops the mathematical theory
22

He later published the longer, original version of his dissertation at the request of Bryce DeWitt and
Neill Graham (DeWitt and Graham, 1973).
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that is the foundation of Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM).
Everett’s pure wave mechanics suggests that there is generally no determinate fact about
the every day properties of the objects in our world, since the equations that are supposed
to describe such properties are such that they describe superpositions of those properties.
Rather, Everett takes there to be only “relative states” and thus “relative properties” of
quantum systems. This has come to be known as Everett’s Relative State Formulation
(Everett, 1957a,b).
According to Everett, when our observer makes a measurement of the electron she does
not cause a collapse, but instead becomes correlated with the electron. What this means is
that where once we had a system that consisted of just an electron, there is now a system that
consists of the electron and the observer. The mathematical equation that describes the state
of the new system has one term in which the electron is x-spin-up and the observer measured
“x-spin-up” and another in which the electron is x-spin-down and the observer measured “xspin-down”. In both terms our observer got a determinate measurement record, so in both,
if we ask her whether she got a determinate record, she will say “yes.” If, as in this case, all
terms share a property (in this case the property of our observer saying “yes” when asked
if she got a determinate measurement record), then that property is determinate (Everett,
1957a,b).
But this is strange because she did not in fact get a determinate measurement record; she
instead recorded a superposition of two outcomes. After our observer measures a y-spin-up
electron’s x-spin, she will not have determinately gotten either “x-spin-up” or “x-spin-down”
as her record. Rather she will have determinately gotten “x-spin-up-or-x-spin-down”, since
her state will have become correlated with the state of the electron due to her interaction
with it through measurement (Everett, 1957a,b; DeWitt and Graham, 1973).
This sparse interpretation of EQM, adding no metaphysics or special assumptions to the
theory, has come to be known as the “bare theory”.
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Everett believed he had explained determinate experience through the use of relative
states. However, it is largely agreed upon in the community of Everettians that he did
not succeed. One might say that the bare theory predicts disjunctive outcomes, since the
observer will report that she got “either x-spin-up-or-x-spin-down” - without any determinate
classical outcome - without being in a state where she would determinately report that she
got “x-spin-up” or determinately report that she got “x-spin-down” (Barrett, 1999).
Thus, if the problem is to explain how we end up with determinate measurement results,
the bare theory does not provide us with that explanation. So while Everett seems to have
regarded his formulation as sufficient, many others have believed that EQM itself requires
interpretation.

2.4.2

The Many Worlds Interpretation, Today

Arguably the most common ‘interpretation’23 of Everett’s formulation is DeWitt’s Many
Worlds Interpretation (DeWitt, 1968; Wheeler and Ford, 1998). In his 1967 lecture, DeWitt
takes Everett’s claim that,
. . . with each succeeding observation (or interaction), the observer state “branches”
into a number of different outcomes of the measurement. . . for the object-system
state. All branches exist simultaneously in the superposition after any given
sequence of observations. (Everett, 1957b, 146)
to imply that we are forced
. . . to believe in the ‘reality’ of all the simultaneous ‘worlds’ represented in the
superposition [in which we find the universe after a measurement interaction]. . . in
23

Many proponents of the MWI, including DeWitt (1968), Deutsch (Saunders et al., 2010), and Wallace
(2012) claim that the MWI isn’t an interpretation of EQM at all - it just is EQM. They see EQM to be “just
quantum mechanics itself, read literally, straightforwardly - naively, if you will - as a direct description of
the physical world, just like any other microphysical theory” (Wallace, 2012, 2) and thus claim that “other
‘interpretations’ . . . are really alternative physical theories . . . ” (Wallace, 2012, 382).
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each of which the measurement has yielded a different outcome. (DeWitt, 1968,
326)
Since then, EQM has most commonly been known as synonymous with the MWI of
quantum mechanics, despite the MWI being a creation of DeWitt’s.
DeWitt’s MWI
DeWitt’s Many World Interpretation claims that branching of EQM is an actual splitting of
the worlds,
[o]ur universe must be viewed as constantly splitting into a stupendous number of branches, all resulting from the measurement-like interactions between its
myriads of components. . . every quantum transition taking place on every star,
in every galaxy, in every remote corner of the universe is splitting our local world
on earth into myriads of copies of itself. (DeWitt and Graham, 1973, 178)
DeWitt takes a strong realist position in regards to the worlds that are the result of the
branches splitting. He takes each branch to be “a possible universe-as-we-actually-see-it”
(DeWitt and Graham, 1973, 163) and believes that in spite of the fact that “all branches
must be regarded as equally real” (DeWitt and Graham, 1973, 178), we inhabit only one of
the worlds that go to make up reality and we have no access to other worlds.
But DeWitt’s MWI faces a challenge in the form of the Preferred Basis Problem. DeWitt
fails to provide us with any explanation of when worlds split. Unfortunately, saying when
they do is just as difficult as saying when a collapse occurs (i.e. the measurement problem).
To determine when a world splits, we would first need to know in which basis we should
write the universal state. If we knew this, then we would know that a split has occurred
because a new term would show up in the universal state when it is written in the preferred
basis. The choice of basis also determines which properties in the universe are determinate
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- namely, those that are represented by vectors that are on the axes of the basis - and which
worlds exist after a measurement interaction. DeWitt does not provide any way to choose
a particular basis, and any way that we might suggest in the context of his MWI would be
blatantly ad hoc.

Oxford’s MWI
Early 21st century MWI theorists have solved the Preferred Basis Porblem by taking a
very different view of the multiplicity of the world - namely, that the multiple branches of
the universe that arise from the mathematical theory of quantum mechanics are emergent
(Wallace, 2012).
The main difference between the Oxford MWI’s emergent branching Universe view and
DeWitt’s MWI is that DeWitt understood the wave function to be a real entity, leading to a
real multiplicity of worlds at the fundamental level of the theory. The Oxford MWI, on the
other hand, sees these worlds to be emergent from the underlying microphysical description
of the universe. They are no less real, but they are structural facts that are instantiated
within EQM (Wallace, 2012).
And this, the Oxford MWI, is where we are today.

2.4.3

So How Many Many Worlds Interpretations Are There?

In short, just one. The Many Worlds Interpretation - properly described - is a singular theory
originally developed by DeWitt who claimed to be following Everett. The Oxford MWI is
an evolution of the original DeWitt MWI theory, and represents our best understaning of
the Many Worlds Interpretation to date.
But because of the Many World Interpretations’s mathematical origins in Everett, and
because of MWI theorists like DeWitt (1968), Deutsch (Saunders et al., 2010), and Wallace
(2012), who argue that the Many Worlds Interpretation just is EQM, Everett’s Relative
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State Formulation is often mistakenly referred to as the Many Worlds Interpretation - though
Everett himself never talked about worlds as such.
As a result, there are other interpretations of EQM, such as the Many Minds view
(Albert and Loewer, 1988; Lockwood, 1996), Saunder’s Relational Interpretation (1993; 1995;
1996; 1997; 1998), the Relative Facts Interpretation (Conroy, 2010, 2012, 2016)which are
not (properly) Many Worlds Interpretations, but are often bundled under the ‘Many Worlds
Interpretations’ heading due to the identification of the Many Worlds Interpretation with
EQM.
For this reason, there have been attempts by some, like Wallace (2012) to eschew the
Many Worlds Intepretation label, replacing it instead with labels like ‘Everettian Quantum
Mechanics’ or just simply ‘quantum mechanics’. But as these alternatives seem no better
- and indeed seem to have potential for further confusion - I’ve chosen not to adopt them
here. Despite the quagmire, I shall continue to refer to the Many Worlds Interpretation to
mean the Oxford MWI. My justification is quite simple: this is what most contemporary
physicists mean when talking about the Many Worlds Interpretation.

And that, in brief, is the Many Worlds Interpretation. Quantum mechanics, interpreted
literally, is a deterministic theory in which the wave function, as given by the Schrödinger
equation, evolves smoothly into a branching multiverse of all outcomes. Decoherence provides us with an emergent structure whose weights obey the axioms of a probability measure.
And that’s all there is to it.
Now let’s see what all this means for the persons and objects living within this branching
universe.
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Identity in a Branching Universe
The Many Worlds Interpretation paints a picture of a universe with a branching tree-like
structure. One where space-timelines split - often into multiple new branches - with each
quantum event. This means that all of the objects in the universe that we’re used to thinking
of as singular individuals - all the plants, trees, tables, cats, and even people - are in fact
multiplicities. And that’s a bit odd.
But odd isn’t the same thing as puzzling or problematic. Magnetic hills1 are odd, but we
have no issue understanding the phenomenon nonetheless. We still know what a hill is, and
what gravity is, and how optics and reference points influence our perception of landscapes,
and there is nothing here that requires us to re-examine our very basic concepts of either of
these things.
And at first, the branching structure of the Many Worlds Interpretation may seem like just
that - odd. But when we start to look deeper and examine the metaphysical implications of
this branching structure - when we consider what this means for our notions of strict identity
- we shift territory from merely odd to puzzling and perhaps even problematic.
1

An optical illusion whereby a slight downhill slope appears to be an uphill slope. Water and cars left
out of gear both appear to roll uphill against gravity. This phenomenon is attributed to the layout of the
surrounding landscape which mostly or completely obstructs the horizon, making it difficult to accurately
judge the slope of a surface.
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If the Many Worlds Interpretation is the correct picture of the universe - and given what
scientific data we have at present we have very good reason to believe that it is, or at the
very least, might be - then we are faced with a structure that challenges the traditional
notion of strict numerical identity.

3.1

Identity

Imagine a very simple Many Worlds Universe that contains just one individual, a, and one
world, w, at time t0 . There are quantum events in this universe, and before long the world at
t0 branches, and at t1 it appears that we now have two worlds, w0 and w00 , each with individual
“a” - let’s say a0 and a00 , respectively. Now, what can we say about the relationship that a0
and a00 bear to a? And what about the relationship that a0 and a00 bear to each other?

3.1.1

“Ordinary” Identity

Perhaps it will be helpful to us to start by considering the “ordinary” case for a moment.
That is, the universe as we have become accustomed to thinking of it - singular, with linear
non-branching progression. How do we typically think about identity over time?
Consider a universe with just one individual in it, a. At time t0 , the universe contains a.
At time t1 , the universe still contains just one individual, a0 . a0 bears a striking resemblance
to a. Setting aside any scenarios involving malicious demons with penchants to vaporize
people and instantly replace them with other people who are physically indistinguishable
from their original victims2 , we are inclined to say that a and a0 don’t just bear a striking
resemblance to each other; they stand in an even more intimate relationship - they are the
same. a0 is a.
And this doesn’t just hold in our hypothetical simple universe. This is how we think or2

See Parfit (1984).
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dinarily think about individuals. Forgetting about branching, we typically consider presentday-Sally to be the same individual as yesterday-Sally. You typically consider you to be the
same individual as you were yesterday. That is to say, we assert identity claims across times.
Why do we think that a and a0 are the same? They look the same. They feel the same.
If we examine a and a0 more closely, we’ll find that they share most of the same properties.
They stand in the right sort of relevant psychological relationships to each other (whatever
those may be). If we ask a0 , she’ll say that she’s the same individual as a. There seems to
be spatio-temporal continuity between the two. Perhaps there’s some sort of unique essence
that they both have.3

3.1.2

Branching Identity

Consider again our branching universe scenario. What should we think about a and a0 now?
Well, if the ordinary case is any guidance, then we should say that a and a0 are the same.
After all, a and a0 look the same. They feel the same. They stand in the right sort of relevant
psychological relationships to each other. There’s spatio-temporal continuity between the
two. Perhaps there’s some sort of unique essence that they both have. They are the same.
What about a and a00 , then? Well, they look the same. They feel the same. They stand in
the right sort of relevant psychological relationships to each other. There’s spatio-temporal
continuity between the two. Perhaps there’s some sort of unique essence that they both
have. They are the same.
And what about a0 and a00 ? Are they the same as well? Well, they look the same. Do
they feel the same? That’s a bit confusing. To a third party, they seem like “twins” or
“alternates” but not really like the same individual. And from their own perspective, surely
a0 and a00 do not feel the same. If a0 falls and breaks an arm, a00 does not feel pain. Perhaps
3
This is by no means intended to be an exhaustive account of identity, nor even represent necessary
criteria for identity. Merely, this is a rough sort of conceptual analysis of our naı̈ve evaluation of identity.
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a00 feels like that could have been me. Or an that’s another me. But does she feel like a0 is
her ? No. a0 and a00 don’t feel the same.
Furthermore, if a0 and a00 are conscious objects, they don’t seem to stand in the right
sort of relevant psychological relationships to each other (whatever that entails). Their
psychologies are independent from one another. The thoughts, beliefs, and desires that a00
experiences in no way affect the thoughts, beliefs, and desires of a0 . They’re not spatiotemporally continuous, either. There is no straight line from a0 to a00 . Both are the result
of a branching in a’s timeline. They’re both spatio-temporally continuous with a, but not
with each other.
a0 and a00 are not the same.
Let’s recap. a is the same as a0 . a is the same as a00 . a0 is not the same as a00 . That fits
with our ordinary thoughts about sameness. But here’s another very ordinary thought we
have about being the same thing: if x is the same as y, and y is the same as z, then x is the
same as z. That is to say, you are the same individual as you were yesterday, and tomorrow
you will say that you are the same individual as you are today. And tomorrow you will also
say that you are the same individual as you were two days before.
And this is where our thoughts about a, a0 , and a00 begin to cause us trouble. It seems
fine to say that a is the same as a0 . And it seems fine to say that a is the same as a00 . But
saying that a0 is not the same as a00 is problematic. This non-sameness claim violates that
transitivity that we associate with sameness. If a0 is the same as a, and a is the same as a00 ,
then a0 should be the same as a00 . But it’s not. And what to think about that is puzzling.

3.1.3

An Impasse

In modern logic, it is standardly taken to be that case that strict numerical identity the sameness relation - is just that relation that everything has to itself and nothing else.
Formally, it has been characterized as an equivalence relation that satisfies both:
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x=x

(3.1)

x = y → ∀F (F x ↔ F y).

(3.2)

From (3.1) and (3.2) we also get reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity.
Which means that now we find ourselves at an impasse. If we continue to hold onto the
traditional notion of strict numerical identity, then we are in trouble. We cannot reconcile
the intuition that a is the same as both a0 and a00 , but that a0 and a00 are not the same as
each other. What to do?
One option is that we could let go of the intuitions concerning a’s identity relations.
Perhaps a is identical with a0 , but not a00 . Or maybe it’s a00 that bears the identity relation
to a and not a0 . Maybe neither of them is identical with a, and we’ve really been talking
about three distinct individuals this whole time. Or perhaps we’ve really misunderstood the
situation and a, a0 , and a00 are all identical.
Another option is to give up on our notion of strict identity. The transitive nature of
identity is the culprit here. If not for transitivity, we wouldn’t be forced into claiming that a0
is identical with a00 just because a is identical with the both of them. So maybe transitivity
has got to go.
Or maybe it’s neither of the above, and what we’ve taken to be an impasse is really a
false dilemma. Maybe we’re just really bad at tracking individuals. Perhaps there is nothing
wrong at all with our notion of identity, and our intuitions regarding a, a0 , a00 , and their
identity relations are correct - we’re just not that great at keeping track of individuals, even
in our super simple hypothetical universe.
There are defenders of all three accounts - and each has its own challenges it must face. I
believe that the third option represents our best way forward in understanding what identity
looks like in a branching universe - and it doesn’t require us to give up our notion of identity.
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But it is worthwhile to examine all of our options first.

3.2

Denying Identity

Our dilemma comes about as a result of attempting to hold that a is identical with a0 , and
a is identical with a00 , but a0 and a00 are not identical with each other. If we give up one of
these things, then our problem goes away. So, it makes sense to start by considering our
options for rejecting one (or more) of these claims.

3.2.1

Parfit

Parfit (1984) adopts this approach by claiming that whenever there is a case of branching,
a does not survive. a is identical with neither a0 nor a00 ; what we have instead are three
distinct individuals. And since a is identical with neither a0 , nor a00 , we don’t wind up in the
conundrum, of having to explain how come a0 is not identical with a00 . Clean and simple.
Branching is strange, after all. It’s not something we are accustomed to thinking about,
even though the Many Worlds Interpretation claims that it’s happening quite frequently.
(Since we are stuck within the branches, we have no way to experience it from the outside
and therefore must use metaphor and imagination to envision what it actually entails.) And
so maybe thinking that individuals survive branching is just mistaken.
Of course, if branching really does happen as frequently as the Many Worlds Interpretation suggests, then it’s a quite ordinary event (despite its strangeness). And this means that
in the course of our ordinary lives, “our lives” don’t really exist in the way that we’re used
to thinking of them. “Our lives” are much - much - shorter than we typically think of them
as. When I think back on my childhood, I’m not really thinking back on my childhood - I’m
really thinking on someone else’s childhood.
What’s more is that my future - that is, the future I think of myself having days, months,
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years from now - also isn’t mine. I’m not sure precisely how long my life is, but it certainly
doesn’t extend very long.
And that’s strange. Of course, strangeness itself isn’t a knockdown objection - after all,
quantum behavior is strange, no matter your interpretational theory. But it is something to
consider, especially when it runs counter to our experiences.
In a Many Worlds universe, Parfit’s theory entails not only that we misunderstand the
concept of an individual, but that we are entirely mistaken about our own identities. Most
of us think we had childhoods full of formative experiences, and have futures full of new
experiences awaiting us. But if Parfit is to be believed, this is all in error. None of that
belongs to us - it all belongs to other people. And that’s a bit hard to swallow.
Things get even more strange for Parfit, though. While we said that branching equates
to death, we need to add a qualifier - branching equates to death most of the time. There
are times when branching doesn’t equate to the death of an individual - when only one of
the branches contains the (previously thought of as identical) individual, and no others do.
Let’s go back to our simple branching universe again. According to Parfit, we have
individual a at time t0 . a’s timeline branches, and at t1 we have two branches, one with a0
and one with a00 . Parfit claims that in this scenario, a does not survive. Once branching
occurs, a ceases to exist and two new individuals, a0 and a00 , come into being (Parfit, 1984).
But what if something happens during the branching, and a0 fails to come into being?
Branching occurs, but when we investigate the universe at t1 , we find one empty branch, and
one branch with a00 . Since individuals do not survive branching, we’d expect that a ceases
to exist, and a00 comes into being, just as before.
But this is not so. Post-branching, in the event where there is a sufficiently similar
individual on only one branch, Parfit claims that there is survival. That is, a does not cease
to exist post branching, and a00 does not come into being. Rather, a continues to exist and
becomes a00 - a and a00 are the same. We are back to the “ordinary” way thinking about such
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things (Parfit, 1984).
This might be a relief to be back on familiar ground, but we ought not to get too comfortable just yet. Rather than making things clearer, Parfit has only muddied the waters. While
we might be relieved to find out there can be survival post-branching (and the emphasis here
is on can - remember that in a Many Worlds universe, branching is rampant and survival is
more of the exception rather than the rule) - the cause for the survival is very bizarre indeed.
It’s not the branching itself that kills off individuals, but the by-products of the branching.
The story goes something like this: timelines branch, sometimes individuals survive those
branches, and a lot of times they don’t. What determines whether an individual survives
branching is how many “replicas” there are post-branching. If there’s only one - that is to
say, there is only one branch in which there is an individual who is sufficiently similar to
the individual before branching, then the individual before branching survives. But if there
is more than one such individual - that is, if the individual has seemed to “replicate,” then
the individual that existed pre-branching ceases to exist and several new individuals come
into being. It’s not the process, but the results, that affect our identity relations. What
determines survival is the number of resultant individuals, plain and simple. One-to-one:
survival. One-to-many: death.
What allows a to survive is the non-existence of a0 . And a0 , remember, is a distinct
individual from a. So there’s two bizarre things going on here: firstly, something non-existent
influences the identity relation between a and a00 , and secondly, something completely distinct
from both a or a00 influences the identity relation between a and a00 .
This story certainly solves the identity problem at hand, but does it really help? This
story seems to be little, if any, improvement over the previous one. Thinking back to our
“ordinary” intuitions once again, it seems perfectly natural to say that a is identical with
a0 , and also to say that a is identical with a00 . Both a0 and a00 are sufficiently similar with a.
What’s more, if you ask either a0 or a00 , both will claim that they are identical with a. The
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reasons they give for such identity will be likely mention a similarity, continuity, the lack of
experience that would make one think she’s not the same, etc.
Contrast this with the non-branching case. Here, a0 will once again claim to be the same
as a. And when interrogated as to why a0 thinks this, she is likely to make claims about
similarity, continuity, the lack of experience that would make one think she’s not the same,
etc. In other words, the experiences of a0 (or a00 ), are identical in both the branching and
non-branching case. So if the existence of an individual on another branch has an effect on
identity, the effect it has isn’t on the experience of any of the individuals. Experientially,
a0 doesn’t know the difference between a universe in which a00 exists and one in which a00
doesn’t exist. As far as a0 ’s experience, the universes are identical - and she’s identical with
a in both of them.
If the difference between a0 being identical with a and not identical with a isn’t found
anywhere in the experience of a0 , then the culprit must be the mere existence of a00 . And
this is stranger than it might sound at first.
The identity relation is perhaps the most intimate of all logical relations. It is that relation
which holds only between a thing and itself. It seems very strange that the existence of some
third party - a party by Parfit’s account which is a distinct individual - should have any
impact on that. If a, a0 , and a00 are all different individuals, then it seems that they should
be different individuals regardless of whether a00 (or a000 , or a0000 ) exist. It seems very bizarre
that some distinct individual’s ontological status has any bearing on the identity relation of
another thing.
Let’s forget the time component here for a moment, and just consider a. a is identical to
a. That is the very simplest instance we can have of identity. Now, regardless of what else
we pack into our universe, a is still identical with a. Ontological crowding in no way impacts
this identity relation.
Why should the case differ with time? If a is identical with a0 , it should make no difference
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that a exists at t0 and a0 exists at t1 .4 If they are identical, then it should make no difference
how much other stuff we pack into our universe. The identity relation should still hold
between a and itself (which is a0 ). But this isn’t what Parfit claims. Parfit claims that the
other stuff in the universe does change the identity relation between a and itself, somehow
making a0 , not itself because something else exists. And this is just as strange as saying that
I am identical with myself only so long as my cat doesn’t exist. The one has no bearing on
the other.
No matter how we read Parfit’s view, it just seems wrong. The idea that individuals
don’t survive branching commits us to accepting that we lead very short lives, and that the
pasts we think of as shaping who we are don’t actually belong to us at all. Moreover, the
cases in which we do survive branching are even more bizarre. For there is nothing intrinsic
that accounts for our survival; rather it is the absence of something other’s existence that
permits us to say we are still the same. The end result is that identity is nothing like we
initially envisioned.

3.2.2

No Fact of the Matter

Rather than flat-out denying the identity of a with a0 , and a with a00 , we might take a softer
approach in claiming that a is identical with a0 -or-a00 , but there is no determinate fact of the
matter that identifies a with either.5 We might think of this view as “Parfit Light”.
The thought goes as such: consider a set of identical twins. Had their zyogote not split,
which twin would the resulting individual have been identical to? Surely, the zygote would
be identical with one or the other, but there is no determinate fact of the matter as to which
twin it would be.
4

One might argue that there is no such thing as identity over time, and that strict identity exists only at
times, rather than between times. That is a position that is rather tangential to the discussion at hand, and
certainly not the position that Parfit has taken.
5
I don’t know that anyone takes up this view, but Michael Devitt brought it my attention as a possible
response to the problem at hand.
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This indeterminacy is reminiscent of Parfit’s view that fission equals death, except if the
other would-be post-fission party dies. I argued in the last section that if identity is the
relation which holds only between an individual and itself, then it seems very strange that
some third party should have any impact on that. And that seems to be what is going on
here. If a is identical with a0 , then that relation should hold regardless of the existence of
a00 .
Suppose that shortly after splitting, the embryo that would have become a00 ceases developing. It seems to me that we would not hesitate to say that the a0 embryo (and resulting
human being) was the zygote a. But if we are willing to say this in the case of the death of
a00 , we should also be willing to say this is the case of the viability of a00 as well.

3.3

Denying Transitivity

Adopting the strategy of saying that neither a0 nor a00 is identical with a proves to be
problematic. Luckily, it’s not the only avenue we have out of this mess. The other obvious
pathway before us is to claim that both a0 and a00 are identical with a. And while this path
might be easy to spot, the route to getting there isn’t as obvious.
The problem with asserting that both a0 and a00 are identical with a comes about as a
result of the transitivity of identity. If a0 is identical with a and a is identical with a00 , then
by transitivity, a0 is identical with a00 . And that seems clearly wrong. So the challenge in
claiming that both a0 and a00 are identical with a is to do so without also committing oneself
to the identity of a0 and a00 . And to this, there have been several attempts.
Perhaps the most straightforward approach is simply denying the transitivity of identity.
Transitivity is the culprit here, and for many of life’s problems, the solution is to remove the
trouble-making entity. And at least prima facie, if we simply deny that identity is transitive,
then the problem is solved. We are able to say that a is identical with a0 , and a is identical
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with a00 without then also committing ourselves to the identity of a0 and a00 . And so we have
arrived right back at our “ordinary” intuitions concerning the matter - surely promising
terrain.
But that’s not the end of the story. While denying the transitivity of identity might easily
solve the problem at hand, we must first justify such a denial. You see, the transitivity
of identity has long been accepted as fundamental to the notion of identity, though it is
incredibly difficult - if not impossible - to give any independent argument for it. Most
attempts to justify our definition of identity seem to do so by invoking identity itself. But
this doesn’t mean that we aren’t, in fact, justified in our definition.
There are several logical principles that seem to suffer from this definitional-justificatory
circularity that we nonetheless feel justified in accepting. Modus ponens is an often-cited example of such a principle. Wright (2004) argues that despite the lack of a non-circular
justification in their defense, we have a rational entitlement to these principles, as the
very virtue of such mooted principles is that there can be nothing more fundamental. Of
course, this entitlement holds only provided that there are no known counter-examples. And
whether branching constitutes a counter-example to the transitivity of identity is dependent
on whether it can be adequately accounted for within our current definition. Until it has
been settled in negative, if we are to deny what has heretofore been considered an essential
property of identity, then we must have really good reasons for doing so.
There have been a few philosophers who have gone down this path, including Prior (1957)
and Priest (2014). Prior’s justification for denying transitivity rests entirely on the problem
at hand, or the “amoeba problem”. It’s not necessary to consider branching universes or scifi teleportation, or evil demons; the issue of identity crops up under very ordinary everyday
circumstances.
Amoebas are able to replicate by way of division. A single amoeba will split itself apart,
resulting in two amoebas post-division. This process of reproduction carries with it the
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exact same questions regarding identity that we have been considering as problematic for
our branching universe model, except that these identity questions happen within a single
world.

3.3.1

Prior

Prior (1957) argues that the amoebae case (and branching in general) are grounds for rejecting the transitivity of identity. He contemplates an example wherein people reproduce like
amoebae, and asks us to suppose that you and I are the products of such a fission. Each of
us has a perfect memory of having been the “original” person, though now the two of us are
both clearly different people who do different things - for instance, I may be reading Plato
and you not. Prior claims that in such a situation, it seems that I could correctly say to you,
“Once you were me,” and you could correctly say the same to me as well. However, neither
of us could correctly say, “You are me,” as this entails, according to Prior, that whatever is
true of me is true of you, and this is ex hypothesi false in the matter of reading Plato. On
the other hand, “You were me,” does not seem to have this consequence, as it only entails
whatever was true of me was true of you, and that seems harmless.
Except it turns out that it’s not harmless. Prior argues that if it was the case before the
fission that I would now be reading Plato, then it was the case before the fission that you
would now be reading Plato. But, you’re not now reading Plato! So it couldn’t have been
the case that you would now be reading Plato. And so, Prior claims, even saying, “You were
me,” entails that whatever is true of me is true of you. And that is clearly mistaken. Faced
with this dilemmea, Prior concludes that the best course of action is to deny the transitivity
of identity. We are both identical with the person before fission, but as long as identity isn’t
transitive, we do have to say that we are identical with each other (Prior, 1957).
Even if we buy into Prior’s argument that amoebas and branching are grounds enough
that identity is not transitive, we somehow haven’t moved any further forward in our under81
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standing of the identity relation. Rather than having a better understanding of identity, we
have a less complete one. For while Prior argues against the standard account of identity, he
doesn’t give us a new one. So at best, we are left with a shattered idea of identity without
any worthwhile replacement.

3.3.2

Priest

Priest (2014) approaches the transitivity of identity from a different angle. He, too, employs
the amoeba case as a counter-example to the transitivity of identity, but does so with the
intent of arguing in favor of his metaphysics of gluons. Priest’s theory of identity relies on
a paraconsistent logic in order to define identity as the material conditional, without then
being committed to transitivity.
For reasons beyond the scope of this discussion, Priest believes that there are entities
(namely gluons), which do the work of metaphysically gluing together a unity. In order to
make sense of how it is that gluons glue, Priest must admit contradictory entities into his
metaphysics. Doing so allows Priest to keep the standard Leibnizian (given by 3.1 and 3.2)
notion of indiscernibility. The behavior of identity will be inherited from the behavior of the
material equivalence within a paraconsistent framework. The upshot here is that Priest has
a notion of identity which is reflexive and symmetric, but in general, not transitive (Priest,
2014).
This solution comes at a metaphysical cost. Priest preserves a non-transitive notion of
Leibnizian identity at the price of adopting contradictory entities. While for some, this
might not seem too radical, many others will balk at this revisionary logic. Of course, we
ought not to hold tight to consistency out of mere stubbornness. If the world truly admits
of contradictory entities (and I’ll leave it to Priest to make the argument that it does), then
we ought to admit them as well.
Let’s give Priest the benefit of the doubt for the moment. Suppose we have good reasons
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to think there are contradictory objects in our universe, and that identity behaves like the
material equivalence. It’s not clear that this actually solves the problem that our branching
people, or even our amoeba, face. Even though transitivity is not admitted generally, Priest’s
identity does have it sometimes. In particular, when the “middle” object is consistent (that
is to say that it has no contradictory property). For example, suppose that a = b = c.
Consider any property P . If b is consistent, then P a ≡ P b and P b ≡ P c. Hence, (P a ≡
P c) ∨ (P b ∧ ¬P b). Since we stipulated that b is consistent, we have P a ≡ P c, so a = c
(Priest, 2014).
So the question at hands becomes, “is our amoeba a consistent object?” In our case, the
“middle” object is a. Is a a consistent object?
Consider the kind of objects that Priest takes as paradigmatic of contradictory entities.
On the one hand, we have self-referential statements. These typically come in two flavors:
semantic and set-theoretic. Of the semantic self-referential statements perhaps the most
notable is the Liar sentence, “This sentence is false.” and its brethren. If the statement is
true, then its content dictates that it’s false, and if the statement is false, then its content
dictates that is it true. We also get self-referential paradoxes in set theory. Russell’s paradox
- consider the set of all non self-membered sets - and Cantor’s paradox - consider the set of
all sets - both ask that we simultaneously include and exclude the set under consideration
as a member of that set (Priest et al., 2018).
Another type of entity that Priest considers exemplary of being contradictory are transition states and borderline cases of vague predicates. Priest argues that we ought to treat
some instances of the predicate baldness as contradictory - it is both true that a man with
half a head of hair is bald, while also being false that that same man is bald. The same can
be said of walking through a doorway - at the moment when one is in the doorway, one is
both inside and outside of the room.
Then there are entities like Priest’s gluons. These are hypothesized entities which act
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as the metaphysical “glue” that functions to bind together parts into a whole. Gluons are
contradictory, being both objects (we can refer to them, think about them, et cetera) and
not being objects (for then they themselves would be parts of the whole, and would require
some other bit to metaphysically join them with the rest of the parts) (Priest, 2014).
Notice what is missing from this list: ordinary medium-sized physical objects. Things
like trees, and chairs, and cats. Even if we accept these other contradictory entities, this
does not then entail that all - or even most - of the entities that we run into in the world
are contradictory. And this is good news for the proponent of dialethism! Accepting contradictory objects into one’s metaphysics might seem extreme - but when one realizes that
contradictory objects are the exception within the universe, and not the rule, dialetheism
becomes much more palatable.
But where does that leave us, then? Let’s suppose that a is an average medium-sized
object - much like an amoeba or person. We have no obvious independent reason to think that
a is inconsistent. After all, amoebas are rather ordinary entities much like trees or people.
And we don’t typically think that all those entities are contradictory (not even Priest claims
that ordinary medium-sized objects are contradictory). But if a isn’t contradictory - if a is a
consistent object - then we get transitive identity for a. And that leaves us right back where
we started.
Perhaps there is a property that we have overlooked, and a is not consistent afterall.
Maybe a does have contradictory properties - afterall, a0 and a00 seem obviously non-identical.
But if they are each taken to be identical with a, then there must be some property, P , for
which both P a and ¬P a. But what could this property be? Perhaps it is the property being
identical with a0 . If a were both identical with a0 and not identical with a0 , then a would be
contradictory, we would no longer have transitive identity, and we could avoid asserting that
a0 and a00 are identical.
That a has the property of being identical with a0 is easy to see. But what about not
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being identical with a0 ? This is not as obvious. What evidence do we have to suppose that a
lacks being identical with a0 ? That a is identical with something other than a0 - a00 - does not
justify our assertion that a has the property not being identical with a0 . It simply means that
a has both the properties being identical with a0 and being identical with a00 . The only way
that being identical with a00 justifies also asserting that a lacks the property being identical
with a0 , is to assert that being identical with a0 and being identical with a00 are themselves
contradictory.
But even this doesn’t get us out of the woods. For what justification do we have for
taking being identical with a0 and being identical with a00 to be contradictory? It seems we
can only justify these properties as contradictory if we have already established that a0 and
a00 are not identical. And to establish that, a must be contradictory. We are back to where
we started.
In addition to questions regarding justification, there is another issue that crops up when
we attempt to appeal to the property not being identical with a0 - namely, that this seems
to be an extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, property. There has commonly been an effort to
distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic properties when it comes to identity, with intrinsic
properties - the properties we have purely in virtue of the way we are - being the only ones
that are important to analyses of identity. Extrinsic properties - the properties we have in
virtue of some external entity, or the way we interact with the world - don’t “count.”
The reasoning behind this distinction seems twofold. For one, there’s something intuitively appealing here. Identity is the most intimate of relations, being that equivalence
relation that holds solely between a thing and itself. It seems bizarre, then, to consider other
things when determining the identity of something. The identity of a thing doesn’t require
there to be any other things at all; all it requires is that thing. Thus, it seems strange to
base evaluations of identity on properties an object has in relation to other things.
Secondly, if we permit appeal to extrinsic properties when evaluating identity, then we’ve
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effectively rejected the notion that there can be identity over time at all. Every physical
object will have a spacetime location. And that location will change over time, even if no
other properties of the object does. Even if the object does not move! Thus, any physical
object will have at least one unique property at any given time that they do not have at any
other. And that either means that we give up identity over time altogether, or else we have
to claim that everything is contradictory in order to do some fancy gymnastics to preserve
it. Neither, I contend, is very appealing.

3.4

Overlapping Individuals

So where does that leave us? On the one hand, we have Parfit’s Very Short Lives, and on
the other we have Priest’s Contradictory Ameobas. Both of these views have their share of
rather problematic consequences.

3.4.1

Lewis

Luckily, there is another option available to us - one that doesn’t commit us to constant
death and preserves transitivity of identity to boot. Furthermore, I argue that it is our best
option for thinking of identity over time, whether or not we live in a branching universe.
It seems that much of the issue in dealing with identity over time is caused by thinking
that an individual is wholly present at any given time that it exists. That is to say that if a
exists at time t0 , then a wholly exists at t0 .
This is an understandably natural assumption given how we experience the world. Our
consciousness “lives” in the present. For any time, we consciously experience only that time
at that time. We don’t, for instance, simultaneously experience both time t1 and t5 . We
experience t1 at t1 and t5 at t5 , and nothing else.
These singular temporal experiences can lead one into mistakenly believing in singular
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temporal existences. But if quantum mechanics has taught us anything at all, it is that there
is more to the universe that we can experience. Just because we experience only one time
at time, we shouldn’t be mistaken into identifying individuals with the parts of them that
exist at those times. An analogy here might be useful.
Consider the United States of America. It is large. So large that it is not possible to
experience its entirety from any single location within it. It is also exceptionally diverse,
with habitats ranging from tropical to desert to polar. It would therefore be a tremendous
mistake to identify the entirety of the United States of America with any single location
within it. We would be no more correct in identifying the United States with New York
City than we would be in identifying it with Missoula, Montana. Each of those locations are
merely parts of the United States, the whole of which comprises of the sum of its parts.
So too should we think of identity over time. We have difficulty in dealing with our
identity puzzles because we have mistakenly identified the entirety of an individual with
merely one of its parts. a at t0 is no more a in toto than Boise, Idaho is the United States
of America. a at t0 is merely one part of a - a temporal part. And it would be just an
erroneous to identify a with a at t0 as it would to identify Boise, Idaho with the United
States of America. And yet, that is exactly what we have been doing up until now.
Once we understand that a is a temporally extended individual, and not merely a at time
tn but rather the totality of all of its temporal parts - all the ‘a’s at time tn put together
- then we can solve our amoeba identity puzzle and understand how identity works in a
branching universe.
This view that objects are temporally extended in time, rather than wholly existent at
a time, is known as perdurantism, or sometimes, the worm theory of identity. Championed
most notably by Lewis (1987), the worm theory of identity tells us that objects are temporally
extended in much the same fashion as they are spatially extended. And just as an object
is composed of the sum of its spatial parts, so too is an object composed of the sum of its
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temporal parts. That is to say that individual a is the entire existence of a - a is every part
of a from birth to death all put together - not any single moment or chunk of a’s existence.
So how does this help our amoeba? Recall that at t0 we have ameboa a. a splits, and
at t1 , we find we have two ameobas, a0 and a00 . Both a0 and a00 are sufficiently similar to a
such that ordinarily we wouldn’t hesitate to say that either a0 or a00 are identical with a. But
it’s also pretty clear that a0 and a00 are not identical with each other, and so asserting that
both a00 and a00 are identical with a poses problems for us given that identity is a transitive
relation.
Perdurantism is able to solve this conundrum rather readily. So far, we have assumed
that a, a0 , and a00 are three wholly existent entities, and have then attempted to determine
the identity relations between them. But perdurantism tells us that a, a0 , and a00 aren’t three
wholly existent entities - they’re merely parts of entities. And this makes all the difference.
Once we realize that a, a0 , and a00 are not whole entities themselves, our question shifts
from What is the identity relationship between these three individuals? to To what individuals
do these parts belong? And that question can be answered without denying the transitivity
of identity, and without committing ourselves to the death of a every time it splits, and while
preserving our naı̈ve intuitions regarding the relationships between a, a0 , and a00 .
Let’s reconsider our naı̈ve intuitions about the situation. Our prima facie instinct is
to say the a is identical with a0 , a is identical with a00 , and a0 and a00 are not identical. If
we replace is identical with with is a part of the same individual as, then we can start to
understand what is going on here. a is a part of the same individual as a0 . a is a part of the
same individual as a00 . a0 and a00 are not part of the same individual.
This shift is crucial. For one, unlike the identity relation, being a part of the same
individual is not a transitive relation. Hawai’i and Oregon are both parts of the United
States of America, and Hawai’i and Fiji are both parts of the Pacific Islands. But this does
not entail that Oregon and Fiji are parts of the same individual. The fact that transitivity
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here fails is a good thing for our amoeba. Remember, we don’t want to have to commit
ourselves to the relation holding between a0 and a00 merely because it holds between a and
a0 , and a and a00 .
We’re off to a good start. But we still have to answer our question, to what individual
do these parts belong? We’ve said that a and a0 are parts of the same individual, and a and
a00 are parts of the same individual, but a0 and a00 are not. In order for this story to make
sense, there must be two individuals: the one constituted by a, a0 , and some other parts;
and the one constituted by a, a00 , and some other parts. The former has a and a0 among its
parts but not a00 ; and the latter has a and a00 among its parts but not a0 . For the sake of
clarity, let’s call the former individual amoeba X and the later amoeba Y .
X is the individual which is the sum of all its temporal parts from the moment of creation
to the moment of extinction. That is to say, it is all the pieces put together from its birth
until death. No one single chunk of this existence can be properly identified as X - only as
part of X.

Perdurantism with Many Worlds
Recall that the Many Worlds Interpretation tells us that for any quantum event, there
is a world which realizes each possible outcome. Ultimately, this creates a universe with a
branching tree-like structure. Individuals in this universe face splitting similar to our amoeba
(with the exception that the post-split individuals exist in separate worlds). We are faced
with the same situation as splitting in a non-branching universe; we have every reason to
think that both of the post-split individuals are the same as the pre-split individual, but not
the same as each other. And this is problematic. Either our conception of identity over time
is in jeopardy, or else our definition of identity itself is.
But just as perdurantism provided us with a with a way to address the splitting of our
amoeba without giving up identity over time or transitivity of identity, so too can we employ
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it to do the same for us in a Many Worlds Universe.
Once more, if we pick out individuals as the sum of all of their temporal parts - their
entire existence from creation to extinction. It is only this object which is properly identified
as Sally (or Jamie, or Fido). Any other smaller bit is simply a part of Sally (or Jamie, or
Fido). And as we recall from before, being a part of is not a transitive relation.
So let’s suppose that Sally lives in world w at time t0 , and w branches. At t1 , we find
instead of w, two worlds - w0 and w00 . Both w0 and w00 are spatio-temporally continuous with
w, and both appear to contain Sally. Which is the real Sally? Which is the one that is the
same Sally as the Sally in w at t0 ? Well, both are.
Sally in w at t0 is not a whole person (at least not metaphysically speaking). Sally in w
at t0 is only part of a larger individual. In fact, Sally in w at t0 is part of at least two larger
individuals, both named Sally - the Sally that contains w at t0 , w0 at t1 , and some other
parts; and the Sally that contains w at t0 , w00 at t1 , and some other parts. Both Sally in w0
and Sally in w00 are the “real” Sally, because both have Sally at t0 as a temporal part.
But importantly, Sally in w0 at t1 is not part of the same Sally as Sally in w00 at t1 . Both
are parts of a Sally, and both of those Sallys that they are parts of also have Sally in w at
t0 as parts, but Sally in w0 at t1 is part of a different Sally than Sally in w00 at t1 . And this
makes sense. Sally in w0 at t1 is not spatio-temporally continuous with Sally in w00 at t1 , nor
do they share the relevant important psychological relationships. What happens to Sally in
w0 at t1 , in no way affects Sally in w00 at t1 , and vice versa (whereas what happens to Sally
in w0 at t0 , does affect both Sally in w0 at t1 and Sally in w00 at t1 ).
We might, as this point, wonder how it can be that Sally at t0 could be a part of two
different people. Even if myself now is only a part of me, it still seems that me-now is a part
of me, and not a part someone else. After all, me-now is a singular, definite, spatiotemporal
object. How can one physical object be part of two individuals?
Another analogy might prove useful once again. Consider the two roads, Interstate 87
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and the New York State Thruway. Each of these roads is a unique individual - each begins
in a different place, ends in a different place, and its extension has a different length. These
are two different roads.
And yet, for approximately 150 miles from just north of the Bronx to just outside of
Albany, Interstate 87 and the New York State Thruway coincide. That is to say, that
for this stretch, I-87 and the NYS Thruway share the same spatiotemporal region - they
completely overlap. If you are driving on the NYS Thruway in this section, you are also
driving on I-87, and vice versa. Just like Sally in w0 and Sally in w00 , The New York State
Thruway and Interstate 87 are distinct individuals that share a spatiotemporal part.
Thus, we have an account of identity over time in a branching universe that preserves
the transitivity of identity while not committing ourselves to near-constant deaths.
But there is something a bit weird about this story. If we are to believe the Many Worlds
Interpretation, then branching happens a lot. And if branching happens a lot, that means
that there are a lot of ‘overlapping people roads’ (and chair roads, and road roads). And
this means that each of us, at this very moment, are actually parts of multiple people. The
current world that you are a part of is going to branch in the near furture - perhaps into
several new worlds - and those worlds are each going to branch into more worlds, and so on.
And except in futures where you are met with sudden demise, each of those worlds is going
to have a person (not a whole person, but a part of a person) that has you - the current
part of you - as part of their personal history. To put it loosely - the future contains a lot
of different yous. And that means that right now, you are actually many, many different
people. And that seems weird.
After all, it’s incredibly counter-intuitive to think that you are multiple people. You
don’t seem or feel like multiple people. You tend to think of yourself as one person with one
future - perhaps a future with multiple possibilities, either epistemically or metaphysically
speaking depending on your inclination - but one future nonetheless. And to say that you
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really have multiples futures just seems plain wrong.
And it is wrong. This sort of mistaken thinking is a pitfall of that “loose” way of talking.
After all, it is not uncommon to talk as if the temporal part of us that exists now is a
whole person. And when we do so, we run into these sorts of multiple-persons problems.
But it would be a mistake to let this loose talk confuse us - and an even bigger one to let
it determine our metaphysics! Futhermore, for every instance in which we talk as if the
temporal part of us that exists now is a whole person, we also speak in such a way as to
recognize that it’s not. We often reference our pasts as parts of us, and not as wholly existent
individuals. So if casual speech is to be indicative of our metaphysical situation (a bad move
altogether), it is of no use to us in this instance.
You (right now) aren’t actually multiple people because you (right now) aren’t actually
a whole person - you’re merely part of a whole person. You - that whole individual which
is the sum of your temporal parts - have exactly one future. You will experience just one
spatiotemporal trajectory of just one life. That is it. It simply happens that there are many
individuals who have overlapping pasts. But no one of those individuals leads multiple lives,
and it would be a mistake of perspective to look into the future and think so.

3.4.2

Perry

There is another position, proposed by Perry (1972), that is closely related to perdurantism
and worth a brief discussion.
Perry proposes that we identify individuals with “lifetimes.” A lifetime is
any set of [temporal parts for which] . . . there is some member in the set such
that all and only members of the set have R to that [temporal part] (Perry, 1972,
481)
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where R is some temporal-unity relation6 For example, let’s suppose that we have a at
t0 , no fission occurs, and we find we have a0 at t1 . On Perry’s account, a and a0 are temporal
parts that are R-related to one another, and thus form a single lifetime (i.e. individual).
Nothing surprising here.
In the case of fissioning, however, things get a bit more complex. Suppose once again
that we have a at t0 , this time fission occurs, and at t1 , we find we now have two objects, a0
and a00 . According to Perry, a0 and a are R-related, and form one lifetime; and a00 and a are
R-related, and thus form another lifetime. But it’s also the case that a is R-related to both
a0 and a00 , and thus composes a third lifetime, that of the hydra-like structure comprising a,
a0 , and a00 :
The Y-shaped structure, although not a branch, is a lifetime; for all [temporal
parts] in it have R to [a] . . . But the two branches that compose the Y-shaped
structure are also each lifetimes. . . . [a] belong[s] to three lifetimes: the Y-shaped
structure and each of its branches. (Perry, 1972, 481)
In the case of rampant fission like that of the Many Worlds Interpretation, this means that
we not only have however many individuals that would be picked out by the perdurantist’s
temporal worms, but we also have many more individuals composed of hydras, and hydras
within hydras.
Perry tries to make the situation more palatable by introducing the notion determinability
at a given time:
Now, at any given time t, only a certain number of lifetimes will be determinable,
in the sense that they are determined by some [temporal part] occurring at that
time. Before [fission], neither of the branches are determinable in this sense:
there is no [temporal part] occurring which has R to all and only their members.
6

Perry adopts the analysis of R as given by Grice (1941) and Quinton (1962).
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The Y-shaped lifetime is similarly not determinable after [fission]. (Perry, 1972,
481)
Is determinability epistemic, or metaphysical? If it’s epistemic, it does nothing to allay
the shock over how many individuals exist in the Universe.
If it’s metaphysical, then Perry seems to suggest that the number of individuals changes,
depending on when we choose to count them. And that’s a bit strange. Perry recognizes the
four-dimensional existence of the entire hydra structure at t0 ; it contains three objects, a, a0 ,
and a00 , that stand in a certain relations to one another. Post-fission at t1 , nothing about this
structure has changed. And yet, if determinability is metaphysical, the number of individuals
has changed. In other words, the number of individuals doesn’t seem to supervene on just
the objects and relations within our structure.
It’s not clear what benefit Perry’s theory provides over perdurantism, but it is clear
at what cost. Not only do we add many more individuals to our ontology (which isn’t
problematic per se), but we also must reconceptualize the notion of an individual. On
Perry’s view, we have disjoint individuals - a single individual (the lifetime picked out by
the hydra) can have parts in separate worlds, all having simultaneous, disjoint experiences.
And this strikes me as a radical departure from the initial characterization of identity as the
most intimate of all relations.
Furthermore, the Many Worlds Interpretation in particular seems to present some challenges for Perry. Perry puts forth his lifetimes view of individuals under the pretext that
fission (if it occurs at all) is exceptionally rare, and that the typical individual is represented
by a linear structure. But even Perry seems to give up his view when confronted with the
idea that fission might be rampant:
It may be that, if selves divided as often as cells or amoebas divide . . . it would
apparently be correct to say that [a] died, and two new [individuals] were born,
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at the time of [branching]. (Perry, 1972, 486-487)
It seems bizarre that the frequency of fissioning - not fissioning itself - should determine
our identity relations.
Moreover, it is reasonable to demand that the correct identity relation for macroscopic
objects (and indeed for quasi-classical worlds) answer to the same considerations as does
any candidate for higher-level ontology: that is, it must pick out an explanatorily important
structure in the world. And as mere conglomerateas of mutally non-interacting structures,
Perry’s disjoint individuals cannot do so.
And so, I argue that perdurantism is our best option for considering identity over time.

3.4.3

Objections to Perdurantism

There have generally been two sorts of objections leveled at perdurantism: those that claim
perdurantism cannot be correct because it’s just too weird, and those that claim that perdurantism doesn’t produce the correct evaluation of modal properties. I shall start with the
first.
The argument (for want of a better descriptor) goes like this: In cases of branching,
perdurantism tells us that prior to said branching there exists two individuals sharing one
physical body (at some tn ). But that’s preposterous. So, perdurantism is clearly wrong.
The problem here is that this is not really an objection. Perdurantism is weird, but mere
“weirdness” is not itself an objection. There must be something more behind that weirdness
in order to warrant being taken seriously. And perhaps the something more here is the
claim that two individuals cannot have co-located parts. But we’ve already shown this to
be incorrect - we have very ordinary cases of co-located roadways. Perhaps there’s a deeper
concern here that co-location is well and good for objects without a mental life like roadways,
but more problematic to have more complex co-located individuals like people. Overlapping
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roads are one thing, but to claim that two people, who we largely (if not entirely) identify
by their mental life, can be in one body is just absurd. Again, this is too quick. If we
look to psychology, we have very ordinary cases of this kind of many-in-one situation for
persons. Dissociative Identity Disorder (APA, 2013) - commonly known as having multiplepersonalities - is an instance whereby one physical person lives two (or more) mental lives,
all distinct from each other. Claiming that perdurantism cannot be correct by fiat is not
going to work.
There is a more subtle version of this objection that is worth giving some attention to.
Perdurantism has a counting problem - it leads to overpopulation. Supposed we wish to count
the population at a given time. We do so by counting physical bodies (or person-slices). But
if we allow for overlap, then there are many more persons than there are person-slices. We
have a population discrepancy.
For instance, we say that in a case of fission one person becomes two. By describing fissions as initial stage-sharing we provide for the two, but now for the one.
There are two all along. It is all very well to say from an eternal or postfission
standpoint that two persons (with a common initial segment) are involved, but
we also demand to say that on the day before the fission only one person entered
the duplication center; that his mother did not bear twins; until he fissions he
should only have one vote; and so on. Counting at a time, we insist on counting
a person who will fission as one. We insist on a method of counting persons that
agrees with the result of counting stages, though we do not think that counting
persons just is counting (simultaneous) stages. (Lewis, 1987, 10)
The trouble here lies in insisting that we count by identity. Doing so requires us to count
overlapping people as two (or more), while in fact we only count them as one. However,
we can simply insist that counting at a time is not done by identity, but by some weaker
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relation of identity-at-a-time, or as Lewis calls this, tensed identity.
Let us say that continuants C1 and C2 7 are identical − at − time − t if and only
if they both exist at t and their stages at t are identical. (More precisely: C1 and
C2 both have stages at t, and all and only stages of C1 at t are stages of C2 at
t.) (Lewis, 1987, 10)
Tensed identity is not a kind of identity, but rather a derivative relation among persons
which is induced by identity among timeslices. It is not identity among persons, but rather
a relation that is weaker than identity whenever different persons have overlap. If we count
persons by tensed identity rather than by identity, we will get the right answer - the answer
that agrees with the answer that we get by counting timeslice - even if there is overlap.
Counting problems aside, there is another argument leveled at perdurantism, this time
having to do with perdurantism’s modal properties: persons have different properties, in
particular different modal properties, from the summation of person-stages with which perdurance identifies them. Thus by 3.2 this identification must be mistaken (Wiggins, 1980).
This argument is quite interesting, but not, I think, a deal breaker. In order to properly
address this argument, we must first come to an understanding of how it is that we ought
to analyze modal identity - a topic which I shall take up in the next chapter.

7

Lewis here uses the term ‘continuant’ to refer to the extended individual that is the maximal aggregate
of all of its spatiotemporal slices.
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One argument that has been leveraged against perdurantism is the idea that an object has
different modal properties from the summation of temporal slices with which perdurantism
identifies those objects. Thus, by the Indiscernibility of Identicals, this identification must
be mistaken:
Anything that is part of a Lesniewskian sum [a mereological whole defined by
its parts] is necessarily a part of it. . . But no person or normal material object is
necessarily in the total state that will correspond to the person- or object-moment
postulated by the theory under discussion. (Wiggins, 1980, 168)
For example, I might have died when I was five years old. But that maximal summation
of person-stages which, according to perdurance theory, is me and has a temporal extent of
at least thirty years, could not have had a temporal extent of a mere five years. So I cannot
be such a summation of stages.
As mentioned at the end of last chapter, this argument is both alluring, and I contend,
mistaken. But in order to properly address this argument, we must first come to an understanding of how it is that we ought to analyze modal statements and identity claims.
98

CHAPTER 4. TRANSWORLD IDENTITIES

4.1

Evaluating Modal Claims

4.1.1

Indicative Versus Modal Claims

Winter in New York City occasionally produces snow storms. Let’s suppose there is a
winter storm that meterologists have been tracking across the northeast and based on known
atmospheric conditions and patterns of how storms typically behave, meteorologists are
calling for several inches of snow to dust New York City tomorrow.
Consider the claim,
(4.1) It might snow tomorrow.
How should we go about evaluating this statement? Well, we could simply wait until
tomorrow and see if it does, in fact, snow. Let’s suppose that it does. It seems clear that
(4.1) is true in this case. Certainly, given that it did, in fact, snow, it must have been possible
for it to snow.
But what if it doesn’t snow? Suppose the storm picks up a bit of speed and moves a bit
too far east before it hits New York City. Does that mean that (4.1) is false?
That doesn’t seem right. After all, even though it didn’t snow, the conditions were ripe
for snow. There was a snow storm that was on track to hit New York, but changed trajectory
late in the day and happened to miss New York City instead. And so, it didn’t snow. That
is the fact of the matter. But still, there is a very strong sense in which it could have snowed.
The fact that it didn’t snow doesn’t seem to preclude the possibility that it might have
snowed.
In other words, it seems that the claim of (4.1) is of a different kind than the claim,
(4.2) It will snow tomorrow.
While both (4.1) and (4.2) make claims about future states of affairs, (4.2) is easily
evaluable with a little bit of patience by examination of the actual world. If it snows, then
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(4.2) is true, and if it doesn’t snow, then (4.2) is false. On the other hand, we may think
that (4.1) is true even if it doesn’t snow! And so it seems that (4.1) is of a different sort
from the claim of (4.2) - one that cannot simply be evaluated by considering actual states
of affairs.
This type of claim - a claim about what is possible is one type of modal claim. Another
type of modal claim makes assertions about what is necessary.
Consider the claim,
(4.3) Animals as massive as whales must live in the ocean and not on land.
Here, instead of a claim about possibility, we have one about necessity - about what must
be. How should we evaluate this claim? Again, we could look to the actual world and see
if there are any animals as massive as whales that live on land – but simply affirming that
all the animals of whale-ish mass are ocean-dwellers doesn’t seem sufficient. The claim of
(4.3) seems to be about more than what happens to be. Rather, (4.3) seems to be saying
something bigger – it’s making a claim about what must be the case, rather than simply
what just is the case. It’s saying that it must be the case that an animal as massive as a
whale lives in the ocean – it could not be any other way. And simply looking around the
actual world isn’t going to be able to tell us that.
Of course, if we find out that there is a land-dwelling animal of whale-ish mass, it would be
sufficient to disprove (4.3). Sometimes, looking at the actual world is enough. In particular,
when we make claims about possibility that are realized in the actual world; and claims
about necessity that aren’t realized in the actual world. In these cases, the actual world
serves as the minimal example (or counter-example) necessary to prove (or disprove) the
claim. But it seems clear that the actual world becomes quickly insufficient in instances
where there are claims of possibility which do not hold at the actual world, and claims of
necessity which do.
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And if we agree to these differences, then we can’t evaluate claims like (4.1) and (4.3) by
simply examining our own world. We need some additional apparatus to deal with these sorts
of hyper-actual claims – the kind of claim that is being employed against the perdurantist.

4.1.2

Possible Worlds

The standard manœuvre these days when it comes to evaluating modal claims appeals to
possible worlds. We are tasked with thinking of some other worlds – possible worlds – and
told to examine those worlds to determine the truth value of our modal claims.
For modal claims about possibility, if there is at least one accessible world in which the
possible state of affairs occurs, then that claim is true. (Accessibility is a relation of relative
possibility between worlds. Certain states of affiars are possible relative to some worlds, but
not others.) It need not matter that state of affairs not occur in the actual world; it just
needs to occur in some accessible possible world. As long as there is some accessible possible
world in which it snows tomorrow, then (4.1) is true, regardless of the storm’s unexpected
shift in the actual world (Menzel, 2017).
A similar treatment is given to modal claims of necessity. For these claims, we are again
asked to consider possible worlds. However, rather than just looking to see if the state of
affairs occurs in just some accessible world, it must occur in all accessible possible worlds.
If so, the modal necessity claim is true, and if not, it is false. Upon examination of all
the accessible possible worlds, if it is the case that all animals of whale-ish mass are ocean
dwellers, then (4.3) is true. However, if we find even one world in which an animal as massive
as a whale lives on land rather than the ocean – even if this never happens in the actual
world – then the claim that it’s necessary that animals as massive as a whales live in the
ocean and not on land is false (Menzel, 2017).
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4.1.3

The Landscape of Logical Space

This possible world apparatus proves quite useful in evaluating the hyper-actuality of modal
claims. But these worlds almost immediately introduce a new problem: how do we decide
what these possible worlds are? Surely, with a little imagination anything could be possible
and nothing could be necessary. And yet, we don’t think that we are making trivial claims
when we say things like (4.1) and (4.3).
So what is going on when we make claims like (4.1) and (4.3)? Surely, in most contexts
in which these claims are made, we use ‘possible’ to mean something importantly different
when claiming,
(4.4) It’s possible it will snow tomorrow.
than we do in saying,
(4.5) It’s possible a very large meteor will destroy New York City tomorrow.
And similarly when using ‘necessary’ in statements such as
(4.6) It is necessary that animals as massive as whales must live in the ocean and
not on land.
and,
(4.7) It is necessary to drink at least sixty-four ounces of water each day.
It seems that the scope of ‘possible’ is different in (4.4) and (4.5). (4.4) seems to have
a narrowed, or more restricted scope. When we look at the weather report and see that
there is a winter storm bringing snow that is moving towards New York City and we then
claim that “It’s possible it will snow tomorrow,” we are using possible to mean something
along the lines of, could happen given the laws of physics and the current conditions. When
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we claim that “It’s possible a very large meteor will destroy New York City tomorrow,” we
are using possible to mean something like, there’s nothing logically contradictory about the
idea or, given that we don’t know that it won’t happen. In other words, there isn’t really
possibility per se – or at least, if there is, that’s often not what we mean by our claims of
possibility.
A similar story can be told about the claims of necessity in (4.6) and (4.7). When we say
that, “It is necessary that animal as massive as whales live in the ocean and not on land,”
we mean something along the lines of, given our current understanding of physiology and
gravity, there is no scenario in which. While when we claim that “It is necessary to drink at
least sixty-four ounces of water each day,” we really mean something along the lines of, the
current health recommendation for human beings is to. Like possibility, many of our claims
of necessity often have some background context to them, and this context often differs from
claim to claim.
Thus, if we wish to evaluate modal claims using the possible-world apparatus, we must
find some way to account for these different senses or restrictions on possibility and necessity
to avoid triviality.
Formally, this is achieved by specifying the accessibility relations within one’s model.
The accessibility relations tell us which other possible worlds we are to consider when we
evaluate claims of possibility and necessity. It is only this specified set that we examine.
When determining if a possibility claim is true, we simply look to see if there’s at least one
world within the specified set where the claim is true. Similarly for necessity claims, we look
to see if the claim is true for all the worlds within the specified set. Thus, except in rare
instances in which we’ve specified the accessibility relation of our model to be all worlds,
never are all the possible worlds under consideration (Menzel, 2017).
Informally, we do this by picking out different kinds of possibility. Most commonly,
philosophers and logicians have divided logical space into the logically possible, the meta103
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physically possible, the physically or nomically possible, and the epistemically possible. The
logically possible contains all the worlds permitted by one’s logic. Classically, this typically
means something like any non-contradictory world – a world which contains square circles,
for instance, would not be included. Generally speaking, the space of logically possible
worlds is pretty large.
A subset of the logically possible worlds are the physically or nomically possible worlds.
These are the worlds that are compatible with our laws of physics. Worlds like those wherein
it does actually snow tomorrow, but not those in which it’s possible for massive objects to
travel at the speed of light, like Star Wars 1 .
And then there’s metaphysically possible worlds. Metaphysically possible space is also a
proper part of logically possible space, but it has the physically possible space as a proper
part of it. In this way, it is smaller and contained within the space of logically possibility,
and larger and contains the space of physical possibility. Like physically possible worlds,
the metaphysically possible worlds are just all those worlds that abide by our metaphysical
“laws”. What, exactly, this means though is incredibly unclear. There is much debate over
what the laws or rules of metaphysics are, or whether there are any at all. As such, the
space of metaphysical possibility is also met with enormous skepticism. While I’ve yet to be
convinced that the metaphysically possible captures something real about the universe, it
may well still have pragmatic value nonetheless. In any case, for present purposes, it matters
little whether there is such a thing as metaphysical possibility and metaphysically possible
worlds. It is enough to know that this is a distinction that is sometimes made when talking
of possibility.
Lastly, philosophers sometimes define the space of epistemic possibility. When we speak
of a claim being epistemically possible, we mean that it is possible as far as we know. Or
rather more precisely, a claim is epistemically possible if we don’t know it to be false. Since
1

Though Star Wars worlds aren’t physically possible, they are logically possible (or so it seems, so far).
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epistemic possibility deals with knowledge, rather than ontology, it is a bit of a different
beast from logical, physical, and metaphysical possibility. As such, it doesn’t nest neatly
within the other spheres. Epistemic possibility contains some, but not all, of the other types
of possible worlds – including impossible worlds (if they exist). For instance, there are some
mathematical truths that we don’t know to be false, but nonetheless are logically impossible.
Still, they are epistemically possible given our understanding.

4.2

Counterfactuals

A very particular type of modal statement is the counterfactual. These are statements about
what could or would be the case were the actual world to be different than it is. These are
claims that are contrary to fact – they assert something about the way in which the world
would be had something else that had happened hadn’t, or something that hadn’t had. They
are claims both about the world and yet not – because we can’t actually look to the actual
world at all in order to evaluate them.
Consider the following claim,
(4.8) If Donald Trump had not won the 2016 US Presidential Election, Hillary
Clinton would have.
The claim of (4.8) seems to be a claim about this world. Yet, we cannot simply examine
this world to determine its truth value because, unfortunately, Donald Trump did win the
2016 election. Thus, we have no actual facts to check this claim against.
So why suppose that (4.8) is about this world at all, then? Or why not just decree that
claims like (4.8) are all true (or false, or don’t have a truth value, etc.)?
Compare the claim of (4.8) with
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(4.9) If Donald Trump had not won the 2016 US Presidential Election, Al Gore
would have.
Both (4.8) and (4.9) are counterfactuals. They both make claims about what the actual
world would look like if some actual state of affairs were not. We cannot simply examine
the actual world to determine the truth value of either of these claims, as the antecedent is
counter to our reality. Despite the unavailability of actuality to examine, and the striking
similarity between the claims of (4.8) and (4.9), many people would agree that one of these
claims is true (4.8), while the other is false (4.9). That is to say that we seem to both
discriminate between counterfactual claims, and assign to them truth values.
Furthermore, the evidence that we appeal to in discriminating between these claims
appeals to the actual world. We are inclined to say that (4.8) is true because Hillary Clinton
was the runner-up and only other major candidate, she won the popular vote, there was no
other candidate who came remotely close to winning the election, et cetera. On the other
hand, (4.9) strikes us as false because Al Gore was not a candidate in the 2016 election!
In other words, it seems that we both discriminate between and assign truth values to
counterfactual statements, and we do so by appealing to the actual world – seeming to
imply that they are somehow statements about the actual world.
Luckily, our possible world apparatus comes in useful here once more. If we can find a
possible world of the appropriate kind in which our antecedent is true, we can then examine
that world to see if the consequent is true as well. If it is, then we deem our counterfactual
claim to be true, and if not, then we consider it false.
Of course, it’s not quite as straightforward once we consider that in all of logically possible
space, for most counterfactuals there’s bound to be more one than one possible world in which
our antecedent is true, and more likely than not, at least some world in which the antecedent
is true and the consequent holds, and some world in which the antecedent is true and the
consequent does not hold. In other words, merely appealing to the universe of possibilia is
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apt to produce conflicting results.
Thus, we need to add another concept to our possible worlds framework – that of proximity. We are told find the closest possible world(s) (to the actual world) in which the
antecedent holds, and then check to see if the consequent holds as well. If it does, then our
counterfactual claim is true, and if it doesn’t, then it is false (Menzel, 2017).2
Proximity in logical space is generally considered to be synonymous with similarity.
Worlds that are more similar are judged to be “closer” in logical space. In terms of proximity
to the actual world, nearly everyone agrees that we ought to consider the physically possible
worlds closer than the merely metaphysically possible worlds; and the metaphysically possible
worlds closer the merely logically possible worlds. The idea here is that with each step, the
set of restrictions on what is allowable within each world loosens – and when restrictions are
loosened, it allows for greater diversity. Since our interests are in finding the most similar
world, diversity is not desirable (Menzel, 2017).
Thus, as a first step, we judge the set of physically possible worlds as closest to the
actual world.3 However, that still leaves a whole plethora of worlds from which to choose.
There are likely many worlds which are physically possible and in which the antecedent of
our counterfactual claim is true, but the truth value of the consequent differs. So we need
2

This is a common approach, but not the only one. Another option employs ceteris paribus clauses in
lieu of world proximity. A ceteris paribus approach tells us to look at worlds that are, ceteris paribus, the
same as ours, except that P , where P is some property of interest to us that does not hold in the actual
world. Whether these two approaches produce the same results will likely depend on your other ontological
commitements. For more on a ceteris parabis approach to modality, see Priest (2008).
3
While physically possible worlds will always be closer to the actual world than merely metaphysically
possible to logically possible worlds, this doesn’t mean that the closest possible world that we consider
in evaluation a counterfactual will always be a physically possible one. Sometimes, the antecedent of our
counterfactuals might demand that we travel beyond the boundaries of the physically possible in order to find
a world in which the antecedent is true. Consider the counterfactual claim, “If the effects of gravity didn’t
exist, there would be no stars in the universe.” Our physics (to the best of our knowledge) demands that the
effects of gravity are real (whether a force, a property of mass, or the curvature of spacetime, or something
else altogether is irrelevant). Any physically possible world must also meet this demand – otherwise, it is
not compatible with our laws of physics. But the antecedent to our counterfactual – “If the effects of gravity
didn’t exist,” is itself incompatible with our laws of physics, thus we are forced beyond the boundary of
physical possibility in finding the closest possible world in which the antecedent of our claim is true.
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further criteria to organize the physically possible worlds to determine which is the most
similar to the actual world. Unfortunately, determining such criteria is enormously difficult,
and here is where the guidance often ends, leaving us to ponder – something I hope to rectify
in the next chapter.

4.3

De Re Modal Claims

The possible worlds framework works well for evaluating de dicto modal statements – general
statements concerning states of affairs, or types of things. But just as often, if not more so,
we make modal claims about particular individuals – claims about what I might have done
had I not chosen to pursue a doctoral degree in philosophy, or about whether George Eliot
could have been a scientist rather than a novelist. Indeed, Wiggin’s argument against the
perdurantist concerns claims about the modal properties of individuals.
Just as it seems plausible to think that states of affairs in the world could have been
different, it too seems plausible to say that an individual could have been somewhat different.
And as we already have a framework for evaluating de dicto modal claims, it feels natural
to extend this possible worlds framework to evaluate de re modal claims as well. But doing
so raises an important question concerning identity: by virtue of what can we say that the
objects or individuals in other possible worlds are the same objects or individuals as those
in this world?
Until now, we’ve taken it for granted that we can look at these other worlds to tell us
something about this world. But surely, that is only successful if the objects in the other
worlds are somehow the same objects in this world. If the objects in the other worlds aren’t
the same – or, at the very least, share some sort of very special connection or relationship –
then it seems silly to suppose that they are informative at all.
The obvious way to account for de re modal statements is to extend the possible worlds
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framework to include them. Suppose that an individual a lacks property F . To say that a
might have had F is to say that there exists some possible world in which a has property F ,
or F a.
Consider the two examples from above. On this extension of the possible worlds framework, to claim that,
(4.10) I might have studied mathematics.
is to say that there is some possible world in which I am a mathematician.
And to claim that,
(4.11) George Eliot could have been a scientist.
is to say that there is some possible world in which George Eliot is a scientist.
In other words, this extension seems to imply that particular individuals (like me, or
George Eliot) exist in more than one world – I exist in both the actual world (not as a
student of mathematics), and some other possible world (as a student of mathematics), and
George Eliot exists in the actual world (as a playright), and some other possible world (as
a scientist). And there is an identity between actual me and possible me, or actual George
Eliot and possible George Eliot. That is to say, this extension seems to imply a commitment
to transworld identity.
Transworld identity is the idea that the identity relation can hold between individuals in
distinct worlds.
To say that there is a transworld identity between A and B is to say that there
is some possible world w1 , and some distinct possible world w2 , such that A
exists in w1 , and B exists in w2 , and A is identical with B. (Remember that we
are treating the actual world as one of the possible worlds.) In other words, to
say that there is a transworld identity is to say that the same object exists in
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distinct possible worlds, or (more simply) that some object exists in more than
one possible world. (Mackie and Jago, 2017, 4)
But this is problematic. Once again, the Indiscernibility of Identicals reminds us that a
fundamental principle of strict numerical identity is that identity requires the sharing of all
(intrinsic) properties:
(4.8) ∀x∀y[x = y → ∀P (P x ↔ P y)]
Any difference between the properties of A and B is enough to show that they are distinct.
And the entire point of transworld identity is to represent the fact that an individual could
have had somewhat different properties from its actual properties. But this is a violation of
the Indiscernibility of Identicals!
And so arises the problem of transworld identity: how are we to account for the seemingly plausible claim that individuals might have been different using the possible worlds
framework, without violating the Indiscernibility of Identicals?

4.4

The Problem of Transworld Identity

It seems reasonable to suppose a complex object like a bicycle could have been have been a
different color, or have had different tires, and still be the same bicycle. Yet, it also seems
reasonable to claim that a bicycle couldn’t have been made entirely from different parts and
still be the same bicycle. That is to say that we seem to differentiate between properties
that an individual has accidentally and those that an individual has essentially.
The problem is that if we both subscribe to the notion of transworld identities and believe
that not all of an individual’s properties are essential to it, then it seems that unless there are
non-trivial individual essences - that is, some property or set of properties that is a unique
necessary condition for being that individual - then we are in danger of having to admit the
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existence of possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the
individuals they contain, but not in any of their other properties.

4.4.1

Chisholm’s Paradox

Consider the following paradox described by Chisholm (1967): Consider the historical figures
Julius Caesar and Marc Antony. Suppose that not all of their properties are essential to
them. It seems, then, that there is a possible world in which Caesar is a little more like
actual Antony than he actually is, and Antony a little more like actual Caesar than he
actually is. And if there is such a world, then it seems that there is a further possible world
in which Caesar is even more like actual Antony, and Antony even more like actual Caesar.
And it seems that we can keep going all the way until we find a possible world in which
Caesar is exactly like actual Antony (except that he is identical to Caesar), and Antony is
exactly like actual Caesar (except that he is identical to actual Antony).
But this is intolerable. While it is reasonable to claim that Caesar and Antony could both
have had some different properties (and that those properties could have been properties that
the other has in the actual world), it does not seem reasonable to claim that they could have
had all of each other’s actual properties and still remain identical to their actual analogues
– anymore than it seems reasonable to claim that a bicycle could have been made out of
entirely different parts and still be the same bicycle.
But then how are we to avoid Chisholm’s paradox? The obvious response is to claim
that Caesar and Antony have different non-trivial essential properties. This is to say that
there are properties that Caesar has that are essential to Caesar being Caesar (i.e. without
which he wouldn’t be Caesar), and there are properties that Antony has that are essential to
Antony being Antony, and there is at least some essential property that Caesar has which
Antony lacks, or vice versa. As such, if there is some property that is essential to being
Caesar that Antony essentially lacks (or that Caesar essentially lacks that Antony essentially
111

CHAPTER 4. TRANSWORLD IDENTITIES
has), then regardless of how much similarity there is in the accidental properties of some
possible Antony and actual Caesar, and some possible Caesar and actual Antony, there is
no possible world in which possible Antony has all of the same properties as actual Caesar
and still remains identical with actual Antony, nor any possible world in which possible
Caesar has all the same properties as actual Antony and still remains identical with actual
Caesar. Possible Antony either shares all the same properties as actual Caesar – including
the essential properties that make Caesar, Caesar, and therefore is Caesar, or else he lacks
some essential property of being Caesar and therefore doesn’t have all of actual Caesar’s
properties (and the like goes for possible Caesar and actual Antony). All this is to say that
as long as Caesar and Antony differ non-trivially in their essential properties, then we can
avoid the role-switching world with which Chisholm has threatened us.
Unfortunately, the story doesn’t end here. It turns out that merely differing in some
essential property is not quite enough to get us off the hook. It may prevent the roleswitching Caesar-Antony world, but it does not guarantee that there isn’t some other possible
individual with all of Caesar’s (or Antony’s) properties except for being identical with Caesar
(or Antony). In order to ensure that nothing other than Caesar (or Antony) could ever
have all of Caesar’s (or Antony’s) properties, it must be that case that every individual
has some unique essential property (or a unique set of essential properties) that every other
individual essentially lacks. That is to say that there must be some unique individual essence
– a non-trivial property or set of properties whose possession is not only necessary but
also sufficient for being that individual. Without individual essences, we wind up in the
undesirable positioning of admitting to bare transworld identities – identities that do not
supervene on other facts – like those of our Caesar-Antony role-switching world.
Chisholm arrives at his role-switching world by a series of small steps. His argument is
sometimes criticized as taking the form of a sorites paradox, as it seems to rely cruicially
on both the assumption that a succession of small changes can add up to a big change, and
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the transitivity of identity across possible worlds. And while sorites paradoxes seem to be
built from impeccable assumptions, they also generate absurd conclusions, such that the
argument form is generally considered fallacious.
However, there are versions of the role-switching argument that do not rely on the cumulative effect of a series of small changes. Suppose we assume that Caesar and Antony do not
differ from one another in their essential properties; in other words, that all the differences
between them are accidental differences. It seems immediately to follow that any way that
Caesar could have been is a way that Antony could have been, and vice versa. But one
way that Caesar could have been is the way Caesar actually is, and one way that Antony
could have been is the way Antony actually is. So (if Caesar and Antony do not differ in
their essential properties) it seems that there is a possible world in which Caesar plays the
Antony role, and a possible world in which Antony plays the Caesar role. But there is no
obvious reason why a world in which Caesar plays the Antony role and a world in which
Antony plays the Caesar role shouldn’t be the very same world. And in that case there is
a possible world in which Caesar and Antony have swapped their roles. This argument for
the generation of a role-switching world does not rely on a series of small changes: all that it
requires is the assumption that there is no essential difference between Antony and Caesar:
or, to put it another way, that any essential property of Antony is also an essential property
of Caesar, and vice versa (Mackie, 2006).

4.4.2

Forbes’ Reduplication Argument

Forbes (1985) drives this point home via his reduplication argument, in which he argues
that a lack of non-trivial individual essences leads to bare transworld identities. Specifically,
Forbes attempts to give an argument in defense of Kripke’s ‘Necessity of Origin’ thesis, which
Forbes takes to be the most plausible candidate for non-trivial individual essences.
Kripke (1972) claims that every person has his or her origins essentially. A person’s
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identity is inextricably tied to the specific sperm and egg whence they came; Queen Elizabeth
would not be Queen Elizabeth had she different parents.
Forbes extends this thesis to all living organisms. He notes that while not all organisms
are created by sexual reproduction, they do all come from some organic antecedent, for which
he introduces the term propagule. A propagule is the structure - the organic antecedent - that
gives rise to a new individual organism. While a human being’s propagule is the zygote, a
plant’s propagule may be a seed - such as an acorn from which an oak tree develops (Forbes,
1985).
The relation x is a propagule of y, or Prop(x,y), is irreflexive, asymmetric, and instransitive. An existent propagule cannot give rise to a non-existent, an existent cannot have a
non-existent propagule, and two non-existents at a world cannot enter into the biochemical reactions of development at that world which make one thing a propagule of another
there. With this notion in hand, Forbes formulates a general version of Kripke’s ‘Necessity
of Origin’ thesis (where ‘P rop(x, y)’ is read as ‘x is the propagule of y’ and ‘E’ is ‘there
exists’),
(K) (∀x)(∀y)(P rop(x, y) → (E(y) → P rop(x, y)))
in defense of which he offers the following reduplication argument (Forbes, 1985).
Suppose that we deny (K) - that is, we deny that origin is essential, and assert instead that
a particular individual might have had a different propagule (and still be that individual).
Consider an actual oak tree that stands in the cloisters of New College, Oxford,4 and the
acorn, c, which is that oak tree’s propagule.
Forbes claims that it’s reasonable to imagine that there is a possible world, w, in which
there is an oak tree that grows in New College cloisters and which resembles the actual oak
tree as far as is possible compatible with the supposition that this tree in w grew from an
4

Take ‘the cloisters of New College, Oxford’ to be a rigid designator of a place.
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acorn c0 distinct from c (it very quickly grows to be constituted by the same matter as the
tree in the actual world, has the same morphology, etc). Let’s also suppose that in w, c
does not exist at all. So the actual world contains a c-tree, in w a c0 -tree, and the trees are
indiscernible across these two worlds except only with respect to origin.
We may now ask, are these trees numerically distinct?
The skeptic of (K) thinks maybe not. It seems to the skeptic that a very plausible
condition for transworld identity is being indistinguishable in every ‘intrinsic’5 respect. The
c-tree in the actual world is indiscernible from the c0 -tree in w. It would be sheer dogmatism
to insist that these trees are numerically distinct. The identity of the propagule acorn surely
can’t have that much significance.
But, Forbes argues, it does. We can agree on an uncontroversial possibility for c (the
propagule of the tree in the cloisters in the actual world): c could have been planted on the
other side of the cloisters and could have developed into an oak tree there. We make no
assumption about the identity of such a tree, nor about how much or how little any such
tree would resemble the c-tree in the actual world.
Consider the class of worlds where this happens. Some of these worlds will be otherwise
almost indistinguishable from w, since the planting of the acorn c on one side of the cloisters
does not render it impossible that c0 is planted on the other side and grows into an oak tree
exactly like the c0 -tree in w. Choose one of these two-tree worlds, u. In u, as in w, the c0 -tree
is the one which bears the high degree of resemblance to the c-tree in the actual world,
while in u the c-tree need not bear much resemblance to the actual tree beyond having its
propagule. If we link trees which have a very high degree of resemblance in almost every
respect by a continuous line, and label trees by their acorns, we have this picture (where w∗
denotes the actual world):
5

Recall from Chapter 3 that an object has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that thing itself,
and nothing else, is.
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c0
w

c
w∗

c c0
u

We may now ask the skeptic about (K), which, if any, of the two trees in u is identical
to the actual tree?
There are three possible answers consistent with a one-to-one conception of identity:
(i) The c-tree in u is the actual tree.
(ii) The c0 -tree in u is the actual.
(iii) Neither of these trees in u is the actual tree.
Suppose the skeptic answers,
(i) The c-tree in u is the actual tree.
Then, since the trees in u are distinct, the c0 -tree in u is not the actual tree, and so the
c0 -tree in u is not the same tree as the c0 -tree in w, which, according to the skeptic, is the
actual tree. But this is problematic for the skeptic of (K) who previously asserted that
indiscernibility is sufficient to claim identity. There is no discernible difference whatsoever
between these c0 -trees; they have (by choice of u) the same propagule, same shape, same
matter, same location. Thus, the skeptic must posit a transworld numerical difference where
there is nothing in virtue of which this difference obtains. This position is exactly like that of
the person who holds that a set X existing at one world can have exactly the same members
there that a set Y has at another world and yet not be the same set as Y . As we saw with
Chisholm’s Paradox, in answering (i), the skeptic thus commits herself to bare transworld
non-identities (Forbes, 1985).
So it seems that either
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(ii) The c0 -tree in u is the actual tree, or
(iii) Neither of these trees is in u is the actual tree
is a more attractive answer to the skeptic of (K). Unfortunately for the skeptic, both of
these responses lead to an unsavory conclusion that appears if we add a fourth world to our
previous picture.
It is plausible to suppose that the c-tree in the actual world could have been just as the
c-tree in u is – it could have grown where the c-tree in u grows, could have had the same
shape, matter, etc. From the class of worlds where the actual tree is just like the c-tree in
u, choose a world, v, which differs from u as little as possible compatible with there being
no c0 -tree in it, and no other tree in the cloisters. Using the same conventions as before, we
may extend our previous diagram:

c
w∗

c0
w

c0 c
u

c
v

The c-trees of u and v are completely indistinguishable in all intrinsic respects, by choice
of v. But, according to the skeptic of (K), they are distinct trees, since by hypothesis the
c-tree in v is the actual tree, while on either answer (ii) or (iii) to our original question
regarding the identity of the tree in u, the c-tree in that world is not the actual tree.
Once more the skeptic of (K) must posit a transworld non-identity where there is nothing
which grounds the difference, if she concedes that there are such worlds as w, u, and v.
Of course, the skeptic of (K) need not grant that there are such worlds as w, u, and
v. But it does not seem that she can consistenly contest these worlds and remain an antiessentialist. In order to deny us the existence of these worlds, she must adopt an extreme
essentialism, claiming that all of an individual’s properties are essential to it. That is to
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say that to deny the existence of these worlds is to deny the very premise of a transworld
interpretation of de re modality - that an individual might have had somewhat different
properties and still be that individual (Forbes, 1985).
So the skeptic of (K) is left with either embracing bare transworld identities, or an extreme
essentialism - both of which seem far less appealing than (K) itself.
Thus, Forbes concludes that unless we embrace (K), transworld identities commit us to
ungrounded facts about identity - or worse.

4.4.3

Against Bare Identities

Forbes’s argument in favor of (K) turns on the need for grounding of facts about the identity
of individuals. The motivation here is to avoid committing ourselves to bare identities,
where such facts that concern the identity of individuals are not grounded in the qualitative
features of the world. Since these identity facts can vary without any difference in qualitative
character, they resist metaphysical explanation. Forbes illustrates this with several cases:
Case 1. Consider the supposition that things could have been exactly as they are
except that the steel tower in Paris opposite the Palais de Chaillot is different
from the one actually there. To make sense of this supposition, it is not permitted
to imagine that the tower is made of different metal from the metal which actually
constitutes it, or that it has a different design, or designer, or history. The only
respect in which the imagined situation is to differ from the actual world is in the
identity of the tower. The extent to which such a difference seems unintelligible
is some measure of the plausibility of the view that transworld differences must
be grounded. (Forbes, 1985, 128)
Recall our splitting ameobae from Chapter 3. We wondered about the identity relations
between our pre-splitting ameoba, a, and our post-splitting ameobae, a0 and a00 . And we
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examined different responses to this puzzle including, denying that a is identical with either
of the post-split ameobae, affirming that a is identical with both of a0 and a00 and instead
denying the transitivity of identity, and asserting that a is really a part of two distinct
individuals the a − a0 ameoba and the a − a00 ameoba.
A solution that we never considered was to claim that a is identical with a0 , but not
identical with a00 (or identical with a00 , but not a0 ). It struck us as obvious that it would be
very strange to hold that in fact, a survives the splitting as - say as a0 - and only one new
ameoba comes into existence, a00 . And the strangeness of this view clearly derives from the
impossibility of citing features in virtue of which a is identical to one rather than the other
of the ameobae which results from the splitting. In other words, it seems that we hold that
identity facts must be grounded in facts about the qualitative character of the world. And
if that is so, then we ought to reject the idea that there could be bare identities.

And so it seems that if we are to take Chisholm’s and Forbe’s arguments seriously while
avoiding bare transworld identities, then we must commit ourselves to the existence of nontrivial (intrinsic) individual essences.
That, however, that may be easier said than done.

4.5

The Problem for Non-Trivial Individual Essences

We’ve seen that a transworld identity conception of de re modal statements appears to
generate bare identities in the absence of non-trivial individual essences. Thus, it seems of
vital importance to produce a suitable candidate for such non-trivial individual essences if
we hope to defend this analysis.
(Forbes, 1985, 162) proposes that for “non-simple” objects - like human beings and
oak trees - origins provide a suitable candidate for such non-trivial individual essences.
119

CHAPTER 4. TRANSWORLD IDENTITIES
Unfortunately, origins cannot be appealed to for all the relevant cases, including some simple
organisms and most artefacts.
Some organisms come from cells which do not function like propagules. Consider once
more our familiar amoebae - but in this case, several amoebae. Each amoeba exists as a
separate, independent individual for a while, reproducing by oridinary mitosis. However, a
funny thing happens when a sufficient number of amoebae are gathered together in one place.
The individual amoebae assemble themselves together into a slime mold - a single organism
which is not just a mere collection of amoebae, but rather a functionally differentiated
creature which leads a life of its own (Forbes, 1985).
If we treat the slime mold in the same manner as we did human beings and oak trees by
appealing to its origins as the non-trivial individual essence, this implies that each individual
ameoba is essential to whichever slime mold it becomes a part of. But this is a hard conclusion
to accept. It seems reasonable to think that a given slime mold could have been formed from
a slightly different collection of ameobae (but not an entirely different collection of ameobae).
No one constituent amoeba is a slime mold is essential to it, and yet some kind of essentiality
of origin attaches to a sufficiently large proportion of these ameobae.
The same situation arises with artefacts. Earlier we said that it seems reasonable to
claim that a particular bicycle might have been slightly different and still have been the
same bicycle. Perhaps it could have had a different chain or handlebar grip. On the other
hand, it also seems plausible to say that it could not have been considerably different in
parts or design and still be the same bicycle. No single part (or set of parts) seems to be
essential to the bicycle’s identity, but they are not all accidental to it either.
In other words, it seems that some organisms and artefacts adhere to the tolerance
principle:
(T) Necessarily, any artefact could have originated from a slightly different collection of parts from any one collection from which it could have originated.
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and to the restriction principle:
(R) Necessarily, any artefact could not have originated from an entirely different collection of parts from any one collection from which it could have
originated.
But (T) and (R) are in some tension with our assertion that facts about identity must
be intrinsically grounded. Indeed, it seems that holding (T) and (R) once more leads us into
the territory of bare identities.

4.5.1

Chisholm’s Paradox, Again

Let hw1 . . . wn i be a sequence of worlds and let hα1 . . . αn i be a sequence of artefacts such
that each αi exists in wi , each αi is constructed according to the same specifications, and no
αi changes its parts through time. Now suppose that but for a very few components, each
αi is made from the same parts as αi+1 , yet the members of the pairs (αi , αi+1 ) differ from
each other in such a way that as i increases so the number of parts αi has in common with
α1 decreases, until we reach αn , which has no parts in common with α1 .
(T) allows us to construct the following model. Take w2 to be a world which realizes the
possibility that α1 is made of the parts which make up α2 . That is to say, α2 in w2 is one
way that α1 might have been. By the thesis of transworld identities, α1 = α2 . But then
w3 may be taken to realize the corresponding possibility for α2 , and thus α2 = α3 . Since
identity is transitive, and α1 = α2 and α2 = α3 , it is the case that α1 = α3 as well. We can
continue in this process until we reach the conclusion that wn realizes a possibility for α1 .
But αn is made of completely different parts from α1 . Thus, any identity between α1 and
αn is a bare identity (Chisholm, 1967).
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4.5.2

The Four Worlds Paradox

Salmon (1981) gives a trickier version that he dubs ‘The Four Worlds Paradox’.
Begin with granting (R), and thus that α1 and αn are distinct things. It follows from
(T) that there is a sequence of worlds, σ1 , like the first half of hw1 . . . wn i and a sequence
of worlds, σ2 , like the second half, only in reverse order, beginning with wn . Each sequence
terminates in a world just like a particular world from the middle of the original sequence,
wk , such that in the last world of σ2 , αn is just like αk in wk , and in the last world of σ1 , α1 is
just like αk in wk . Since α1 and α2 are distinct, so are these worlds. But the only difference
between them is in the identity of the artefacts they contain, and that difference in identity
is itself an ungrounded difference. So we once more have an instance of a bare non-identity.

4.5.3

Responses

There are several possible responses to this problem posed by simple organisms and artefacts
for transworld identities.
The issues arise as result of the tolerance principle and the restriction principle. Thus,
one obvious move would be to give up one or the other of these. One could give up any nontrivial version of the restriction principle and hold that a particular artefact could have come
into existence with an entirely different material compostion that it actually does. Mackie
(2006) attempts to defend such a position. While this avoids the paradox, it is a hard pill
to swallow. On the other hand, one could opt to give up the tolerance principle, and insist
that a particular artefact could not have come into existence with a material composition in
any way different from its actual composition. Roca-Royes (2016) defends this position, but
it is not an appealing choice, as it amounts to little more than extreme essentialism.
A third possible response comes from Salmon (1979, 1981) following Chandler (1976).
They attempt to reconcile transworld identities with both the tolerance principle and the
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restriction principle. We need not deny that there are possible worlds in which there are
artefacts that are composed of few (if any) of the same parts as the artefacts in the actual
world. Instead, we can claim that those worlds are not accessible to w1 . Some later worlds
in the sequence which are accessible to w4 , for instance, are not accessible to w1 . So while
wn may represent a possibility for w4 , it does not represent a possibility for w1 . From
the standpoint of w1 , such an original composition for the bicycle is only possibly possible:
something that would have been possible, had things been different in some possible way,
but is not, as things are, possible (Chandler, 1976).
While the notion of an accessibility relation among worlds is not a new one, in this
context it feels rather ad hoc. It’s unclear on what basis the accessibility is decided, and
even if such decisions can be defended, whether this solution is satisfactory is disputed. The
idea that, as regards the type of metaphysical possibility that is involved in puzzles such as
that of the bicycle, there might be states of affairs that are possibly possible and yet not
possible is regarded with suspicion by many philosophers.6
Furthermore, this solution doesn’t seem to solve the Four Worlds Paradox. The accessibility solution entails that the last world of σ1 is accessible to w1 , but the last world of σ2
is not. It therefore requires us to distinguish between these two worlds, but this distinction
has the same problematic status as the one between their artefacts. Any distinction between
these worlds is bare, which ought not to satisfy those seeking a solution in the first place.
Let’s take stock. We’ve argued that transworld identities require non-trivial individual
essences. One candidate for those essences appeals to an individual’s origins. While this may
suffice for complex organisms like human beings and oak trees, most artefacts and simple
organisms are problematic. So, we are left still searching for a suitable candidate.
Perhaps notably, no one appears to have argued for a non-trivial individual essence
solution that can be applied to all the relevant cases. Maybe there is some as of yet unthought
6

It is a violation of S4.
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of candidate for non-trivial individual essences. But the landscape does not look promising.
The consensus appears to be that the price of interpreting all de re modal claims in terms
of transworld identity is the acceptance of bare identities across possible worlds. And for
many, including myself, this is too high of a price to pay; it is grounds enough for questioning
whether transworld identities is really the right analysis after all.

4.6

A Pseudo-Problem

It’s worthwhile to pause here for a moment and to acknowledge and address one well-known
response to the problem of transworld identity - that there is no problem of transworld
identity; it is a pseudo-problem. Among the proponents of such a response are Plantinga
(1978, 1979) and Kripke (1972).
The point of debate seems to be whether or not the provision of criteria of transworld
identity are needed to back the claim that an individual exists in more than one possible
world. Here things get a bit ambiguous, as there are two different senses in which we
may interpret a criterion of identity – an epistemological sense, and a metaphysical one.
Epistemologically, a criterion of identity is a way of telling whether an individual A is
identical to an individual B. But metaphysically speaking, a criterion of identity is a set of
non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of an identity statement. If we
are lucky, these conditions also allow for us to determine, epistemically, whether A and B
are identical – but they need not. It is entirely possible to give metaphysical criteria that
doesn’t aid us at all epistemically (Mackie and Jago, 2017).
Plantinga (1978, 1979) and Kripke (1972) both argue that the problem of transworld
identity is merely a pseudo-problem. They claim that the so-called problem of transworld
identity rests on one of three assumptions: the epistemological assumption, the security
of reference assumption, or the intelligibility assumption. None of these roles seem to be
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fulfilled by our possession of criteria of transworld identity, leading anyone who relies on one
of these assumptions to believe that there is a problem of transworld identity. But Plantinga
and Kripke argue that these assumptions are bunk. Once they have been debunked, the
problem of transworld identity, they claim, may be dismissed as a pseudo-problem.
While each of these assumptions may be problematic, I will argue that they don’t exhaust
the claim that transworld identity is problematic. Let’s take each of them in turn.

4.6.1

Epistemological Assumption

Assumption
The epistemological assumption is that we must possess criteria of transworld identity in
order to ascertain, on the basis of their properties in other possible worlds, the identities of
individuals in those worlds.
One thinks, in this picture, of a possible world as if it were a foreign country.
One looks upon it as an observer. Maybe Nixon has moved to the other country
and maybe he hasn’t, but one is given only qualities. One can observe all his
qualities, but of course, one doesn’t observe that someone is Nixon. So we had
better have a way of telling, when we come across one of these other possible
worlds, who was Nixon. (Kripke, 1972, 43)
In other words, it seems to imply that the point of our having a criterion of identity would
be that we could then use it to determine, for example, which individual in a possible world
is Nixon (or using our example from earlier, George Eliot). Without such a criterion we
would be unable to identify Nixon in other possible worlds.
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PK Response
But, Plantinga and Kripke argue, this is confused. No one thinks that our epistemological
access to other possible worlds is of this kind. The idea of that a criterion of transworld
identity would allow us to tell, by empirical inspection of the properties of individuals in
other possible worlds, which, if any, of those individuals is Nixon, is flawed. And once we
face up to the fact that a criterion of transworld identity (if we had one) could have no such
empirical use, the argument based on the epistemological assumption appears to collapse
Plantinga (1978, 1979); Kripke (1972).

4.6.2

Security of Reference Assumption

Assumption
The security of reference assumption is the notion that we must possess criteria of transworld
identity if our references to individuals in other possible worlds are not to miss their mark.
Its possession enables us to know that when we say, ‘There is a possible world in which
Nixon lost the election’ (or ‘There is a possible world in which George Eliot is a scientist’),
we are talking about Nixon (or George Eliot), rather than someone else.
Suppose we have someone, Nixon, and there’s another possible world where there
is no one with all the properties Nixon has in the actual world. Which one of
these other poeple, if any, is Nixon? Surely you must give some criterion of
identity here! If you have a criterion of identity, then you just look in the other
possible worlds at the man who is Nixon; and the question whether, in other
other possible world, Nixon has certain properties, is well defined. (Kripke, 1972,
42)
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PK Response
Again, Plantinga and Kripke reject this assumption. Kripke insists that it seems spurious to
suggest that we need a criterion of transworld identity in order to know which individual we
are referring to when we make such a claim. Rather, Kripke argues, we can simply stipulate
that the individual in question is Nixon.
There is no reason why we cannot stipulate that, in talking about what would
have happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual situation, we are talking
about what would have happened to him. (Kripke, 1972, 44)

4.6.3

Intelligibility Assumption

Assumption
The intelligibility assumption asserts that we must possess criteria of transworld identity
in order to understand transworld identity claims. We must be able to give an informative
answer to the question, ‘What would it take for a scientist in another possible world to be
identical with Eliot?’ in order to understand the claim that there is another possible world
in which George Eliot is a scientist.

PK Response
But if what is demanded is that one be able to specify a set of properties whose possession, in
another possible world, by an individual in that world, is non-trivially necessary and sufficient
for being George Eliot, then, Plantinga (1978, 1979) claims, this demand is illegitimate. We
can simply rely on our prior understanding of the claim that she might have been a scientist
(Kripke, 1972).
What do we mean when we say ‘In some other possible world I would not have
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given this lecture today?’ We just imagine the situation where I didn’t decide to
give this lecture or decided to give it some other day. (Kripke, 1972, 44)

4.6.4

More to the Story

Having debunked these assumptions, Plantinga and Kripke dismiss the problem of transworld
identity as mere pseduo-problem. But whether or not the epistemological assumption, the
security of reference assumption, and the intelligibility assumption hold up, the move to
dismiss the problem of transworld identity is made too soon.
Even if we are in no a position to conduct an empirical investigation in other possible
worlds in order to determine if the individuals therein satisfy the necessary and sufficient
conditions given by criteria of transworld identity, this does not entail there isn’t such criteria.
We might think that there must be a criterion of transworld identity for an individual if the
claim that there is a possible world in which that individual has some property other than she
has in the actual world is to be true. That is to say, there must be a criterion of transworld
identity for George Eliot if the claim that there is a possible world in which George Eliot is
a scientist, is to be true.7
The fact that one may be able to ensure, by stipulation, that one is talking about a
possible world in which George Eliot (and not someone else) is a scientist (if there is such a
world) does not imply that, when making this stipulation, one is not implicitly stipulating
that this individual satisfies, in that world, conditions non-trivially necessary and sufficient
for being Eliot, even if one is not in a position to say what these conditions are.
This point is an extension of the observation that, if (as many philosophers, including
Kripke believe) George Eliot has some essential properties (properties that she has in all
possible worlds in which she exists), to stipulate that one is talking about a possible world
7

Such a set of properties would be what is called a non-trivial individual essence of Eliot, where an
individual essence of an individual A is a property, or set of properties, whose possession by an individual
in any possible world is both necessary and sufficient for identity with A.
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in which Eliot is a scientist is, at least implicitly, to stipulate that the possible world is one
in which someone with Eliot’s essential properties is a scientist.
For example, according to Kripke’s ‘necessity of origin’ thesis, human beings have their
parents essentially (Kripke, 1972). If this is correct, then, when we say ‘There is a possible
world in which Eliot is a scientist’, it seems that, if our stipulation is to be coherent, we
must be at least implicitly stipulating that the possible world is one in which someone with
Eliot’s actual parents is a scientist, even if the identity of Eliots’s parents is unknown to us,
and even though we are (obviously) in no position to conduct an empirical investigation into
the ancestry, in the possible world, of the individuals who exist there.
Thus, if Kripke is right in insisting that we need not be able to specify non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions for being George Eliot in another possible world if we are
legitimately to claim that there are possible worlds in which she is a scientist, it does not
follow that there aren’t such necessary and sufficient conditions to which we are beholden.
And indeed, we have a very good positive reason to demand that transworld identity
requires non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions – because the alternative seems to be
the unacceptable commitment to bare identities.

4.7

Where This Leaves Us

Let’s take stock of things.
It seems very natural to claim that an individual might have had some different properties.
But these de re modal claims – when we extend our possible worlds framework to include
analysis of them – seem to require a commitment to transworld identities. Transworld
identities, in turn, require non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions (individual essences)
in order to avoid worlds with bare identities. But it seems that there are no plausible
candidates for non-trivial individual essences. And thus, transworld identity faces a serious
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problem.
There have been several possible responses to this problem. Some have rejected transworld
identities outright; some argue that we should accept bare identities; and some claim that
we out to replace transworld identities with a theory of counterparts which do the work
of transworld identities without the commitment to individual essences that is required. It
appears significant to note that no one has attempted to argue in favor of a non-trivial
individual essence solution that can be applied to all the relevant cases.
It’s also worthwhile to note that the problems concerning transworld identity arise because of the assumption that an individual might have had some different properties – that
is, that not all of an individual’s properties are essential to it. We might start by rejecting
that assumption, and therefore transworld identities. This seems to imply an extreme sort
of modal essentialism:
Let a be any object that exists at a world, w. Then at any other world, since a
does not exist there, P a is false there. It follows that ♦P a is false at w, unless
wRw, in which case ♦P a is true at w iff P a is. (Priest, 2008, 339)
While this certainly avoids the problem facing transworld identities, the price of doing
so is the denial that an individual could have been any other way other than the exact way
that she is. That is to say, that every property of an individual is necessary. Any change
in any property whatsoever would be a change in identity of that individual. And while
science fiction has done its best to tempt us with fantastic butterfly-effect stories, it seems
rather far-fetched to argue that my entire identity hinges on a papercut. We might argue
how many of an individual’s properties could be different, or which ones, but to defend
such extreme modal essentialism for the mere purpose of avoiding the problems posed by
transworld identities is an overreaction. We should be wary of those who take up such a
position without extenuating reasons to justify such a move. Here, we are merely stuck
130

CHAPTER 4. TRANSWORLD IDENTITIES
between a pebble and a hard place.
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Chapter 5
Many Worlds Counterparts
5.1

Lewis’s Counterparts

Transworld identities face some serious problems. But they also capture a hard-to-deny
idea that an individual might have been somewhat different. Rejecting transworld identities
outright leaves us in an unattractive position. But what if we could find some way to
both preserve the notion that an individual might have been somewhat different while also
avoiding the metaphysically problematic baggage that transworld identities bring?
Counterpart Theory is just that promise.
Counterpart Theory replaces the claim that an individual exists in more than one possible
world with the claim that although each individual exists in one world only, it has counterparts in other worlds, where the counterpart relation does not have the logic of identity. It
is these counterparts who represent the idea that individuals might have been different, and
serve as the truthmakers for our modal claims.
Recall our earlier assertion that George Eliot might have been a scientist rather than a
playwright. According to Counterpart Theory, the one and only George Eliot exists in the
actual world. There is no other individual in any other world which is identical with George
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Eliot. However, this doesn’t mean that we have to accept that George Eliot could not have
been at all different than she is; George Eliot is not identical with any individuals in other
worlds, but she does have counterparts in some other worlds. And it is the existence of
counterparts of George Eliot who are scientists rather than novelists that make it true that
George Eliot could have been a scientist (Lewis, 1973).
At first, this might seem like nothing more than sleight of hand. We’ve simply replaced the
term ‘transworld identity’ with ‘counterpart’ and claimed that all crises have been averted.
But there is one key difference between the transworld identity relation and the counterpart
relation – counterparts are not identical. Rather, the counterpart relation is based on similarity. An object is a counterpart if it is a thing that is sufficiently similar, and nothing at
that world is more similar:
In general: something has for counterparts at a given world those things existing
there that resemble it closely enough in important respects of intrinsic quality
and extrinsic relations, and that resemble it no less closely than do other things
existing there. (Lewis, 1973, 39)
And the difference between identity and similarity is key. All of the troubles plaguing
transworld identity turn on the nature of the equivalence relation itself – in particular, the
transitive nature of identity. Similarity, on the other hand, isn’t bound by such definitional
constraints. Similarity isn’t generally transitive. a may be similar to b which may be similar
to c, without a being similar to c. This is primarily due to another major difference between
identity and similarity – similarity admits of degrees. Identity is an all-or-nothing affair;
but two individuals may be more or less similar to one another. And once we’ve adopted
a transworld relation that is not transitive, we are able to avoid the problems (and thus
the unpalatable choice between extreme mereological essentialism and bare identities) that
transworld identity brings to the table.
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5.2

Counterpart’s Problems

While Counterpart Theory may promise a viable alternative to transworld identities, it is
not without its own challenges.

5.2.1

Humphrey Objection

Perhaps the most well-known criticism of Counterpart Theory is given by Kripke (1972), who
objects to the idea that it is some other individual’s having of a property which determines
your possibly having that property:
Thus if we say “Humphrey might have won the election” (if only he had done
such-and-such), we are not talking about something that might have happened to
Humphrey but to someone else, a “counterpart”. Probably, however, Humphrey
could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him,
would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus, Lewis’s view seems
to me even more bizarre than the usual notions of transworld identification that
it replaces. (Kripke, 1972, 45 note 13)
Of course, Lewis may respond, Kripke’s objection is little more than foot-stomping.
Kripke essentially claims that it isn’t Humphrey himself that has the property of possibly
winning the election, only Humphrey’s counterpart. But for Lewis, the property of possibly
winning the election is the property of having a counterpart who wins. Humphrey has a
counterpart who wins, and so Humphrey himself might have won. Kripke’s insistence that
this is incorrect, while it might carry some sort of intuitive appeal, isn’t an argument.
Nor is Humphrey’s having of different propositional attitudes towards himself possibly
winning the election, and having a counterpart who wins the election. This is simply the
paradox of analysis. A reasonable person can care about a property under one description
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while not caring about the same property under another description, provided it is not
obvious the descriptions pick out the same property. And as counterpart theory is hardly
colloquial, it’s likely far from obvious to Humphrey (Sider, 2006).
And yet, there is something enticing about Kripke’s objection. It does seem a bit bizarre
that what properties you (or Humphrey) might have had is determined by the properties
of some other individual who is not you (nor Humphrey), in much the same way that it
struck us as bizarre in Chapter 3 that your identity might be contingent on the existence (or
nonexistence) of another individual. When it came to identity, I argued that the intimate
nature of the identity relation is such that it is not determined by some third party - whether
or not I am identical to my five year-old self is totally independent from the existence of my
cat. And I think that something similar is going on here.
The reason Kripke’s obejction is hard to dismiss, I think, is because it hints at this notion
that certain relationships are more intimate than others - and the counterpart relationship
as given by Lewis doesn’t seem to be intimate enough for the work that it’s doing. While we
saw in the last chapter that relying on identity to evaluate modal claims is problematic, it
feels as though Lewis’s counterparts have the opposite problem - their mere similarlity to us
doesn’t feel deeply connected enough to make claims on what we might or might not have
done. Simply achieving a minimum similarity score doesn’t seem sufficient to warrant the
type of modal causal relationship that we are positing when we say that a has the property
of possibly x because b has the property of x. It seems like there ought to be something
more underlying this relationship.

5.2.2

Lost In Translation

Another criticism of Counterpart Theory comes from Feldman (1971), who claims that Counterpart Theory is inadequate because of its inability to translate certain modal sentences.
Feldman notes two theses concerning counterparts:
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(A) If you have a counterpart in another world, then it is the entity in that
world which resembles you most closely.
(B) If an entity in another world is “quite unlike” you, then it is not your
counterpart. (Feldman, 1971, 406)
Now consider the following fairly standard modal sentence:
(5.1) I could have been quite unlike what I in fact am.
When translated according to Counterpart Theory, (5.1) becomes something like:
(5.2) I have a counterpart who is quite unlike me.
But this is problematic for Lewis. (B) tells us that an entity that is “quite unlike” me is not
a counterpart of mine. Thus, (5.2) cannot be true. But if (5.1) is true, then (5.2) is not a
suitable translation of (5.1).
Of course, Lewis might respond that (5.1) is simply not true, and thus there is no tension
between (5.1) and (5.2). It is simply false that you might have been quite unlike how you
are; you might have been somewhat different, but not vastly different (certainly not “quite
unlike”). To think of someone who is quite unlike you is not to think of a life you might
have led, but to think of a life of someone else.
Still, those who, like Feldman, think that (5.1) is true - or at least, may be true (which
is enough to show that it’s different from (5.2)) - will likely find this response unsatisfying.
Feldman presents a second difficult case for a Counterpart Theoretic translation. Consider two people who lead very divergent lives. One is happy, healthy, and prosperous, while
the other is sad, sickly, and poor. The happy woman, pondering her own good fortune, and
the plight of her sad friend, may be inclined to say:
(5.3) I could have been more like what you in fact are than like what I in fact
am, and at the same time, you could have been more like what I in fact am
than like what you in fact are. (Feldman, 1971, 407)
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It seems reasonable, Feldmand argues, to suppose that (5.3) may express something true,
and something that should be expressible in Counterpart Theoretic terminiology. However,
such translations once again prove problematic.We may try to translate (5.3) as:
(5.4) There is a possible world, w, and two entities therin, x and y such that
x is my counterpart in w, y is your counterpart in w, x is more like what
you actually are than y is, and y is more like what I actually am than x is.
(Feldman, 1971, 407)
But this won’t do. Like (5.2), (5.4) cannot be true. Recall that (A) tells us that should you
have a counterpart in another world, it is the entity that resembles you the most closely.
But for (5.4) to be true, there must be a possible world in which your counterpart is less
like you than my counterpart is, and my counterpart is less like me than your counterpart
is. And this is not allowed by (A).
Now, once again, Lewis could simply deny that (5.3) may be true. He could claim that
it’s simply not the case that I could have been more like you than me and still have been me,
and you could have been more like me than you and still have been you. Perhaps I might
have been less fortunate, and perhaps you might have been more fortunate. But it’s not the
case that I might have been you, nor that you might have been me (or near enough). And
this distinction is important. Lewis might argue that the lure of claims like (5.3) are the
former; the idea that our fortunes in life might have been different is hard to resist. But to
tack on the additional claim that from this we should say that I might have had your life,
or you mine, is an error.
I think it unlikely that this imagined response would placate Feldman, anymore than I
imagine Feldman’s critique to phase Lewis. And so we find ourselves once more in a stalemate
of intuitions.
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5.2.3

Propositional Properties

Another criticism leveled against Counterpart Theory comes from (Priest, 2008), who points
out that Lewis’s Counterpart Theory plays some havoc with the propositional properties of
modal logic.
Recall that the counterpart of an object at a world may not be unique. As similarity
admits of degrees and isn’t transitive, it’s not a one-to-one relation. There may well be two
individuals in a world which are equally as similar to an individual in another world, and
therefore are both counterparts to that individual.
Relatedly, a world may not contain a counterpart at all. There may be a world, w2
without any individual sufficiently similar to a in w1 , and thus a does not have a counterpart
in w2 .
We already know that Lewis’s counterprt relation is not transitive - but it is not symmetric
either. a in world w1 might have b as a counterpart in w2 as b is the most (and sufficiently)
similar individual to a in w2 . However, this does not therefore entail that a is b’s counterpart
in w1 . There might be another individual in w1 that is more similar to b than a is. Thus, a
would not be a counterpart to b, while b would be a counterpart to a.
With these quirks in mind, we can see how Counterpart Theory plays havoc with the
propositional properties of modal logic. For example, even in V Kν 1 , P a ⊃ P a fails:
Given a in w1 , the thing most (and sufficiently) similar in w2 may be b. But
the thing most (and sufficiently) similar to b in w3 may be c. a may yet be
more similar to a different object, d, in w3 than c. We can depict this situation
as follows, where the degree of similarity between objects is represented by the
distance between the corresponding letters:
1

Variable domain version of the propositional logic, K with universal accessibility relation - essentially,
variable domain version of S5.
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w1 : a
w2 :

b

w3 : d

c

Suppose that the worlds and objects depicted are the only ones that are, and
that P is true of a, b, and d at their respective worlds, but not c. Then P a is
true at w1 . But at w2 , P b is false, since b’s counterpart at w3 is c; and since b
is the counterpart of a in w2 , P a is false at w1 . (Priest, 2008, 340)
Similarly, P a ⊃ ♦P a fails as well.

So while counterpart theory might avoid the problems of transworld identities, it does not
seem like we are out of the woods just yet. There are still significant issues that this theory
faces, to which we are right to demand resolution. I argue that if the Many Worlds Interpretation is true, these issues can be resolved within in it with a reimagined theory of Many
Worlds Counterparts.

5.3

A New Kind of Counterpart

Transworld identities are plagued by their commitment to transitivity. Counterpart Theory
falls short because of the lack of transitivity and symmetry, and problematic dependence on
qualitative similarity. It would seem that we are at an impasse. But what if we could have
a theory in which the modal relation is both transitive and symmetric, but doesn’t have to
live up to the requirements of identity? One which doesn’t depend on qualitative similarity?
That is, a theory of transitive, symmetric counterparts – one where similarity is quantified
by proximity, and not identity, is transitive and symmetric. This is what I will argue for in
this section.
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5.3.1

Many Worlds, Many Entities

There is a natural question that arises when considering the identity of entities over time
within the Many Worlds Interpretation: If the relationship between very similar entities in
different branches (different “worlds”) is not one of identity, then what is it?
Perhaps it isn’t anything. Or at least, it isn’t anything in the sense that there isn’t any
relationship here between these non-identical entities that is anything special or different
from the relationship between any two non-identical entities, such as my cat and the Empire
State Building. They are two non-identical entities whose relationship isn’t really any more
interesting than that.
But is this really the case with the branching entities within the different worlds of the
Many Worlds Interpretation? It seems as though there’s a bit more going on. Recall our
amoebae from the previous chapter. Amoeba b and amoeba c seem to have a different sort
of relationship than my cat and the Empire State building. For one, amoeba b and amoeba
c are remarkably much more similar to one another; they seem to share almost all the same
properties. Of course, that’s not really surprising. After all, my cat and the Empire State
Building never spatio-temporally overlapped, while amoeba b and amoeba c did (they both
claim amoeba a as one of their temporal parts). And so amoeba b and amoeba c seem to be
much more like Interstate 87 and the New York State Thruway, than like my cat and the
Empire State Building. And there does seem to be a special relationship between these two
roads – one that is more than just simply that of two non-identical entities.
And perhaps that’s the crucial difference here. The simple fact that I-87 and the New
York Thruway share spatio-temporal parts gives them a relationship that is beyond the nonidentity of two random entities. Instead, they stand in some sort of special relation to one
another. I argue that the same is true of those entities who spatio-temporally overlapped
before branching - who have split, so to speak.
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Entities who have overlapping temporal parts stand in a unique relation to one another.
This relationship is not that of identity, as I argued in Chapter 3. But it is not ordinary nonidentity, either. After all, there is unique a shared history and set of experiences (whether
great or small) between these entities.
Moreover, the differences that separate them – that cause these entities to be distinct
– very naturally and plausibly seem to represent the different ways that these individuals
(physically) could have been. Before a split, both entities had the exact same experiences.
It was only after branching that their experiences differed. It seems very natural to look
at that split, and the resultant entities, and feel like those are “alternate paths” that one’s
life could have taken. It’s a way that things could have been for you because until that
differentiation, all the experiences and properties of that individual were yours.
And this idea that these entities and timelines represent alternate realities to ours – that
they are ways that things could have been for the entities in our world (just as we are one
way that things could have been for entities in other worlds) – seems to me a good candidate
for de re modality.

5.3.2

Many Worlds Counterparts

I propose a new kind of counterpart - a Many Worlds Counterpart. As counterparts are
meant to function to evaluate de re modal claims, it seems natural to label those individuals
from whom we’ve branched as our Many Worlds Counterparts, or MWCs. More precisely,
a MWC is any transworld entity with co-located temporal parts. They’re those entities from
whom we’ve branched at some point. These are not transworld identities, because we are
not identical with these entities. Rather, we are merely similar – a hallmark of counterpart
theory.
And about that similarity – similarity can be a quite difficult thing to assess. But here’s
where the Many Worlds Interpretation can come in useful to us once again. We can take
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similarity to be the degree of overlap of any two counterparts. It stands to reason that you are
more similar to those Many Worlds Counterparts from whom you’ve split more recently than
you are to those Many Worlsd Counterparts from whom you’ve split less recently. After all,
up until the moment of splitting, you and your Many Worlds Counterpart(s) have shared
all the same properties. You’ve had all the same experiences, thoughts, hopes, dreams,
disappointments, sensations, and perceptions. And since the Many Worlds Interpretation
only allows for branching, never for converging, you will always share the highest degree of
overlap with the Many World Counterparts from whom you’ve split most recently.
There is an interesting upshot to understanding counterparts and similarity in this way:
the Many Worlds Counterpart relation is symmetric and transitive. Because of the branching
structure given by the Many Worlds Interpretation (which allows for branching, but never
converging) and the requirement that MWCs overlap, it will always be the case that if x is
a Many Worlds Counterpart of y, and y is a Many Worlds Counterpart of z, then x is also a
Many Worlds Counterpart of z since x and y must overlap, and if y and z overlap, then at
some point x and z overlap as well.
It’s also easy enough to see that the MWC relation is symmetric. If x is a Many Worlds
Counterpart to y, then x and y must overlap. And if x and y overlap, that means that y is
also a Many Worlds Counterpart to x.
On this theory of Many Worlds Counterparts, possibility and necessity then work in a
familiar manner. To say that something is possible (de re), is to say that the entity in
question has a MWC of whom it is true. For instance, to claim that ‘George Eliot might
have been a scientist’, is to claim that George Eliot has a Many Worlds Counterpart who
is a scientist. To say that something is necessary (de re) is to say that it is true of all of
the individual’s MWCs. For instance, it is necessary that George Eliot has the biological
parents that she does, as George Eliot has no MWCs with different biological parents (since
MWCs must overlap).
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We can also time-index possibility and necessity claims. While the Many Worlds Interpretation paints an entirely deterministic picture of the universe, some may argue that some
of our modal claims reflect a certain kind of temporal indeterminacy. For example, suppose
that you purchase a lottery ticket for a drawing tomorrow. It seems reasonable to claim at
the time that you purchase the ticket that it is possible (however unlikely) that you will win.
Afterall, on the Many Worlds picture, there is likely (at least) one individual continuous with
the one who purchased the lottery ticket and who does, in fact, win. But there is also likely
(at least) one individual continuous with the one who purchased the lottery ticket and who
does not win. Timelessly, we have (at least) two unique individuals, one who wins and one
who doesn’t. But at the time of the purchase, those individuals overlap – they have the exact
same properties and experiences. Thus, it seems that there is some sort of indeterminacy at
the time of buying the lottery ticket.
And this analysis of possibility can capture that indeterminacy through time-indexing.
We can say that at the time of purchasing the ticket, it is possible that you win the lottery, as
there is (at least) one individual that is continuous with the one who purchased the lottery
ticket that wins. Even if the next day you do not actually win, and thus it is not possible
that you won (because you didn’t), we can still truly say that at the time of purchase, it
was possible that you will win the lottery. Timelessly, some individual wins the lottery that
has, as a proper temporal part, that experience of purchasing the lottery ticket and winning.
That may or may not be you when all is said and done. But at the time of purchase, there
is a real possibility that the person who does win is you.

Once we’ve reconceptualized counterparts and similarity in this way, the challenges that
Lewis’s counterparts face go away.
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5.3.3

Humphrey Objection Revisited

Recall that Kripke (1972) objects to Lewis’s Counterpart Theory on the basis that, according
to Counterpart Theory, if we say “Humphrey might have won the election,” we are not
talking about something that might have happened to Humphrey, but to someone else, a
“counterpart”. And this strikes Kripke as incredibly bizarre.
As I noted earlier, this objection very quickly reaches an impasse, with Lewis claiming
that the property of possibly winning the election just is the property of the counterpart,
and Kripke insisting that this analysis is conceptually flawed. While Kripke’s objection
might miss the bullseye, it doesn’t feel like it misses the target entirely. It does seem rather
bizarre that what might or might not be for you is determined by some other individual. And
moreover - one with whom you have no causal interaction whatsoever. You’ve never met this
person, never talked to them, not a single particle of your body has - or ever will - interact
with a single particle of theirs, ever. And yet, somehow this individual determines your
modal properties. It is a strangley intimate relationship with someone (many someones!)
with whom you have no interaction whatsoever!
Many Worlds Counterparts are able to answer this intimacy problem. Though you are not
identical with your MWCs - it’s still someone else who determines your modal properties
- they are not completely foreign to you, either. At some point, you shared experiences,
thoughts, fears, desires, physical space; you literally shared a body and all that comes with
that. At some point, you had the most intimate of relationships with your MWCs. So it
doesn’t seem quite as strange that these persons - persons with whom you’ve literally shared
part of your life - should stand in such an intimate relationship to you as to determine your
modal properties.
Furthermore, it makes sense that this is the particular role they play. When we make
claims about what might have happened to you, which alternate courses that your life might
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have taken, we typially imagine your life up until a certain crucial juncture, and then consider
what it would be like if, at that juncture, something different had happened. And this is
exactly what MWCs are. They are individuals who entirely shared your life until a particular
moment in which something different happened to them than happened to you. They are
your “might haves” because, until you branched, you were indistinguishable. And the lives
your MWCs now lead feel as though they are lives you could have led - they are what might
have been for you - because persons with all your same experiences up until those crucial
junctures led them.
And so we can respond to Kripke’s Humphrey objection. When we say that “Humphrey
might have won the election”, we are talking about something that might have happened to
Humphrey. Sure, the truthmaker for the claim isn’t Humphrey himself - it is one (or more)
of Humphrey’s Many Worlds Counterparts. But this isn’t abhorrent because Humphrey
shares a very large proper part with those MWCs. He stands in the appropriate intimate
relationship with those MWCs, and for all intents and purposes, lived their lives. Obviously, Humphrey doesn’t win the election. And so winning the election is not a property of
Humphrey. But it seems reasonable to say that might having won the election is a property
of Humphrey just in case another individual with whom, up until some point close to the
election, Humphrey indistinguishably shared his life, wins. When we say that “Humphrey
might have won the election” (if only he had done such-and-such) we are asserting that there
is someone who had the exact same life as Humphrey except that he did such-and-such, and
won. We are asserting that Humphrey has a Many Worlds Counterpart who won.

5.3.4

Lost in Translation Revisited

Feldman (1971)’s critique of Lewis’s Counterpart Theory relies on the claim that there are
farily standard modal sentences of English for which Counterpart Theory should provide a
translation, but cannot. Sentences like:
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(5.1) I could have been quite unlike what I in fact am.
(5.3) I could have been more like what you in fact are than like what I in fact
am, and at the same time, you could have been more like what I in fact am
than like what you in fact are.
The apparent problem with translating such sentences using the Counterpart Theoretic
framework is that the translations cannot be true, while the sentences themselves seem
like they might be true. Thus, Feldman argues, Counterpart Theory cannot be the correct.
As I noted previously, Lewis may respond to Feldman’s argument by simply insisting
that Feldman is wrong in his analysis regarding the truth values of (5.1) and (5.3); like
their translations, they cannot be true. Any suspicion that they might be true is simply a
misunderstanding of possible space. It shouldn’t be hard to see how this quickly devolves
into a stalemate of intutions, each side doing little more than insisting on their viewpoint.
But Many Worlds Counterparts provides clear truthvalues for (5.1) and (5.3), thereby
ending the stalemate. (5.1) is true just in case you have a MWC who is quite unlike you,
and false otherwise. (5.3) is true just in case there is a world where I have a MWC that is
more like you than me, and in that same world, you have a MWC that is more like me than
you, and false otherwise.
At first, this might seem no different from Lewis’s analysis. But what differentiates
MWCs from Lewis’s Counterpart Theory is in how counterparts are picked out in worlds.
For Lewis, your counterpart (should you have one) is the individual in that world who is most
(and sufficiently) similar to you. This causes problems when translating Feldman’s sentences,
because in order for them to be true, you must have a counterpart who is quite unlike you
- and by definition, those individuals are not your counterparts. But MWC doesn’t face
this same challenge, since being the most (and sufficiently) similar is no longer the criterion
for counterparthood. An individual is your Many Worlds Counterpart just in case you have
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a spatio-temporal overlapping proper part. It stands to reason that those individuals with
whom you have very large overlapping proper parts are quite similar to you; but this is not a
necessary condition. And certainly there doesn’t seem any reason to preclude the possibility
that you might have a MWC that is quite unlike you, either due to branching long ago, or
some traumatic life-altering event for instance. Feldman is right in asserting that (5.1) might
be true; but he’s wrong in asserting that its translation cannot be so. Of course, it might
also turn out that you do not, in fact, have any MWCs quite unlike you after all. Perhaps
the possible space for your life is rather narrow. In this case, both (5.1) and its translation
would be false.
The same goes for (5.3). There is a simple fact of the matter as to whether (5.3) is true or
false, and it is given to us by the wave function of the Universe. (5.3)’s translation into Many
Worlds Counterpart Theory does not preclude it from being true, nor is it self-contradictory.
The truth value of (5.3) depends entirely on the physical state of the Universe. The truth
value of (5.3) is not decided by arguing intuitions; it is a simple fact of physics.

5.3.5

Propositional Properties Revisited

Lewis’s Counterpart Theory played havoc with the propositional properties of modal logic
(Priest, 2008). Before, even in V Kν , we saw that it is possible to build a model where
P a ⊃ P a failed. But Many Worlds Counterparts offers us a transitive, symmetric
conception of the counterpart relation which resolves this tension. Within Many Worlds
Counterpart Theory, for any model in where P a, we find that P a holds as well.
Consider the model given by Priest wherein we have three worlds - w1 , w2 , w3 - and four
objects - a, b, c, d - and P is true of a, b, and d, but not c. Then, Priest shows, we can
construct a model,
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w1 : a
w2 :

b

w3 : d

c

where P a ⊃ P a fails. P a is true at w1 since all the worlds accessible to w1 have
a counterpart of a in which P is true of that counterpart (a’s counterpart at w2 is b, and P
is true of b; a’s counterpart at w3 is d and P is true of d). But at w2 , P b is false, as b’s
counterpart at w3 is c, and P is not true of c. And since b is a’s counterpart, and c is b’s
counterpart, we have a model in which P a ⊃ P a fails.
But within my Many Worlds Counterpart Theory, we see that P a ⊃ P a does in
fact hold, and the model Priest constructs as a counterexample no longer works. To see
this, we have to consider the entire temporal extension of these worlds, since the Many
Worlds Counterpart relation depends on having a spatio-temporal overlapping history. To
create Priest’s model, there are four possible initial conditions to consider with respect to
the entities a, b, c, and d that could produce these three worlds and their objects, we might
begin with one, two, three, or four separate objects at t0 .
Two Objects
Suppose that at t0 , there are two objects, abd and c. One possible history is that the world at
t0 branches to form two worlds at t1 , one containing one object, ab, and another containing
two objects, d and c. Another branching occurs at t1 , producing our three worlds at t2 , w1 ,
w2 , and w3 , and four objects, a ∈ w1 , b ∈ w2 , and c, d ∈ w3 . Recall that in these three
worlds, P a, P b, P d, and ¬P c.
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(1)

abd,c

(2)

ab

t0
d,c

(3)

a

b

(4)

w1

w2

t1
t2

(5)

d,c

(6)

w3

Now what can we say about P a and P a?
P a is true. In w2 , b is a MWC of a (they overlap from t0 to t1 ), and P b; and in w3 , d
is a MWC of a (they overlap at t0 ) and P d. But unlike previously, P a is also true. b’s
MWCs are a in w1 and d in w3 , and P a and P d, respectively. d’s MWCs are a in w1 and b
in w2 , and P a and P b, respectively. Thus, P a ⊃ P a for this model.
Note that we avoid the problem that this model posed for Lewisian Counterparts because
c is a MWC to no other objects; on this history of the model, c never overlaps any of the
other objects, and so is never considered a MWC of any of them (nor does c have any MWCs
of its own). Thus, we avoid any problems brought on by the fact that ¬P c.
Of course, this is just one combination possible initial conditions that could produce the
model Priest presents. We might start with a different set of two objects such as {abc, d}.
Suppose we have two objects at t0 , abc and d. Branching occurs, and at t1 , we have ab
on one branch and c and d on another branch. Branching occurs again, and at t2 , we once
more have three worlds and four objects, a ∈ w1 , b ∈ w2 , and c, d ∈ w3 , where P a, P b, P d,
and ¬P c at their respective worlds, just as before.
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(1)

abc,d

(2)

ab

t0
c,d

(3)

a

b

(4)

w1

w2

t1
t2

(5)

c,d

(6)

w3

Does P a ⊃ P a hold?
In this instance, it’s pretty easy to see that P a ⊃ P a holds vacuously. P is false.
c is a MWC to a (they overlap at t0 ), and ¬P c at w3 , so ¬P a.
We could also look at these two combinations and consider a different branching history
- perhaps one where we have {abd, c} at t0 , and a branches off at t1 , but b doesn’t branch
off until t2 :
(1)
(2)

abd,c
a

t0
bd,c

t1

(3)

b

d,c

(4)

w2

w3

(5)

a

(6)

w1

t2

And we see that P a ⊃ P a still holds as before, since c is not a MWC to a.
In fact, the particular history of how abd splits to a, b, and d doesn’t really matter. As
long as a, b, and d overlapped at some point, they are Many Worlds Counterparts to each
other. And if they never overlapped, as is the case with c, they are not. Because the Many
Worlds Interpretation allows only for fission of branches, and never for fusion of branches,
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simply knowing which objects overlap at t0 is enough to evaluate whether P a ⊃ P a
holds in the three-world model that Priest gives us, as it is broadest point of overlap of all
our objects. Knowing which objects we have at t0 , and what worlds and objects therein exist
at some tn , we are able to evaluate whether P a ⊃ P a holds, regardless of the particular
branching history from t0 to tn . Thus, we can readily evaluate the remainder of our possible
initial combinations.
There are seven possible combinations of a, b, c, and d such that we have two objects at
t0 . We’ve already seen that P a ⊃ P a holds for both {abd, c}, and {abc, d}, the former
because a and c are not MWCs, and the latter holds vacuously because they are. This will
remain true for the remaining two-object combinations: {a, bcd}; {ab, cd}; {ad, bc} all hold
because a are not MWCs, and so ¬P c poses no threat to P a; and {acd, b}; {ac, bd} both
hold vacuously becuase ¬P a.
If we have just two objects at t0 , P a ⊃ P a holds.
Three Objects
Perhaps we have three objects at t0 . There are several possible combinations: {ab, c, d};
{ad, b, c}; {a, bc, d}; {a, bd, c}; {a, b, cd}; {ac, b, d}.
Let’s suppose we have the three objects ab, c, and d at t0 . Branching occurs (however
many times necessary), and at some tn we have our by-now familiar model with of worlds,
w1 , w2 , w3 ; and four objects a, b, c, d; where a ∈ w1 , b ∈ w2 , and c, d ∈ w3 .
(1)

ab,c,d
..
.

(2)

t0

(3)

a

b

d,c

(4)

w1

w2

w3

tn

P a is true at w1 because a’s only counterparts are b and itself, and P a and P b. P a
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is true because b’s only counterparts are a and itself, and P a and P b. Thus, P a ⊃ P a
holds.
We could, of course, have a different set of three objects at t0 - we might have {ad, b, c};
{a, bc, d}; {a, bd, c}; {a, b, cd}. It should quickly become apparent that, just as with our
two-object combinations, if a and c do not overlap at t0 (combinations {a, bc, d}; {a, bd, c};
{a, b, cd}), then P a ⊃ P a holds since c is never a MWC to a, and if a and c do overlap
at t0 (combination {ac, b, d}), then P a ⊃ P a holds vacuously.
In fact, we see that the particular number of objects we have at t0 matters very little. No
matter the number of objects we begin with: if a and c overlap at t0 , then P a ⊃ P a
holds vacuously; if they do not, then P a ⊃ P a holds because c is not a counterpart to
a. Whether we have two, three, one, or four objects (as we will see momentarily) at t0 , it
only matters whether a and c overlap.

Four Objects
Consider the situation whereby we have four objects at t0 : a, a, c, d. It should be readily
apparant by now that P a ⊃ P a will hold, as a does not overlap with any other objects,
so has no MWCs other than itself, and P a. Thus, P a ⊃ P a is trivially true.
One Object
Finally, we might also have just a single object at t0 , abcd. No matter how the branching
occurs, a will have c as a MWC, and ¬P c, thus P a is false and so P a ⊃ P a holds.
And this is generally true for every possible history of this model. Because the Many
Worlds Counterpart relation is transitive, it will always be the case that either: a overlaps
with c at t0 , and so c is a MWC of a in which case ¬P a; or a doesn’t overlap with c at any
point, and so c is not a MWC of a.
So P a ⊃ P a holds.
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5.3.6

Chisholm’s Paradox Revisited

We’ve now seen that Many Worlds Counterparts are able to overcome the criticism that
Lewis’s Counterpart Theory faces. Moreover, MWC also successfully avoids several of the
challenges facing transworld identities.
Chisholm’s Paradox (Chisholm, 1967) demands the existence of non-trivial individual
essences in order to avoid commitment to bare identities (remember that the prospects for
such non-trivial individual essences are bleak, at best). But Many Worlds Counterparts
manages to avoid these tricky situations.
Recall that Chisholm’s world-switching paradox claimed that, via a series of small steps
in which we agree that it’s possible that Adam was a little bit more like Noah that he actually
was, and Noah a little bit more like Adam than he actually was, we end up asserting that
there is a possible world which (i.e. it’s possible that) is a duplicate of the actual world
except for the fact that in this world Adam plays the role of Noah, and Noah the role of
Adam. And for the proponents of transworld identities, this is intolerable.
But Many Worlds Counterparts doesn’t have this role-switching problem. Remember
that the only properties possible of Adam are those properties for which Adam has a MWC
with those properties. And in order to be a MWC of Adam, there must be some time where
the MWC and Adam overlap. (Likewise for Noah.) This means there must be some set of
properties shared by Adam and all of his MWCs. And while it’s possible (and very likely)
that Adam has MWCs who have some of the same properties that Noah has, we will never
get the role-switching that occurs with transworld identities since Adam and Noah never
overlap. There is no Adam MWC with all of Noah’s properties, because then it wouldn’t
be a MWC to Adam. So there is no possible world in which Adam exists with all of Noah’s
properties, and Noah exists with all of Adam’s properties.
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5.3.7

Wiggins Revisited

We can now respond to the objection leveled at perdurantism from the beginning of the last
chapter. Recall that Wiggins (1980) claims that an object has different modal properties from
the summation of temporal slices with which perdurantism identifies those objects. Thus,
by the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the identification with the entire temporal extension of
an object that perdurantism makes must be mistaken:
Anything that is part of a Lesniewskian sum [a mereological whole defined by
its parts] is necessarily a part of it. . . But no person or normal material object is
necessarily in the total state that will correspond to the person- or object-moment
postulated by the theory under discussion. (Wiggins, 1980, 168)
In other words, Wiggins argues, I might have died when I was five years old. But that
maximal summation of person-stages which, according to perdurance theory, is me and has
a temporal extent of at least thirty years, could not have had a temporal extent of a mere
five years. So, the argument goes, I cannot be such a summation of stages.
Putting this into argument form, Wiggin’s objection looks something like this:
P1 I might have died when I was five years old.
P2 According to perdurance theory, the maximal summation of person-stages
which is me has a temporal extent of at least thirty years.
C1 Given P2, the maximal summation of person-stages which is me could not
have had a temporal extent of a mere five years.
C2 Given P1 - C1, I cannot be such a summation of stages.
With our new understanding of Many Worlds Counterparts, we are now prepared to
respond to this argument.
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P1 is true according to Many Worlds Counterpart Theory if and only if I have a MWC
who died when she was five years old. This is to say that there is some individual with whom
I overlapped before branching, and that individual died at the age of five. If there is no such
individual – if I don’t have a MWC that died at five – then the argument fails right away.
But let’s suppose that this isn’t the case, and I do have a MWC who dies when she is five
years old. Then P1 is acceptable.
P2 follows from the definition of perdurantism.
Yet, I argue that C1 does not. While it is the case that, according to perdurance theory,
the maximal summation of person-stages which is me does not have a temporal extent of a
mere five years, perdurance theory itself makes no claims about what could have been. For
that, we need some sort of theory of modality in order to tell us what could (or could not)
have happened.
And here, I offer Many Worlds Counterparts to fill in the gap. Many Worlds Counterparts
tell us that how we evaluate what is possible – that is to say, what could or might happen
or could have or might have happened – is by checking in with our MWCs. A property is
possible of a iff either a has that property, or else a MWC to a has that property. Given
that I do not have a temporal extent of a mere five years does not rule out the possibility
that I might have had a temporal extent of a mere five years. As long as I have a MWC
who dies at five years old, then it will be the case that I might have had a temporal extent
of a mere five years even though, in fact, I do not. Thus, I reject C1. The restriction on my
modal properties does not follow from the fact of my indicative ones.
This allows us to also reject C2. Since there is no difference in modal properties between
myself and the summation of my stages, the claim that, according to Leibniz’s Law, the
identification of myself with the summation of my stages is mistaken, does not hold.
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Many Worlds Counterparts provides us with an analysis of modal possibility, while also
answering one of the foremost challenges leveled against perdurantism. It avoids the pitfalls
that plague transworld identities and the modal weirdness that plagues Lewis’s Counterpart
Theory. But what is the cost?

5.4

Objections

My argument here is embedded within the physical framework of the Many Worlds Interpretation. As I have discussed in earlier chapters, there are independent reasons for taking
the Many Worlds Interpretation to be the true theory of quantum physics (as far as we
know). That the Many Worlds Interpretation provides us with a framework which we can
then employ to understand and evaluate metaphysical commitments such as modal claims
seems only to strengthen the case in favor of it.
My intention in this dissertation was to examine the metaphysics of identity within
the Many Worlds Interpretation. So naturally, my arguments here are embedded within
that framework. Discussing identity or counterpart theory outside of the Many Worlds
Interpretation is simply not aim of the this project.
Still, some may argue that my theory’s embeddedness within the Many Worlds Interpretation framework makes it less attractive. After all, the driving force for reconceptualizing
counterparts in the way that I suggest is the physical picture of a branching universe given
to us by the Many Worlds Interpretation. Without this picture, one may argue, my theory
falls apart.
Surely, as I am convinced that the Many Worlds Interpretation is the best theory of
quantum physics that we have so far, I do not have a lot of interest in attempting to theorize
about modal claims within some other context. As such, I will not attempt to defend Many
Worlds Counterparts against such an objection. However, I will offer this: the mere claim
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that Many Worlds Counterparts is theory-laden should not be so swiftly considered as a point
against me. Upon closer inspection, any conception of transworld identities or counterparts
will turn out to be theory-laden. Indeed, it’s incredibly difficult (if not impossible) to do any
sort of metaphysics without having some sort of underlying theory of the physical universe.
Here I’ve just been more transparent about what my commitments are. While I will not
attempt to remove the Many Worlds framework and map Many Worlds Counterparts onto an
alternate theory of quantum physics, that does not entail that it cannot be done. Perhaps
the same moves I make here can be justified within another framework; I do not know.
As I said before, it is not my interest to attempt this, and it is outside the scope of this
dissertation. But that does not mean that it cannot be done. Thus, I will set aside this
particular objection and instead address some of the other, more interesting, criticisms.

5.4.1

It’s Not Enough

Another objection to Many Worlds Counterparts is that the theory is too narrow, as it only
offers an analysis of physical possibility without accounting for other types of possibility such
as metaphysical or logical possibility. Because the theory is tied to a physically possible (and
actualized) system (i.e. Many Worlds Interpretation), Many Worlds Counterparts, at best,
only describes that which is physically possible and neglects the other realms of possibility
that we are often interested in.
While this observation is posed as an objection, I’m unconvinced that it really is one. We
began by dealing with de re possibility. And, I contend, it seems quite natural to limit talk
of de re possibility to physically possible worlds. After all, any world which is not physically
possible would be so vastly different from our world that we have no reason to think that
whatever individuals exist there have any relation to those that exist here. It seems that
what is of interest in evaluating de re possibility is confined to the physically possible sphere.
Even so, one may counter that Many Worlds Counterparts doesn’t fully account for the
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sphere of physical possibility, either. When we consider the space of the physically possible,
we typically characterize this space as what is possible given the laws of physics. And while
it’s clear that the many worlds of the Many Worlds Interpretation certainly fits into this
space, it’s not clear that it exhausts this space. After all, what actually happens in the
physical universe is not determined solely by the physical laws; one must also supply a
set of initial conditions in order to produce a history. And this is what the worlds of the
Many Worlds Interpretation are – just one possible (maximal) history given the physical
laws and a certain set of initial conditions. But had the initial conditions been different,
though the laws remain the same, we’d have a different set of resultant worlds and thus
a different understanding of what is physically possible. Thus, the objector claims, Many
Worlds Counterparts doesn’t deliver on giving us a complete analysis of physical possibility.
This objection is rather interesting, and not at all clear whether it’s true.
It’s not obvious whether the Universe could have had different initial conditions. It’s
tempting to think of the Universe as the output we get when we take the Schrödinger
equation, input some values (i.e. initial conditions), and press ‘go’. (And if that’s the correct
picture, then the Many Worlds Interpretation doesn’t account for all of physical possibility;
it only gives one maximal history of the Universe.) But this strikes me as perhaps putting
the cart before the horse. This picture seems to presuppose that the physical laws enjoy
an existence independent from the Universe itself. They exist ontologically prior to the
Universe, which then is formed from them. And that’s a bit strange.
While I don’t doubt that someone holds the belief that the laws of physics exist independent from the Universe itself (perhaps they are the mind of God or some such), this does
not seem to be the standard position. On the contrary, it seems that the typical treatment
of the laws of physics regards them as a part of the Universe. They are deeply embedded
within the Universe, and some would even claim, simply supervene on the facts of the Universe. The laws of physics are not entities that enjoy an existence apart from a Universe
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that instantiates them. And if this is the case, then the picture we have of the Universe as
the output of plugging initial conditions into the laws, is mistaken.
Once we’ve let go of this way of thinking of laws and initial conditions, it becomes
incredibly unclear whether the Universe could have been any different. What does it mean
to say that the Universe might have had different initial conditions but the same physical
laws? After all, it is the Universe that exists that has produced the physical laws we have.
Nonetheless - but keeping in mind this skepticism, of course - let’s give the objector the
benefit of the doubt that the Many Worlds Universe - and thus Many Worlds Counterparts
- doesn’t occupy the whole of the space of physical possibility. It seems that there might be
some de re possibilities left unaccounted for by Many Worlds Counterparts.
For example, we might think that,
(5.4) I could have been conceived, from the same gametes, one second earlier than
I, in fact, was.
is true. But Many Worlds Counterparts is unable to account for this truth. Recall that de
re modal possibility is determined by the having of at least one Many Worlds Counterpart
who has the property in question - in this case, my having of a Many Worlds Counterpart
that was conceived one second earlier than I, in fact, was. Also recall that by definition,
Many Worlds Counterparts have overlapping spatiotemporal parts. And in a Universe that
only allows for branching, never for converging, this means that at the very least, I must
share spatiotemporal origins with all of my Many Worlds Counterparts. Thus, if we take
conception to be my spatiotemporal origins (and we have no reason not to), then Many
Worlds Counterparts tells us that (5.4) is false. And this might strike us as incorrect.
There are a couple of possible responses here. First, and perhaps most obvious, is to
simply bite the bullet and concede that despite its prima facie appeal, (5.4) is simply not
true. I could not have been conceived any earlier than I was. My spatiotemporal origins,
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not just my biological origins, are essential to me. And that might mean that there is an
individual in another world that is very similar to me, but is not one of my Many Worlds
Counterparts! But that’s okay, as Many Worlds Counterparts do not rely on qualitative
similarity for modal analysis.
I’m tempted to adopt this response. While I see the appeal of (5.4), it also doesn’t strike
me as a glaringly obvious, either. This is a possibility about which I’m willing to say that
we might just be mistaken in thinking that it is true - it happens. Furthermore, it seems to
be a one-off variety. Only statements about possibilities concerning origin are problematic.
And origin statements seem to be a fuzzy area where our intuitions breakdown sooner than
they do elsewhere. If Many Worlds Counterparts entail that (5.4) is false, then so be it.
But there is another response that has been suggested to me that is interesting. Suppose
that the Universe instantiates only one possible physical history (again, I’m quite skeptical
of this, but nonetheless). The Many Worlds Interpretation gives us one maximal set of
physically possible worlds for this one possible universal history. We might then posit that
there are other universes just like ours, one for each set of possible initial conditions, each
of which comprise their own set of worlds. The set of all the universes then constitute the
whole of physically possible space. We could go on to define some sort of meta-possibility
that relates the worlds of our Universe with worlds in other Universes, in hopes of accounting
for the likes of (5.4).
While this is an interesting - and certainly fun - suggestion, it also strikes me as ontologically extravagant (some might think ironically so). We have moved from an infinity of worlds
to an infinity of universes. And while the difference in magnitude is certainly notable, it’s
not the sheer increase in the number of worlds per se that is concerning. Rather, it’s that
we’ve multiplied universes without any empirical basis for doing so. The Many Worlds of
the Many Worlds Interpretation are not just posited from our imagination; we find evidence
for their existence within our best science. The same cannot be said of these universes. We
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have no evidence to suggest that they exist - indeed, it’s not clear what evidence we even
could have for their existence. So while the Many Universe theory might be promising sci-fi
fodder, I cannot argue for it here.

In this dissertation, I have attempted to consider what comes of taking seriously the idea
that our best scientific theories tell us something about the world. Specifically, I have asked
us to start by supposing that the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is true.
If so, then the branching individuals described by the Many Worlds Universe raise questions
about the nature of identity over time. If we wish to preserve our notion of strict numerical identity, then I’ve argued that we ought to adopt a perdurantist account of identity one which identifies individuals with the maximal summation of their temporal parts - in
the context of such a branching Universe structure. Furthermore, I’ve considered questions
regarding the nature of possibility, and the modal relationship that the other worlds of the
Many Worlds Universe have to our own. In doing so, I’ve developed a novel account of counterpart theory - Many Worlds Counterparts - that provides an analysis for de re physical
possibility that grows out of the framework of the Many Worlds Interpretation itself. My
aim here was not to defend the Many Worlds Interpretation, so much as to give it the benefit
of the doubt, and ask what comes of it if we do. And to this end, I believe I have put forth
a promising account of identity and physical possibility for consideration.
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